An Economic Theory of DemocracyThis book seeks to elucidate its subject-the governing of democratic state-by making intelligible the party politics of democracies. Downs treats this differently than do other students of politics. His explanations are systematically related to, and deducible from, precisely stated assumptions about the motivations that attend the decisions of voters and parties and the environment in which they act. He is consciously concerned with the economy in explanation, that is, with attempting to account for phenomena in terms of a very limited number of facts and postulates. He is concerned also with the central features of party politics in any democratic state, not with that in the United States or any other single country. |
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Page 101
Anthony Downs. Thus each party can ideologically woo only a limited number of social groups , since its appeal to one implicitly antagonizes others . But because of uncertainty , it is not obvious which combi- nation of groups yields the ...
Anthony Downs. Thus each party can ideologically woo only a limited number of social groups , since its appeal to one implicitly antagonizes others . But because of uncertainty , it is not obvious which combi- nation of groups yields the ...
Page 190
... groups : ( 1 ) high - income groups , whose funds give them initial dominance , and ( 2 ) emergent low - income collective - bargaining centers , which may eventually gain a numerical edge . As long as the high - income groups succeed ...
... groups : ( 1 ) high - income groups , whose funds give them initial dominance , and ( 2 ) emergent low - income collective - bargaining centers , which may eventually gain a numerical edge . As long as the high - income groups succeed ...
Page 273
... groups would vote even if voting costs were equally difficult for everyone to bear . Because citizens who abstain exercise less influence than those who vote , low - income groups in society are likely to have less political power than ...
... groups would vote even if voting costs were equally difficult for everyone to bear . Because citizens who abstain exercise less influence than those who vote , low - income groups in society are likely to have less political power than ...
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Common terms and phrases
abstain alternatives analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus citizen X coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making democracy Derived from Chapter discount distribution of voters division of labor economic theory economists effect election period electorate equal ernment exist extremist fact favor free information free market gain goals government action government policy government's groups hence ideologies incumbents indifferent individual influence irrational issue Kenneth Arrow marginal cost marginal equilibrium maximize means ment motives multiparty system oligopoly opposition parties outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's pay-off political information political parties position possible preferences problem Proposition rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected return from voting scale selection principles social society strategy tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility income V. O. Key views vote-selling voting decision welfare Welfare Economics well-informed zero