An Economic Theory of DemocracyThis book seeks to elucidate its subject-the governing of democratic state-by making intelligible the party politics of democracies. Downs treats this differently than do other students of politics. His explanations are systematically related to, and deducible from, precisely stated assumptions about the motivations that attend the decisions of voters and parties and the environment in which they act. He is consciously concerned with the economy in explanation, that is, with attempting to account for phenomena in terms of a very limited number of facts and postulates. He is concerned also with the central features of party politics in any democratic state, not with that in the United States or any other single country. |
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... assumption , in fact , that gives his theory its explanatory power . Most of us are such uncritical children of Freud that to say , " He did that because he decided it was the best way to get what he wanted , " is apt to strike us as ...
... assumption , in fact , that gives his theory its explanatory power . Most of us are such uncritical children of Freud that to say , " He did that because he decided it was the best way to get what he wanted , " is apt to strike us as ...
Page 151
... assumption that every man views elections purely as a government - selection process . Even with this assumption , our re- vised multiparty model can produce governments if voters behave as we said they would in the summary of Chapter 3 ...
... assumption that every man views elections purely as a government - selection process . Even with this assumption , our re- vised multiparty model can produce governments if voters behave as we said they would in the summary of Chapter 3 ...
Page 182
... assumption of superperfect certainty neces- sary to overcome these technical difficulties , society will not al- ways reach a Paretian optimum . a . It will do so only by chance in a two - party system if the op- position party can wait ...
... assumption of superperfect certainty neces- sary to overcome these technical difficulties , society will not al- ways reach a Paretian optimum . a . It will do so only by chance in a two - party system if the op- position party can wait ...
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Common terms and phrases
abstain alternatives analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus citizen X coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making democracy Derived from Chapter discount distribution of voters division of labor economic theory economists effect election period electorate equal ernment exist extremist fact favor free information free market gain goals government action government policy government's groups hence ideologies incumbents indifferent individual influence irrational issue Kenneth Arrow marginal cost marginal equilibrium maximize means ment motives multiparty system oligopoly opposition parties outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's pay-off political information political parties position possible preferences problem Proposition rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected return from voting scale selection principles social society strategy tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility income V. O. Key views vote-selling voting decision welfare Welfare Economics well-informed zero