An Economic Theory of DemocracyThis book seeks to elucidate its subject-the governing of democratic state-by making intelligible the party politics of democracies. Downs treats this differently than do other students of politics. His explanations are systematically related to, and deducible from, precisely stated assumptions about the motivations that attend the decisions of voters and parties and the environment in which they act. He is consciously concerned with the economy in explanation, that is, with attempting to account for phenomena in terms of a very limited number of facts and postulates. He is concerned also with the central features of party politics in any democratic state, not with that in the United States or any other single country. |
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Page 84
... zero . When it is not zero , some passives will also abstain . For a detailed discussion of how voting costs affect participation , see Chapter 14 . 3 they want to vote . This does not mean that 84 AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY.
... zero . When it is not zero , some passives will also abstain . For a detailed discussion of how voting costs affect participation , see Chapter 14 . 3 they want to vote . This does not mean that 84 AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY.
Page 264
Anthony Downs. voters really have zero party differentials or merely lack information . In the last chapter we saw that most voters do not acquire enough information to discover ... zero , it makes 264 AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY.
Anthony Downs. voters really have zero party differentials or merely lack information . In the last chapter we saw that most voters do not acquire enough information to discover ... zero , it makes 264 AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY.
Page 271
... zero because all party policies and plat- forms appear identical to him , he weighs his long - run participa- tion value plus the expected value of " change " as opposed to " no change " ( or vice versa ) against the cost of voting.10 a ...
... zero because all party policies and plat- forms appear identical to him , he weighs his long - run participa- tion value plus the expected value of " change " as opposed to " no change " ( or vice versa ) against the cost of voting.10 a ...
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Common terms and phrases
abstain alternatives analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus citizen X coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making democracy Derived from Chapter discount distribution of voters division of labor economic theory economists effect election period electorate equal ernment exist extremist fact favor free information free market gain goals government action government policy government's groups hence ideologies incumbents indifferent individual influence irrational issue Kenneth Arrow marginal cost marginal equilibrium maximize means ment motives multiparty system oligopoly opposition parties outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's pay-off political information political parties position possible preferences problem Proposition rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected return from voting scale selection principles social society strategy tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility income V. O. Key views vote-selling voting decision welfare Welfare Economics well-informed zero