was meant they should be understood by posterity. The ministers and managers for the commons were persons who had, many of them, an active share in the revolution. Most of them had seen it at an age capable of reflection. The grand event, and all the discussions which led to it, and followed it, were then alive in the memory and conversation of all men. The managers for the commons must be supposed to have spoken on that subject the prevalent ideas of the leading party in the commons, and of the whig ministry. Undoubtedly they spoke also their own private opinions; and the private opinions of such men are not without weight. They were not umbratiles doctores, men who had studied a free constitution only in its anatomy, and upon dead systems. They knew it alive and in action.

In this proceeding, the whig principles, as applied to the revolution and settlement, are to be found, or they are to be found no where. I wish the whig readers of this appeal first to turn to Mr. Burke's Reflections from page 49 to page 81; and then to attend to the following extracts from the trial of Dr. Sacheverel. After this, they will consider two things; first, whether the doctrine in Mr. Burke's Reflections be consonant to that of the whigs of that period; and secondly, whether they choose to abandon the principles which belonged to the progenitors of some of them, and to the predecessors of them all, and to learn new principles of whiggism, imported from France, and disseminated in this country from dissenting pulpits, from federation societies, and from the pamphlets, which, (as containing the political creed of those synods) are industriously circulated in all parts of the two kingdoms. This is their affair, and they will make their option. These new whigs hold, that the sovereignty, whether exercised by one or many, did not only originate from the people, (a position not denied, nor worth denying or assenting to) but that, in the people the same sovereignty constantly and unalienably resides; that the people may lawfully depose kings, not only for misconduct, but without any misconduct at all; hat they may set up any new fashion of government for themselves, or continue without any government at their pleasure; that the people are essentially their own rule, and their will the measure of their conduct; that the tenure of magistracy is not a proper subject of Contract; because magistrates have duties, but no rights; and that if a contract de facto is made with them in one age, allowing that it binds at all, it only hinds those who are imme

diately concerned in it, but does not pass to posterity. These doctrines concerning the people (a term which they are far from accurately defining, but by which, from many circumstances, it is plain enough they mean their own faction, if they should grow by early arming, by treachery, or violence, into the prevailing force) tend, in my opinion, to the utter subversion, not only of all government, in all modes, and to all stable securities to rational freedom, but to all the rules and principles of morality itself.

I assert, that the ancient whigs held doctrines, totally different from those I have last mentioned. I assert, that the foundation laid down by the commons, on the trial of Dr. Sacheverel, for justifying the revolution of 1688, are the very same laid down in Mr. Burke's Reflections; that is to say,—a breach of the original contract, implied and expressed in the constitution of this country, as a scheme of government fundamentally and inviolably fixed in king, lords, and commons.-That the fundamental subversion of this ancient constitution, by one of its parts, having been attempted, and in effect accomplished, justified the revolution. That it was justified only upon the necessity of the case; as the only means left for the recovery of that ancient constitution, formed by the original contract of the British state; as well as for the future preservation of the same government. These are the points to be proved.

A general opening to the charge against Dr. Sacheverel was made by the attorney-general, Sir John Montagu: but as there is nothing in that opening speech which tends very accurately to settle the principle upon which the whigs proceeded in the prosecution, (the plan of the speech not requiring it,) I proceed to that of Mr. Lechmere, the manager, who spoke next after him. The following are extracts, given, not in the exact order in which they stand in the printed trial, but in that which is thought most fit to bring the ideas of the whig commons distinctly under our view.

MR. LECHMERE.'

'It becomes an indispensable duty upon us who appear in the name and on the behalf of all the commons of Great Britain, not only to demand your lordships' justice on such a criminal [Dr. Sacheverel] but clearly and openly to assert our foundations.'

"The nature of our constitution is that of a limited monarchy; wherein the supreme power

* State Trials, vǝl. v. p. 65

*

Sir John Hawles, another of the managers, follows the steps of his brethren, positively affirming the doctrine of non-resistance to the government to be the general, moral, religious, and political rule for the subject; and justifying the revolution on the same principle with Mr. Burke, that is, as an exception from necessity. Indeed he carries the doctrine on the general idea of non-resistance much further than Mr. Burke has done; and full as far as it can perhaps be supported by any duty of perfect obligation; however noble and heroic it may be, in many cases, to suffer death rather than disturb the tranquillity of our country.

SIR JOHN HAWLES.*

Certainly it must be granted, that the doctrine that commands obedience to the supreme power, though in things contrary to nature, even to suffer death, which is the highest injustice that can be done a man, rather than make an opposition to the supreme power [is reasonable;]t because the death of one, or some few private persons, is a less evil than disturbing the whole government; that law must needs be understood to forbid the doing or saying any thing to disturb the government; the rather because the obeying that law cannot be pretended to be against nature; and the doctor's refusing to obey that implicit law, is the reason for which he is now prosecuted; though he would have it believed, that the reason he is now prosecuted. was for the doctrine he asserted of obedience to the supreme power; which he might have preached as long as he pleased, and the commons would have taken no offence at it, if he had stopped there, and not have taken upon him, on that pretence or occasion, to have cast odious colours upon the revolution.'

exception, and stating, that under the specious pretence of preaching a peaceable doctrine, Sacheverel and the jacobites meant in reality to excite a rebellion in favour of the pretender, he explicitly limits his ideas of resistance and the boundaries laid down by his colleagues and by Mr. Burke.

GENERAL STANHOPE.

'The constitution of England is founded upon compact; and the subjects of this kingdom have, in their several public and private capacities, as legal a title to what are their rights by law, as a prince to the possession of his crown.

"Your lordships, and most that hear me, are witnesses, and must remember the necessities of those times which brought about the revolution that no other remedy was left to preserve our religion and liberties; that resistance was necessary, and consequently just.'

'Had the doctor, in the remaining part of his sermon, preached up peace, quietness, and the like, and shewn how happy we are under her majesty's administration, and exhorted obedience to it, he had never been called to answer a charge at your lordships' bar. But the tenour of all his subsequent discourse is one continued invective against the government.'

Mr. Walpole (afterwards Sir Robert) was one of the managers on this occasion. He was an honourable man and a sound whig. He was not, as the jacobites and discontented whigs of his time have represented him, and as ill-informed people still represent him, a prodigal and corrupt minister. They charged him in their libels and seditious conversations as having first reduced corruption to a system. Such was their cant. But he was far from governing by corruption. He governed by party attachments. The charge of systematic corruption is less applicable to him, perhaps, than to any minister who ever served the crown for so great a length of time. He gained over very few from the opposition. Without being a genius of the first class, he was an intelligent, prudent, and safe minister. He loved peace; and he helped to communicate the same disposition to nations at least as warlike and restless as that in which he had the chief

direction of affairs. Though he served a master who was fond of martial fame, he kept all the establishments very low. The land tax continued at two shillings in the pound for the greater part of his administration. The other

impositions were moderate. The profound repose, the equal liberty, the firm protection of just laws during the long period of his power, were the principal causes of that prosperity which afterwards took such rapid strides towards perfection; and which furnished to this nation ability, to acquire the military glory which it has since obtained, as well as to bear the burthens, the cause and consequence of that warlike reputation. With many virtues, public and private, he had his faults; but his faults were superficial. A careless, coarse, and over familiar style of discourse, without sufficient regard to persons or occasions, and an almost total want of political decorum, were the errours by which he was most hurt in the public opinion; and those through which his enemies obtained the greatest advantage over him. But justice must be done. The prudence, steadiness, and vigilance of that man, joined to the greatest possible lenity in his character and his politics, preserved the crown to this royal family; and with it, their laws and liberties to this country. Walpole had no other plan of defence for the revolution, than that of the other managers, and of Mr. Burke; and he gives full as little countenance to any arbitrary attempts, on the part of rest less and factious men, for framing new governments according to their fancies.

MR. WALPOLE.

'Resistance is no where enacted to be legal, but subjected, by all the laws now in being, to the greatest penalties. It is what is not, cannot, nor ought ever to be described, or affirmed, in any positive law, to be excusable: when, and upon what never-to-be-expected occasions, it may be exercised, no man can foresee; and it ought never to be thought of, but when an utter subversion of the laws of the realm threatens the whole frame of our constitution, and no redress can otherwise be hoped for. It therefore does, and ought for ever to stand, in the eye and letter of the law, as the highest offence. But because any man, or party of men, may not, out of folly or wantonness, commit treason, or make their own discontents, ill principles, or disguised affections to another interest, a pretence to resist the supreme power, will it follow from thence that the utmost necessity ought not to engage a nation in its own defence, for the preservation of the whole?'

Sir Joseph Jekyl was, as I have always heard and believed, as nearly as any individual tould be, the very standard of whig principles

in his age. He was a learned, and an able man; full of honour, integrity, and public spirit; no lover of innovation; nor disposed to change his solid principles for the giddy fashion of the hour. Let us hear this whig.

SIR JOSEPH JEKYL.

'In clearing up and vindicating the justice of the revolution, which was the second thing proposed, it is far from the intent of the commons, to state the limits and bounds of the subject's submission to the sovereign. That which the law hath been wisely silent in, the commons desire to be silent in too; nor will they put any case of a justifiable resistance, but that of the revolution only; and they persuade themselves that the doing right to that resistance will be so far from promoting popular licence or confusion, that it will have a contrary effect, and be a means of settling men's minds in the love of, and veneration for the laws to rescue and secure which was the ONLY aim and intention of those concerned ir resistance.'

Dr. Sacheverel's counsel defended him on this principle, namely that whilst he enforced from the pulpit the general doctrine of nonresistance, he was not obliged to take notice of the theoretic limits which ought to modify that doctrine. Sir Joseph Jeky., in his reply, whilst he controverts its application to the doctor's defence, fully admits and even enforces the principle itself, and supports the revolution of 1688, as he and all the managers had done before, exactly upon the same grounds on which Mr. Burke has built, in his reflections on the French revolution.

SIR JOSEPH JEKYL.

'If the Doctor had pretended to have stated the particular bounds and limits of non-resist ance, and told the people in what cases they might, or might not resist, he would have beer much to blame; nor was one word said in the articles, or by the managers, as if that was expected from him: but, on the contrary, we have insisted, that in NO case can resistance be lawful, but in case of extreme necessity; and where the constitution cannot otherwise be preserved; and such necessity ought to be plain and obvious to the sense and judgment of the whole nation; and this was the case at the revolution.'

and to confess, that an exception to the general doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance did exist in the case of the revolution. This the managers for the commons considered as having gained their cause; as their having obtained the whole of what they contended for. They congratulated themselves and the nation on a civil victory, as glorious and as honourable as any that had been obtained in arms during the reign of triumphs.

Sir Joseph Jekyl, in his reply to Harcourt, and the other great men who conducted the cause for the tory side, spoke in the following memorable terms, distinctly stating the whole of what the whig house of commons contended for, in the name of all their constituents:

SIR JOSEPH JEKYL.

'My lords, the concessions [the concessions of Sacheverel's counsel] are these:-That necessity creates an exception to the general rule of submission to the prince;-that such exception is understood or implied in the laws that require such submission;-and that the case of the revolution was a case of necessity.

'These are concessions so ample, and do so fully answer the drift of the commons in this article, and are to the utmost extent of their meaning in it, that I can't forbear congratulating them upon this success of their impeachment; that in full parliament, this erroneous doctrine of unlimited non-resistance is given up and disclaimed. And may it not, in after ages, be an addition to the glories of this bright reign, that so many of those who are honoured with being in her majesty's service have been at your lordship's bar, thus successfully contending for the national rights of her people, and proving they are not precarious or remediless?

'But to return to these concessions; I must appeal to your lordships, whether they are not a total departure from the Doctor's answer.'

*

*

*

I now proceed to shew that the whig managers for the commons meant to preserve the government on a firm foundation, by asserting the perpetual validity of the settlement then made, and its coercive power upon posterity. I mean to shew that they gave no sort of countenance to any doctrine tending to impress the people, taken separately from the legislature which includes the crown, with an idea that they had acquired a moral or civil competence to alter (without breach of the original compact on the part of the king) the succession to the crown, at their pleasure; much less that hev had acquired any right, in the case of

such an event as caused the revolution, to set up any new form of government. The author of the Reflections, I believe, thought that no man of common understanding could eppose to this doctrine, the ordinary sovereign power, as declared in the act of queen Anne. That is, that the kings or queens of the realm, with the consent of parliament are competent to regulate and to settle the succession of the crown. This power is, and ever was inherent in the supreme sovereignty; and was not, as the political divines vainly talk, acquired by the revolution. It is declared in the old statute of queen Elizabeth. Such a power must reside in the complete sovereignty of every kingdom; and it is in fact exercised in all of them. But this right of competence in the legislature, not in the people, is by the legislature itself to be exercised with sound discretion; that is to say, it is to be exercised or not, in conformity to the fundamental principles of this government; to the rules of moral obligation; and to the faith of pacts, either contained in the nature of the transaction, or entered into by the body corporate of the kingdom; which body, in juridical construction, never dies; and in fact never loses its members at once by death.

Whether this doctrine is reconcileable to the modern philosophy of government, I believe the author neither knows nor cares; as he has little respect for any of that sort of philosophy. This may be because his capacity and knowledge do not reach to it. If such be the case, he cannot be blamed, if he acts on the sense of that incapacity; he cannot be blamed, if in the most arduous and critical questions which can possibly arise, and which affect to the quick the vital parts of our constitution, he takes the side which leans most to safety and settlement; that he is resolved not "to be wise beyond what is written" in the legislative record and practice; that when doubts arise on them, he endeavours to interpret one statute by another; and to reconcile them all to established recognised morals, and to the general ancient known policy of the laws of England. Two things are equally evident, the first is, that the legislature possesses the power of regulating the succession of the crown; the second, that in the exercise of that right it has uniformly acted as if under the restraints which the author has stated. That author makes what the ancients call mos majorum, not indeed his sole, but certainly his principal rule of policy, to guide his judg ment in whatever regards our laws. Uniformity and analogy can be preserved in them