Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 69
First of all , despite his strong advocacy of his own pet ideas at meetings with his
advisers , President Truman on more than one occasion showed his readiness to
accept opposing views of his advisers and to be influenced by them . During the ...
First of all , despite his strong advocacy of his own pet ideas at meetings with his
advisers , President Truman on more than one occasion showed his readiness to
accept opposing views of his advisers and to be influenced by them . During the ...
Page 77
There are strong indications that Kimmel ' s advisers formed a cohesive ingroup
and shared strong feelings of loyalty to their leader . Face - to - face contact
among the members of the Navy group was not limited to business meetings . All
the ...
There are strong indications that Kimmel ' s advisers formed a cohesive ingroup
and shared strong feelings of loyalty to their leader . Face - to - face contact
among the members of the Navy group was not limited to business meetings . All
the ...
Page 153
It was not easy to maintain this open - ended view at a time when strong Soviet
provocation evoked resentment and readiness to retaliate . Khrushchev had lied
and made a fool of President Kennedy by deceiving the United States
government ...
It was not easy to maintain this open - ended view at a time when strong Soviet
provocation evoked resentment and readiness to retaliate . Khrushchev had lied
and made a fool of President Kennedy by deceiving the United States
government ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House