An Economic Theory of DemocracyThis book seeks to elucidate its subject-the governing of democratic state-by making intelligible the party politics of democracies. Downs treats this differently than do other students of politics. His explanations are systematically related to, and deducible from, precisely stated assumptions about the motivations that attend the decisions of voters and parties and the environment in which they act. He is consciously concerned with the economy in explanation, that is, with attempting to account for phenomena in terms of a very limited number of facts and postulates. He is concerned also with the central features of party politics in any democratic state, not with that in the United States or any other single country. |
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Page 271
... voting . 4. Only a few men who become well - informed do not vote . Furthermore , our analysis has isolated several ... cost of voting , his long - run participation value , and the num- ber of other citizens he believes will vote ...
... voting . 4. Only a few men who become well - informed do not vote . Furthermore , our analysis has isolated several ... cost of voting , his long - run participation value , and the num- ber of other citizens he believes will vote ...
Page 272
... cost of voting , he votes for his favorite party ( or some other party in certain cases - see Chapter 3 ) . b . If the sum of these quantities is smaller than the cost of vot- ing , he abstains . 5. Throughout the above processes he ...
... cost of voting , he votes for his favorite party ( or some other party in certain cases - see Chapter 3 ) . b . If the sum of these quantities is smaller than the cost of vot- ing , he abstains . 5. Throughout the above processes he ...
Page 273
... cost of voting is harder for low - income citizens to bear ; therefore , even if returns among high- and low - income groups are the same , fewer of the latter vote . Sec- ond , the cost of information is harder for low - income ...
... cost of voting is harder for low - income citizens to bear ; therefore , even if returns among high- and low - income groups are the same , fewer of the latter vote . Sec- ond , the cost of information is harder for low - income ...
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Common terms and phrases
abstain alternatives analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus citizen X coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making democracy Derived from Chapter discount distribution of voters division of labor economic theory economists effect election period electorate equal ernment exist extremist fact favor free information free market gain goals government action government policy government's groups hence ideologies incumbents indifferent individual influence irrational issue Kenneth Arrow marginal cost marginal equilibrium maximize means ment motives multiparty system oligopoly opposition parties outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's pay-off political information political parties position possible preferences problem Proposition rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected return from voting scale selection principles social society strategy tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility income V. O. Key views vote-selling voting decision welfare Welfare Economics well-informed zero