An Economic Theory of DemocracyThis book seeks to elucidate its subject-the governing of democratic state-by making intelligible the party politics of democracies. Downs treats this differently than do other students of politics. His explanations are systematically related to, and deducible from, precisely stated assumptions about the motivations that attend the decisions of voters and parties and the environment in which they act. He is consciously concerned with the economy in explanation, that is, with attempting to account for phenomena in terms of a very limited number of facts and postulates. He is concerned also with the central features of party politics in any democratic state, not with that in the United States or any other single country. |
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Page 5
... goals which either possess are considered deviations that qualify the rational course toward the main goal . In such analysis , the term rațional is never applied to an agent's ends , but only to his means.2 This follows from the ...
... goals which either possess are considered deviations that qualify the rational course toward the main goal . In such analysis , the term rațional is never applied to an agent's ends , but only to his means.2 This follows from the ...
Page 161
... goals in the most efficient manner . But men live in society and in a world of scarce resources ; so when each pursues his own goals , his actions affect other men . Furthermore , these other men never have precisely the same goals that ...
... goals in the most efficient manner . But men live in society and in a world of scarce resources ; so when each pursues his own goals , his actions affect other men . Furthermore , these other men never have precisely the same goals that ...
Page 234
... goals necessary for rational delegation . According to our hypothesis , party officials are interested only in maximizing votes , never in producing any particular social state per se . But voters are always interested in the latter ...
... goals necessary for rational delegation . According to our hypothesis , party officials are interested only in maximizing votes , never in producing any particular social state per se . But voters are always interested in the latter ...
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Common terms and phrases
abstain alternatives analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus citizen X coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making democracy Derived from Chapter discount distribution of voters division of labor economic theory economists effect election period electorate equal ernment exist extremist fact favor free information free market gain goals government action government policy government's groups hence ideologies incumbents indifferent individual influence irrational issue Kenneth Arrow marginal cost marginal equilibrium maximize means ment motives multiparty system oligopoly opposition parties outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's pay-off political information political parties position possible preferences problem Proposition rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected return from voting scale selection principles social society strategy tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility income V. O. Key views vote-selling voting decision welfare Welfare Economics well-informed zero