Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 77
Included were four key men on Kimmel ' s staff with whom he conferred nearly
every day and with whom he usually took his meals — Captains William W .
Smith , Walter DeLany , Charles H . McMorris , and Arthur C . Davis . Also in
attendance ...
Included were four key men on Kimmel ' s staff with whom he conferred nearly
every day and with whom he usually took his meals — Captains William W .
Smith , Walter DeLany , Charles H . McMorris , and Arthur C . Davis . Also in
attendance ...
Page 79
Staff subordinates usually had more impersonal conversations with Kimmel , but
apparently looked up to him with admiration . The fleet operations officer ,
Admiral Good , reported retrospectively that the chief ' ' was grand to work for ...
Staff subordinates usually had more impersonal conversations with Kimmel , but
apparently looked up to him with admiration . The fleet operations officer ,
Admiral Good , reported retrospectively that the chief ' ' was grand to work for ...
Page 162
with a policy - planning staff of his own choosing , to provide a detailed ,
integrated set of policy recommendations . According to Kennan , his group “ was
supposed to review the whole great problem of European recovery in all its
complexity ...
with a policy - planning staff of his own choosing , to provide a detailed ,
integrated set of policy recommendations . According to Kennan , his group “ was
supposed to review the whole great problem of European recovery in all its
complexity ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House