An Economic Theory of DemocracyThis book seeks to elucidate its subject-the governing of democratic state-by making intelligible the party politics of democracies. Downs treats this differently than do other students of politics. His explanations are systematically related to, and deducible from, precisely stated assumptions about the motivations that attend the decisions of voters and parties and the environment in which they act. He is consciously concerned with the economy in explanation, that is, with attempting to account for phenomena in terms of a very limited number of facts and postulates. He is concerned also with the central features of party politics in any democratic state, not with that in the United States or any other single country. |
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Page 172
... Paretian optimum even though collective goods exist . However , as we shall see later , it is sometimes irrational for the government to move the economy into a Paretian optimum position . In analyzing such cases , it is important not ...
... Paretian optimum even though collective goods exist . However , as we shall see later , it is sometimes irrational for the government to move the economy into a Paretian optimum position . In analyzing such cases , it is important not ...
Page 178
... Paretian optimum even in the certain world of traditional economic theory . However , in order to demonstrate the other factors which might prevent so- ciety from reaching such an optimum , let us momentarily assume that all the ...
... Paretian optimum even in the certain world of traditional economic theory . However , in order to demonstrate the other factors which might prevent so- ciety from reaching such an optimum , let us momentarily assume that all the ...
Page 181
... Paretian optimum ? The answer depends upon the validity of our assumption that the incumbents must take a stand before the opposition has done so . If it is true , the opposi- tion can defeat the incumbents with either an optimal or a ...
... Paretian optimum ? The answer depends upon the validity of our assumption that the incumbents must take a stand before the opposition has done so . If it is true , the opposi- tion can defeat the incumbents with either an optimal or a ...
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Common terms and phrases
abstain alternatives analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus citizen X coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making democracy Derived from Chapter discount distribution of voters division of labor economic theory economists effect election period electorate equal ernment exist extremist fact favor free information free market gain goals government action government policy government's groups hence ideologies incumbents indifferent individual influence irrational issue Kenneth Arrow marginal cost marginal equilibrium maximize means ment motives multiparty system oligopoly opposition parties outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's pay-off political information political parties position possible preferences problem Proposition rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected return from voting scale selection principles social society strategy tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility income V. O. Key views vote-selling voting decision welfare Welfare Economics well-informed zero