An Economic Theory of DemocracyThis book seeks to elucidate its subject-the governing of democratic state-by making intelligible the party politics of democracies. Downs treats this differently than do other students of politics. His explanations are systematically related to, and deducible from, precisely stated assumptions about the motivations that attend the decisions of voters and parties and the environment in which they act. He is consciously concerned with the economy in explanation, that is, with attempting to account for phenomena in terms of a very limited number of facts and postulates. He is concerned also with the central features of party politics in any democratic state, not with that in the United States or any other single country. |
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Page 57
... electorate , agreed upon all issues gov- ernment faced . Therefore the coalition - of - minorities strategy works only when no majority of voters exhibits perfect consensus on all issues . Furthermore , condition two means that once the ...
... electorate , agreed upon all issues gov- ernment faced . Therefore the coalition - of - minorities strategy works only when no majority of voters exhibits perfect consensus on all issues . Furthermore , condition two means that once the ...
Page 91
... electorate - in which case the electorate will appreciate them post facto - but also that the electorate already desires them . But since everyone can make such a claim , the government will not be impressed unless some proof is adduced ...
... electorate - in which case the electorate will appreciate them post facto - but also that the electorate already desires them . But since everyone can make such a claim , the government will not be impressed unless some proof is adduced ...
Page 245
... electorate to minimize investment in political data . For them , rational behavior implies both a refusal to expend resources on political information per se and a definite limi- tation of the amount of free political information ...
... electorate to minimize investment in political data . For them , rational behavior implies both a refusal to expend resources on political information per se and a definite limi- tation of the amount of free political information ...
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Common terms and phrases
abstain alternatives analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus citizen X coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making democracy Derived from Chapter discount distribution of voters division of labor economic theory economists effect election period electorate equal ernment exist extremist fact favor free information free market gain goals government action government policy government's groups hence ideologies incumbents indifferent individual influence irrational issue Kenneth Arrow marginal cost marginal equilibrium maximize means ment motives multiparty system oligopoly opposition parties outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's pay-off political information political parties position possible preferences problem Proposition rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected return from voting scale selection principles social society strategy tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility income V. O. Key views vote-selling voting decision welfare Welfare Economics well-informed zero