Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 111
From the beginning , most members of Johnson ' s inner circle probably shared
similar ideological viewpoints on basic issues of foreign policy and domestic
politics . However , all of them probably did not start with the same attitude of ...
From the beginning , most members of Johnson ' s inner circle probably shared
similar ideological viewpoints on basic issues of foreign policy and domestic
politics . However , all of them probably did not start with the same attitude of ...
Page 170
In the policy - appraising committee responsible for approving the Bay of Pigs
invasion , the leader , probably without realizing it , induced the group members
to give the highest priority to preserving group unity by avoiding harsh criticisms
of ...
In the policy - appraising committee responsible for approving the Bay of Pigs
invasion , the leader , probably without realizing it , induced the group members
to give the highest priority to preserving group unity by avoiding harsh criticisms
of ...
Page 246
When appropriate precautions are taken , a group that has become moderately
or highly cohesive probably can do a much better job on its decision - making
tasks than if it had remained noncohesive . Compliance out of fear of
recrimination is ...
When appropriate precautions are taken , a group that has become moderately
or highly cohesive probably can do a much better job on its decision - making
tasks than if it had remained noncohesive . Compliance out of fear of
recrimination is ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
6 other sections not shown
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Common terms and phrases
accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House