Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 106
... fact that conferees find them- selves in a crisis and realize they are facing the possibility of defeat does not preclude a strong element of wishful thinking and even a strong dose of over- optimism about limited hopes such as escaping ...
... fact that conferees find them- selves in a crisis and realize they are facing the possibility of defeat does not preclude a strong element of wishful thinking and even a strong dose of over- optimism about limited hopes such as escaping ...
Page 285
... fact that with initiative and darkness a river can be crossed ; the fact that there were no other diplomatic channels open to the Chinese - that there was no other way for them to deliver their threat if they had been serious - these facts ...
... fact that with initiative and darkness a river can be crossed ; the fact that there were no other diplomatic channels open to the Chinese - that there was no other way for them to deliver their threat if they had been serious - these facts ...
Page 324
... fact . . . was the worst ' : Ibid . " Who do you . . . down " and " totally cut off " and " The White House . . . the Watergate thing " : Ibid . " to hide ... White House ' : Ibid . " He's awfully close . . . Haldeman now " and ...
... fact . . . was the worst ' : Ibid . " Who do you . . . down " and " totally cut off " and " The White House . . . the Watergate thing " : Ibid . " to hide ... White House ' : Ibid . " He's awfully close . . . Haldeman now " and ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House