An Economic Theory of DemocracyThis book seeks to elucidate its subject-the governing of democratic state-by making intelligible the party politics of democracies. Downs treats this differently than do other students of politics. His explanations are systematically related to, and deducible from, precisely stated assumptions about the motivations that attend the decisions of voters and parties and the environment in which they act. He is consciously concerned with the economy in explanation, that is, with attempting to account for phenomena in terms of a very limited number of facts and postulates. He is concerned also with the central features of party politics in any democratic state, not with that in the United States or any other single country. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 30
Page 246
... well - informed ; and ( 2 ) it is individually irrational to be well - informed . Here individual rationality apparently conflicts with social rationality ; i.e. , the goals men seek as individuals contra- dict those they seek in ...
... well - informed ; and ( 2 ) it is individually irrational to be well - informed . Here individual rationality apparently conflicts with social rationality ; i.e. , the goals men seek as individuals contra- dict those they seek in ...
Page 247
... well - informed for the following reasons : 1. There is no reliable , objective , inexpensive way to measure how well - informed a man is . 2. There is no agreed - upon rule for deciding how much information of what kinds each citizen ...
... well - informed for the following reasons : 1. There is no reliable , objective , inexpensive way to measure how well - informed a man is . 2. There is no agreed - upon rule for deciding how much information of what kinds each citizen ...
Page 253
... well enough to be in favor of a specific policy . True , many people voice strong policy preferences without benefit of much infor- mation , and the ballots these people cast are just as potent as those of the well - informed ...
... well enough to be in favor of a specific policy . True , many people voice strong policy preferences without benefit of much infor- mation , and the ballots these people cast are just as potent as those of the well - informed ...
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
abstain alternatives analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus citizen X coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making democracy Derived from Chapter discount distribution of voters division of labor economic theory economists effect election period electorate equal ernment exist extremist fact favor free information free market gain goals government action government policy government's groups hence ideologies incumbents indifferent individual influence irrational issue Kenneth Arrow marginal cost marginal equilibrium maximize means ment motives multiparty system oligopoly opposition parties outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's pay-off political information political parties position possible preferences problem Proposition rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected return from voting scale selection principles social society strategy tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility income V. O. Key views vote-selling voting decision welfare Welfare Economics well-informed zero