An Economic Theory of DemocracyThis book seeks to elucidate its subject-the governing of democratic state-by making intelligible the party politics of democracies. Downs treats this differently than do other students of politics. His explanations are systematically related to, and deducible from, precisely stated assumptions about the motivations that attend the decisions of voters and parties and the environment in which they act. He is consciously concerned with the economy in explanation, that is, with attempting to account for phenomena in terms of a very limited number of facts and postulates. He is concerned also with the central features of party politics in any democratic state, not with that in the United States or any other single country. |
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Page 167
... pays off only once in the distant future must do so at a higher rate than those which pay off sooner . Thus it can compensate for the capital build - up possible with the latter . The last reason can be clarified by an example . If the ...
... pays off only once in the distant future must do so at a higher rate than those which pay off sooner . Thus it can compensate for the capital build - up possible with the latter . The last reason can be clarified by an example . If the ...
Page 168
... for risk . For example , if A owns an investment opportunity with a future pay - off which he discounts to below the current interest rate , he can sell it to B , whose risk discount is lower , and B will undertake it . If B has no ...
... for risk . For example , if A owns an investment opportunity with a future pay - off which he discounts to below the current interest rate , he can sell it to B , whose risk discount is lower , and B will undertake it . If B has no ...
Page 176
... for marginal vote pay - off equilibrium and private agents ' quest for marginal utility pay - off equilibrium , the former always takes precedence over the latter . Furthermore , this asymmetry of power cannot be directly counter ...
... for marginal vote pay - off equilibrium and private agents ' quest for marginal utility pay - off equilibrium , the former always takes precedence over the latter . Furthermore , this asymmetry of power cannot be directly counter ...
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Common terms and phrases
abstain alternatives analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus citizen X coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making democracy Derived from Chapter discount distribution of voters division of labor economic theory economists effect election period electorate equal ernment exist extremist fact favor free information free market gain goals government action government policy government's groups hence ideologies incumbents indifferent individual influence irrational issue Kenneth Arrow marginal cost marginal equilibrium maximize means ment motives multiparty system oligopoly opposition parties outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's pay-off political information political parties position possible preferences problem Proposition rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected return from voting scale selection principles social society strategy tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility income V. O. Key views vote-selling voting decision welfare Welfare Economics well-informed zero