Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 106
But because Operation Rolling Thunder was not achieving its original purpose of
breaking the will of the North Vietnamese , its purpose was redefined . The new
objective of the operation was to reduce the flow of men and supplies from the ...
But because Operation Rolling Thunder was not achieving its original purpose of
breaking the will of the North Vietnamese , its purpose was redefined . The new
objective of the operation was to reduce the flow of men and supplies from the ...
Page 180
Drew Middleton ' s military analysis in the New York Times concluded that : Even
if the militants had been overcome and the hostages freed , the noise of the
operation would surely have awakened the neighborhood . Iranian
reinforcements ...
Drew Middleton ' s military analysis in the New York Times concluded that : Even
if the militants had been overcome and the hostages freed , the noise of the
operation would surely have awakened the neighborhood . Iranian
reinforcements ...
Page 282
If the exiles were forced into the mountains as guerrillas , the operation was still a
net gain ( Wyden , p . 308 , italics added ) . Note that Kennedy ' s appraisal , as
summarized by Wyden , is the same as that of the key members of his team who ...
If the exiles were forced into the mountains as guerrillas , the operation was still a
net gain ( Wyden , p . 308 , italics added ) . Note that Kennedy ' s appraisal , as
summarized by Wyden , is the same as that of the key members of his team who ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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