Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 12
loyalty requires each member to avoid raising controversial issues , questioning
weak arguments , or calling a halt to softheaded thinking . Paradoxically ,
softheaded groups are likely to be extremely hardhearted toward out - groups
and ...
loyalty requires each member to avoid raising controversial issues , questioning
weak arguments , or calling a halt to softheaded thinking . Paradoxically ,
softheaded groups are likely to be extremely hardhearted toward out - groups
and ...
Page 37
These wishful beliefs continue to dominate their thinking until an unequivocal
defeat proves otherwise , whereupon - like Kennedy and his advisers — they are
shocked at the discrepancy between their stereotyped conceptions and ...
These wishful beliefs continue to dominate their thinking until an unequivocal
defeat proves otherwise , whereupon - like Kennedy and his advisers — they are
shocked at the discrepancy between their stereotyped conceptions and ...
Page 176
A study by Philip Tetlock indicates that among the politically relevant
consequences is the relatively poor quality of the thinking that goes into the
public statements made by national leaders when they announce and try to
explain policy ...
A study by Philip Tetlock indicates that among the politically relevant
consequences is the relatively poor quality of the thinking that goes into the
public statements made by national leaders when they announce and try to
explain policy ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House