Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 66
... enemy had given fair warning , and a major source of frustration was the failure of all responsible leaders in the Truman administration to expect the worst from that enemy . The domestic " vilifiers " of the administration were a ...
... enemy had given fair warning , and a major source of frustration was the failure of all responsible leaders in the Truman administration to expect the worst from that enemy . The domestic " vilifiers " of the administration were a ...
Page 105
... enemy victory and convincing him that he would not win , the thrust became defeating the enemy in the South . The Department of Defense study suggests that when the decision was made to increase American forces in 1965 , perhaps " no ...
... enemy victory and convincing him that he would not win , the thrust became defeating the enemy in the South . The Department of Defense study suggests that when the decision was made to increase American forces in 1965 , perhaps " no ...
Page 152
... enemy Stereotypes of the enemy as evil , weak , and stupid - which were so much in evidence during the White House discussions of the Bay of Pigs decision- seldom , if ever , were voiced after the bitter anger of the opening session of ...
... enemy Stereotypes of the enemy as evil , weak , and stupid - which were so much in evidence during the White House discussions of the Bay of Pigs decision- seldom , if ever , were voiced after the bitter anger of the opening session of ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House