Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 243
selit n that all cessful executives react when they become involved in two - week
workshops in group relations training suggest that none is immune to groupthink
Even individuals who are generally high in self - esteem and low in dependency
...
selit n that all cessful executives react when they become involved in two - week
workshops in group relations training suggest that none is immune to groupthink
Even individuals who are generally high in self - esteem and low in dependency
...
Page 275
Is a little knowledge of groupthink a dangerous thing ? Even if we had more than
a little knowledge of groupthink , my answer to this question would be a
categorical “ yes ” if we have in mind a naive person in a position of power who
might be ...
Is a little knowledge of groupthink a dangerous thing ? Even if we had more than
a little knowledge of groupthink , my answer to this question would be a
categorical “ yes ” if we have in mind a naive person in a position of power who
might be ...
Page 299
Groupthink , according to Longley and Pruitt , can be thought of as a decision
process that suffers from too much integration too soon , at the cost of too little
differentiation . Longley and Pruitt also emphasize the obvious point that
premature ...
Groupthink , according to Longley and Pruitt , can be thought of as a decision
process that suffers from too much integration too soon , at the cost of too little
differentiation . Longley and Pruitt also emphasize the obvious point that
premature ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House