The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational ContractingThis long-awaited sequel to the modem classic Markets and Hierarchies develops and extends Williamson's innovative use of transaction cost economics as an approach to studying economic organization by applying it to work and labor as well as the corporation itself. In addition, Williamson explores its growing implications for public policy, including its potential influence on antitrust and merger guidelines, labor policy, and SEC and public utility regulations. |
Contents
The Governance of Contractual Relations 1 Contracting Traditions | 1 |
Efficient Governance | 2 |
Uncertainty | 3 |
Copyright | |
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adaptations agreement alternative arbitration argument assessment asset specificity Assume attributes bargaining behavior benefits bilateral bounded rationality buyer capital CATV ceteris paribus Chandler Chapter Communal-emh comparative institutional competition complex condition contract renewal interval corporation decision Demsetz described developed differences discussed economic organization economies of scale effects efficiency employees ex ante ex post exchange expropriation favor firm forward integration franchise bidding golden parachute governance structures hazards hierarchy high-powered incentives hostage human asset industry innovation Inside Contracting interest internal organization investments issues kind labor M-form manufacturers merger microanalytic modes monopoly natural monopoly node nomic observed operating organizational ownership parties posed presumably price discrimination private ordering problems purpose technology Putting-Out Putting-Out system realized reference relevant respects responsible safeguards Schwinn specific assets strategic supplier supply stage theory tion trading transaction cost economics transaction-specific uncertainty unions vertical integration Williamson workers