Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 107
The evidence shows that even if his main arguments against the quagmire myth
are subsequently verified by fresh evidence about the deliberations of the policy -
makers , his analysis of the major escalation decisions made by the Johnson ...
The evidence shows that even if his main arguments against the quagmire myth
are subsequently verified by fresh evidence about the deliberations of the policy -
makers , his analysis of the major escalation decisions made by the Johnson ...
Page 196
... makers to make biased miscalculations in using evidence about the
consequences of alternative courses of action . ... base rates , relying too much
on evidence from small samples , and failing to discount evidence from biased
samples .
... makers to make biased miscalculations in using evidence about the
consequences of alternative courses of action . ... base rates , relying too much
on evidence from small samples , and failing to discount evidence from biased
samples .
Page 273
... and harmful procedures and provide solid evidence to keep the good ones
going . By accumulating systematic evidence , they could contribute to the
transformation of effective policy - making from a haphazard art into a cumulative
science .
... and harmful procedures and provide solid evidence to keep the good ones
going . By accumulating systematic evidence , they could contribute to the
transformation of effective policy - making from a haphazard art into a cumulative
science .
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House