Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 17
He did not attend the entire series of formal meetings of the advisory committee
but was brought in as an active participant about four or five days before the
President made his final decision . During that week , according to his
memorandum ...
He did not attend the entire series of formal meetings of the advisory committee
but was brought in as an active participant about four or five days before the
President made his final decision . During that week , according to his
memorandum ...
Page 42
President Kennedy , as leader at the meetings in the White House , was probably
more active than anyone ... At each meeting , instead of opening up the agenda
to permit a full airing of the opposing considerations , he allowed the CIA ...
President Kennedy , as leader at the meetings in the White House , was probably
more active than anyone ... At each meeting , instead of opening up the agenda
to permit a full airing of the opposing considerations , he allowed the CIA ...
Page 322
memory errors , as Neisser ( 1981 ) found when he compared John Dean ' s
testimony about two crucial White House meetings with the unedited transcripts .
( See Note 7 of Chapter 9 for a discussion of Neisser ' s study . ) A few noncrucial
...
memory errors , as Neisser ( 1981 ) found when he compared John Dean ' s
testimony about two crucial White House meetings with the unedited transcripts .
( See Note 7 of Chapter 9 for a discussion of Neisser ' s study . ) A few noncrucial
...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House