Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 117
We cannot expect to be in a position to evaluate the applicability of the
groupthink hypothesis to the handling of dissenters among Johnson ' s advisers
until more candid observations become available from men who left the group
and from ...
We cannot expect to be in a position to evaluate the applicability of the
groupthink hypothesis to the handling of dissenters among Johnson ' s advisers
until more candid observations become available from men who left the group
and from ...
Page 151
McNamara shared the Attorney General ' s position and added that it was
expedient to select an initial course of action that would enable the United States
government to “ maintain the options ” so as to " leave us in control of events .
McNamara shared the Attorney General ' s position and added that it was
expedient to select an initial course of action that would enable the United States
government to “ maintain the options ” so as to " leave us in control of events .
Page 152
changes of position that occurred while the members were trying to hammer out
an acceptable strategy to resolve the crisis : Abel : “ The fact is that nearly every
man in the room changed his position at least once — some more than once ...
changes of position that occurred while the members were trying to hammer out
an acceptable strategy to resolve the crisis : Abel : “ The fact is that nearly every
man in the room changed his position at least once — some more than once ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House