Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 74
... warn- ings during 1941 based on what MAGIC revealed , and , in addition , they had obtained warning information from their own intelligence operations . Following the Pearl Harbor disaster , the warning messages were studied ...
... warn- ings during 1941 based on what MAGIC revealed , and , in addition , they had obtained warning information from their own intelligence operations . Following the Pearl Harbor disaster , the warning messages were studied ...
Page 75
... warning that war with Japan was to be expected at any time : " Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful . This situation coupled with statements of Japanese government and movements [ of ] their naval and ...
... warning that war with Japan was to be expected at any time : " Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful . This situation coupled with statements of Japanese government and movements [ of ] their naval and ...
Page 92
... warning messages in late November . Nevertheless , their low - probability estimates affected the wording of their communications to Hawaii and en- abled Admiral Stark to be unperturbed about continuing to communicate his own brand of ...
... warning messages in late November . Nevertheless , their low - probability estimates affected the wording of their communications to Hawaii and en- abled Admiral Stark to be unperturbed about continuing to communicate his own brand of ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House