Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 137
President Kennedy ' s initial decision to resort to some form of coercive action to
get rid of the missiles in Cuba may have failed to meet some of these criteria .
Had he not precluded the alternative of relying upon the traditional methods of ...
President Kennedy ' s initial decision to resort to some form of coercive action to
get rid of the missiles in Cuba may have failed to meet some of these criteria .
Had he not precluded the alternative of relying upon the traditional methods of ...
Page 145
President Kennedy ' s initial decision ( before the first meeting of the Executive
Committee ) was that some form of coercive action would have to be taken to
eliminate the missile threat . This judgment has been attacked by a number of
political ...
President Kennedy ' s initial decision ( before the first meeting of the Executive
Committee ) was that some form of coercive action would have to be taken to
eliminate the missile threat . This judgment has been attacked by a number of
political ...
Page 145
President Kennedy ' s initial decision to resort to some form of coercive action to
get rid of the missiles in Cuba may have failed to meet some of these criteria .
Had he not precluded the alternative of relying upon the traditional methods of ...
President Kennedy ' s initial decision to resort to some form of coercive action to
get rid of the missiles in Cuba may have failed to meet some of these criteria .
Had he not precluded the alternative of relying upon the traditional methods of ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House