Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 16
Arthur Schlesinger , Jr . , in his authoritative history of the Kennedy administration
, recalled that “ Kennedy would sometimes refer incredulously to the Bay of Pigs ,
wondering how a rational and responsible government could ever have ...
Arthur Schlesinger , Jr . , in his authoritative history of the Kennedy administration
, recalled that “ Kennedy would sometimes refer incredulously to the Bay of Pigs ,
wondering how a rational and responsible government could ever have ...
Page 48
It illustrates once again how responsible leaders of a democratic nation can
support each other in making gross errors of judgment that have disastrous
consequences . Victory soon turned into defeat when Communist China
responded by ...
It illustrates once again how responsible leaders of a democratic nation can
support each other in making gross errors of judgment that have disastrous
consequences . Victory soon turned into defeat when Communist China
responded by ...
Page 194
To what extent was the policy a result of defective decision - making procedures
on the part of those who were responsible ? 3 . Can symptoms of groupthink be
discerned in the group ' s deliberations ? ( Do the prime symptoms pervade the ...
To what extent was the policy a result of defective decision - making procedures
on the part of those who were responsible ? 3 . Can symptoms of groupthink be
discerned in the group ' s deliberations ? ( Do the prime symptoms pervade the ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House