Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 77
tion , that certainly the outbreak of war with Japan was to be expected at any
moment after November 27 , but not to be expected at Pearl Harbor . " 2 Kimmel '
s congenial group of advisers As the various warnings were received , each ...
tion , that certainly the outbreak of war with Japan was to be expected at any
moment after November 27 , but not to be expected at Pearl Harbor . " 2 Kimmel '
s congenial group of advisers As the various warnings were received , each ...
Page 214
A central theme of Dean ' s book about his role in Watergate , Blind Ambition , is
that he valued his membership in the top White House group to such an extent
that he was willing to suppress his misgivings and do whatever was expected of ...
A central theme of Dean ' s book about his role in Watergate , Blind Ambition , is
that he valued his membership in the top White House group to such an extent
that he was willing to suppress his misgivings and do whatever was expected of ...
Page 304
A similar interaction effect would also be expected for symptoms of groupthink ,
such that the effect of lack of norms requiring methodical procedures might have
little or no effect on the eight symptoms ( listed in box C in Figure 10 - 1 ) when
the ...
A similar interaction effect would also be expected for symptoms of groupthink ,
such that the effect of lack of norms requiring methodical procedures might have
little or no effect on the eight symptoms ( listed in box C in Figure 10 - 1 ) when
the ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House