Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 66
... enemy had given fair warning , and a major source of frustration was the failure of all responsible leaders in the Truman administration to expect the worst from that enemy . The domestic " vilifiers " of the administration were a ...
... enemy had given fair warning , and a major source of frustration was the failure of all responsible leaders in the Truman administration to expect the worst from that enemy . The domestic " vilifiers " of the administration were a ...
Page 105
... enemy victory and convincing him that he would not win , the thrust became defeating the enemy in the South . The Department of Defense study suggests that when the decision was made to increase American forces in 1965 , perhaps " no ...
... enemy victory and convincing him that he would not win , the thrust became defeating the enemy in the South . The Department of Defense study suggests that when the decision was made to increase American forces in 1965 , perhaps " no ...
Page 152
... enemy Stereotypes of the enemy as evil , weak , and stupid - which were so much in evidence during the White House discussions of the Bay of Pigs decision- seldom , if ever , were voiced after the bitter anger of the opening session of ...
... enemy Stereotypes of the enemy as evil , weak , and stupid - which were so much in evidence during the White House discussions of the Bay of Pigs decision- seldom , if ever , were voiced after the bitter anger of the opening session of ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group air strike Allen Dulles alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs blockade bombing Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan issues Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs judgment Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader major Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Nixon North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared sion social Sorensen Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House White House group