Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 55
The resolution was not well planned and did not take account of the risks that
George Kennan had carefully outlined in a memorandum he had submitted to the
Secretary of State . Acheson later admitted : “ The trouble inherent in the
resolution ...
The resolution was not well planned and did not take account of the risks that
George Kennan had carefully outlined in a memorandum he had submitted to the
Secretary of State . Acheson later admitted : “ The trouble inherent in the
resolution ...
Page 282
He shared with them the overoptimistic expectation that the risks of failure and of
embarrassment to the United States government were so slight that they need not
be a deterrent to approving the clandestine operation . Wyden also ...
He shared with them the overoptimistic expectation that the risks of failure and of
embarrassment to the United States government were so slight that they need not
be a deterrent to approving the clandestine operation . Wyden also ...
Page 286
As for the military chiefs ' being reluctant to tell the President about the military
risks , McLellan says that there would be no reason for them to keep the
President ignorant of serious risks of which they were aware " unless we are to
assume the ...
As for the military chiefs ' being reluctant to tell the President about the military
risks , McLellan says that there would be no reason for them to keep the
President ignorant of serious risks of which they were aware " unless we are to
assume the ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House