Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 56
The warning was repeated on October 3 , this time relayed to Washington
through the Indian ambassador to China , who stated that “ if the U . N . forces
crossed the 38th parallel China would send in troops to help the North Koreans .
The warning was repeated on October 3 , this time relayed to Washington
through the Indian ambassador to China , who stated that “ if the U . N . forces
crossed the 38th parallel China would send in troops to help the North Koreans .
Page 64
been attained partly because the military members of the group did not voice
their continuing concern about the vulnerability of MacArthur ' s widely dispersed
forces . Evidently the military members of the advisory group did not think the
risks ...
been attained partly because the military members of the group did not voice
their continuing concern about the vulnerability of MacArthur ' s widely dispersed
forces . Evidently the military members of the advisory group did not think the
risks ...
Page 278
Had the plan called for direct intervention by United States military forces , it
undoubtedly would have been rejected by the ... Sorensen points out that “ had
the U . S . Navy and Air Force been openly committed , no defeat would have
been ...
Had the plan called for direct intervention by United States military forces , it
undoubtedly would have been rejected by the ... Sorensen points out that “ had
the U . S . Navy and Air Force been openly committed , no defeat would have
been ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House