Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 74
MAGIC supplied plenty of warning signals showing that Japan was getting ready
for massive military operations , but it did not inform the Americans exactly where
. This ambiguity left room for collective misjudgments based on wishful thinking ...
MAGIC supplied plenty of warning signals showing that Japan was getting ready
for massive military operations , but it did not inform the Americans exactly where
. This ambiguity left room for collective misjudgments based on wishful thinking ...
Page 75
Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Irving Lester Janis.
Washington ) sent Admiral Kimmel a strong warning that war with Japan was to
be expected at any time : “ Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with
Japan ...
Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Irving Lester Janis.
Washington ) sent Admiral Kimmel a strong warning that war with Japan was to
be expected at any time : “ Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with
Japan ...
Page 92
None of Stark ' s official warning messages was sufficiently dramatic or explicit
about the danger to Hawaii to challenge the local officers ' assumptions about
Hawaii ' s immunity . Moreover , Admiral Stark promptly counteracted some of the
...
None of Stark ' s official warning messages was sufficiently dramatic or explicit
about the danger to Hawaii to challenge the local officers ' assumptions about
Hawaii ' s immunity . Moreover , Admiral Stark promptly counteracted some of the
...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House