Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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I hope that the interpretations and theoretical conceptions suggested in the case
studies will add something to the thinking of scholars in each of these disciplines
. For students of social psychology , this book raises some new questions ( and ...
I hope that the interpretations and theoretical conceptions suggested in the case
studies will add something to the thinking of scholars in each of these disciplines
. For students of social psychology , this book raises some new questions ( and ...
Page 44
... out of his position as second - incommand , instead of replacing Rusk , whom
he liked personally and wanted to keep as a central member of his team . “ I can '
t do that to Rusk , ” Kennedy later said when someone suggested shifting ...
... out of his position as second - incommand , instead of replacing Rusk , whom
he liked personally and wanted to keep as a central member of his team . “ I can '
t do that to Rusk , ” Kennedy later said when someone suggested shifting ...
Page 105
These observations , if accurate , suggest that when Johnson and his principal
advisers were deliberating about the escalation decisions , they shared a
staunch faith that somehow everything would come out right , despite all the
gloomy ...
These observations , if accurate , suggest that when Johnson and his principal
advisers were deliberating about the escalation decisions , they shared a
staunch faith that somehow everything would come out right , despite all the
gloomy ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
6 other sections not shown
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House