thought of our country partitioned and torn, as a new Poland, must be one of heartrending sorrow. In asking these names we have no ulterior object in view, and we give an assurance that they shall be used only to show to the Government and to the world that the country is unrelentingly opposed to partition.' On May 8 a letter from Archbishop Walsh appeared in the Nationalist evening papers. In this letter he spoke of partition as holding a leading place in the practical politics of the day, and in a postscript added that he had reason to believe that the country had already been sold. Immediately after came the election in South Longford . . . [upon which the Archbishop's letter had a strong influence]. The contest was a straight fight between the two parties; the Nationalists were represented by Mr. Patrick McKenna, while the Sinn Feiners had selected as their candidate Mr. J. P. McGuinnes, a local man who was serving a Court-Martial sentence of penal servitude in connection with the Rebellion. The Nationalist strength in the constituency was known to be great, and the Sinn Feiners freely declared that if they could carry South Longford they could carry any seat in Ireland. The Nationalist leaders, Mr. Dillon and Mr. Devlin, intervened in person on behalf of Mr. McKenna, in whose support the whole force of the Nationalist organisation was concentrated in the constituency. The result of the polling, declared on May 10, showed that the Sinn Fein candidate had won by the narrow majority of thirty-seven votes.

The

"The result of the election determined absolutely the reception of the Government's plan of settlement, published [May 16, in] a circular letter addressed by Mr. Lloyd George to Mr. John Redmond (Nationalist), Sir John Lonsdale (Ulster Unionist Party), Mr. William O'Brien (All-for-Ireland Party), and Viscount Midleton (for the Unionists of the South and West). Prime Minister wrote that the government approached the subject 'with a deep desire to put an end to a state of affairs which is productive of immense evil, not only to Ireland, but to Great Britain and the Empire'; that any settlement proposed during the war must be one which would be substantially accepted by both sides, and that therefore the idea of the Government has been to try to effect an immediate settlement conceding the largest possible measure of Home Rule which can be secured by agreement at this moment, without prejudice to the undertaking by Parliament of a further and final settlement of the questions most in dispute after the war.' The Government's proposals to this end, which were at once found unacceptable, need not be recorded at length. . . . After setting forth this scheme the Prime Minister . . . proposed the Convention plan. "There remains an alternative plan which, though it has been sometimes seriously discussed, has never been authoritatively proposed that of assembling a Convention of Irishmen of all parties for the purpose of providing a scheme of Irish Self-Government. . . . The Government is ready, in default of the adoption of its proposals for Home Rule, to take the necessary steps for the assembling of such a Convention. Mr. Redmond, in his reply, at once rejected the Government's scheme and welcomed the alternative proposal of Midleton a Convention. . . . Viscount

un

dertook to recommend the acceptance of the Convention plan on condition that it was fully representative and that its recommendations were subject to review by Parliament. The Irish Unionist

1917-1918. Irish convention. — "Immediately before the assembly of the Convention an addition was made to the Defence of the Realm Regulations declaring it to be unlawful for anyone to violate the secrecy of its proceedings. The prohibition covered both printed publication and public speaking, and forbade any report or statement which described or purported to describe its proceedings, or referred to them, except reports or statements officially authorised by the Chairman. It was generally recognised by the friends of the Convention that this prohibition was necessary if its work was not to be hampered, perhaps fatally, by public debate on its proceedings, though on the other hand the secrecy involved a certain atrophy of political thought in Ireland which gave larger scope to the Sinn Fein propaganda.”—W. B. Wells and N. Marlowe, Irish convention and Sinn Fein, pp. 99-100. -The first meeting was held in Dublin on July 25, 1917, and the following day adjournment was made to August 8 to permit of the collection of information and drafting of schemes. During the latter part of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 sittings of the convention were held; but it became increasingly evident that no agreement would be reached, especially after the death of John Redmond. Debate in the convention was "mainly occupied with the taxing power. Ulster's objection to Home Rule, in so far as it was not based on the impossibility of putting Ulster Protestants under a Parliament in which Catholics would one conhave the majority, revealed itself as cerning taxation. At this moment Ulstermen had begun to recognise that wealth actually existed outside of Ulster; but Ulster was still enormously impressed with the strength and solidity of its own financial position, and of its general forwardness as compared with the backwardness of the rest of the country. Fear was indicated that Ulster's taxes would be made a milch cow to feed schemes of social and industrial development

IRELAND, 1917-1918

in those backward regions. The governing assumption was that Ulster would remain permanently more solvent than the Catholic counties. Over and above this was the argument repeatedly enforced, that Irish policy, as outlined by the most representative minds in Southern Ireland, contemplated protection against English competition; that any difference in the indirect taxation of Great Britain involved a tariff barrier and customs frontier; and that any such arrangement would be ruinous to Ulster's commerce. It was held essential to Ulster's prosperity that there should be unfettered freedom of exchange between the two countries; Ulstermen were not prepared to put their business interests at the mercy of an Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer who might be more zealous to bolster up nascent industries in the South and West than to safeguard those existing in the Protestant North. Between this view and that of the Nationalist majority, which contended that a Parliament must be the sole taxing authority in its own area, there seemed to be no common meeting ground; yet a section in the Convention, representing the old landlord interest in the South and the wealthy Protestant business and professional community, set itself to the task of making a bridge. Lord Midleton [a Unionist] proposed a scheme which contemplated an Irish Parliament with powers limited only by the exclusion of what belongs to naval and military administration and to the Foreign Office. But the fixing of customs duties was from his point of view an affair touching the sphere of foreign relations, since such taxes may be the subject of treaties. Discussion was behind closed doors; but the controversy became public. Ulster's spokesmen made it clear that they would not accept the proposed compromise. It became then a question whether Nationalists ought to waive their view for complete fiscal autonomy, in order to secure agreement with a large and powerful body of Irishmen from whom they had been politically estranged in the past. . . . A press campaign began in which control over customs and excise was represented as a vital and essential part of selfgovernment. Redmond was of the other opinion. He saw in Lord Midleton's overtures the possibility of forming a new and wider constitutional party for self-government within the Empire. At the crisis of a too prolonged effort to secure agreement, Redmond died, and Nationalists in the Convention expressed divided opinions in their Report."-S. L. Gwynn, Irish situation, pp. 54-56.— "The Issue of the Report .. [which was laid on the table of the house on April 9] was made to an Irish public profoundly uninterested in it. The mind of the whole people was fixed on conscription, to the complete exclusion of any other question. Nor was the gathering storm of determined opposition to the proposal to conscript Ireland in any way checked by a certain change in the Government's attitude which was disclosed during the hurried passage of the Military Service Bill through the House of Commons. . . . The Irish clause of the Bill-Clause II.-gave the Government power to extend the operation of the Act to Ireland by Order in Council. . . After the passage of the Military Service Bill on April 16th-the Irish clause being carried by 296 votes to 123-the Nationalist Parliamentary Party immediately left Westminster and returned to Ireland. A passive resistance movement was already afoot."-W. B. Wells and N. Marlowe, Irish convention and Sinn Fein, pp. 144-145, 147.-The whole Roman Catholic hierarchy was opposed to

IRELAND, 1918

the measure. A conference at the Mansion House declared that the passing of the Conscription Bill "must be regarded as a declaration of war on the Irish people."

1918. Anti-conscription movement. - Arrest of Sinn Fein leaders.-"The most spectacular demonstration of protest... [against conscription] was made by the Irish Labour Party. A conference of fifteen hundred delegates convened in Dublin by the Irish Trades Union Congress, in adopting a resolution to resist Conscription 'in every way that to us seems feasible,' asserting 'our claims for independent status as a nation in the international movement and the right of self-determination as a nation as to what action or actions our people should take on questions of political or economic issues,' called upon Irish workers to abstain from all work on April 23rd as 'a demonstration of fealty to the cause of Labour and Ireland.' . . . The Labour Party however had a point of view somewhat different from that of Sinn Fein. Labour was opposed to Conscription on principle, and would have, unlike Sinn Fein, opposed it even if agreed to by an Irish Parliament."-R. M. Henry, Evolution of Sinn Fein, p. 265.-"The work of the Convention was forgotten. and all classes united with that passionate feeling often characteristic of Irish movements to fight against military service imposed by the United Kingdom. . . . During these days most of the Irish members were either not present in the House of Commons, or when they spoke it was with bitterness and chilling resentment. Ireland was seething with discontent, and not willing, except for the Ulster Unionists, any longer to assist in the war, . . . [and] Sinn Fein was believed to be in treasonable correspondence with Germany as it had been two years before."-E. R. Turner, Ireland and England, p. 415.-In May, Viscount French was appointed lord lieutenant to succeed Lord Wimborne, and Mr. Edward Shortt was made chief secretary. "When the formidable nature of the task they had undertaken dawned upon the Lord Lieutenant and his Chief Secretary, it was decided by the Irish Government to cut the sinews of the opposition by the arrest of those who were chiefly responsible for fomenting it. . . . The two Sinn Fein members of the Mansion House Conference, Messrs. de Valera and Griffith, with a number of less prominent Sinn Feiners, were deported and imprisoned. But this was a course which required some explanation. They were not the only people prominent in the Anti-Conscription campaign; and in any case English public opinion while, on the whole, indignant with the attitude of Ireland towards compulsory service, was becoming somewhat uneasy as to happenings in Ireland and inclined to question the entire wisdom of the Irish Executive. Accordingly, it was asserted that the arrested Sinn Feiners had been guilty of complicity in a German plot. The exLord Lieutenant, Lord Wimborne, during whose tenure of office the discovery of the plot (it was said) began to be made, publicly and flatly denied all knowledge of it, and expressed disbelief in its existence. . . . No further attempts were made to provide non-political reasons for political arrests; it was judged better that the Executive should rely upon the extraordinary powers conferred upon it by the Defence of the Realm Act."-R. M. Henry, Evolution of Sinn Fein, pp. 265, 267.-Some evidence of a German plot was provided by the fact that "throughout the year 1917 frequent communications had passed between

Berlin and the released rebels. The German Military Attaché in Madrid reported to his Government that an intermediary in America had '15,000 marks a month at his disposal for the S. (secret) service and communication with Ireland.' . . . During the early part of 1918 the Germans landed arms and ammunition on the west coast. Prominent leaders of Sinn Fein were constant in exhorting to drill and arm secretly."-P. H. Bagenal, Royal Irish Constabulary and Sinn Fein (Nineteenth Century and After, July, 1922).-"The Nationalists repudiated connection with Sinn Fein, and presently decided to go back to the House of Commons. Mr. Dillon, their leader, issued an appeal to Irish-Americans not to believe that Ireland was pro-German, and not to be prejudiced against them for what they were doing. But meanwhile Nationalist voters were rapidly going to Sinn Fein. . . . Nationalist members of the House of Commons resolved to remain in Ireland to resist the enforcement of conscription, declaring that such enforcement without the consent of Ireland would be brutal tyranny and oppression. Addressing a great throng in Belfast, Mr. Devlin advised that the act just passed be in no way recognized, and that no man should register his name. . . . [On June 1918] Lord Curzon announced that efforts would be made to recruit Irishmen by voluntary enlistment, and that meanwhile compulsory service would not be exacted. At the same time he said that in view of the present circumstances, and in consideration of recent revelations about Sinn Fein, the government did not deem the present an opportune occasion for the setting up of Home Rule. . . . Impatient at any delay, the mass [of Irishmen] gradually arifted away from their leaders to the radicals, and in the end, when the Nationalist leaders tried to keep their following, they had to be almost as resolute in their opposition as Sinn Fein, with which at times they seemed in accord."-E. R. Turner, Ireland and England, pp. 433-434, 415417.-This was the state of affairs when the election of 1918, under the new Franchise Act, gave the Sinn Fein an opportunity to show its strength. The contest lay between the Nationalists and Sinn Fein; between Home Rule, and a claim for complete independence with representation at the peace conference. The result of the election was the return of seventy-three Sinn Fein members, twenty-five Unionists, and seven Nationalists. In Ulster, the Unionist strength was unimpaired, and the members had been returned with very large majorities. But south and west of the Boyne, Sinn Fein had swept all before it.

1918 (March 6).-John Redmond and Convention.-Death of Redmond.-John Redmond, who had been chosen leader of the Irish party in the House of Commons in 1900, had been one of the most outstanding figures in Irish politics for many years. The Third Home Rule Act, so strenuously opposed by Sir Edward Carson, was regarded by Redmond as a reasonable measure to be accepted as a final settlement of the question, and he hoped that it would quiet agitation which Lad kept the country so long in a state of upheaval. The failure to put the act in operation, his attitude on the World War, and the split in the ranks of the National Volunteers greatly lessened his authority but he was still a man to be reckoned with, and but for an untoward circumstance might have made a success of the convention of 1917-1918. On January 4, 1918, he made a speech, the greatest he had made in the convention, in which, speaking of the Unionists, he said

IRELAND, 1919

"Between these men and us there never again can be the differences of the past. They have put behind them all bitter memories. They have agreed to the framework of a Bill better than any offered to us in 1886, 1893 or 19:4." In this spirit he accepted proposals for a compromise, made by Lord Midleton, the Unionist leader, provided they were "adopted by His Majesty's Government as a settlement of the Irish question and legislature effect be given to them forthwith." The convention, however, adjourned and when it met again he withdrew his motion because he had found that "some very important Nationalist representatives are against this course-the Catholic bishops, Mr. Devlin-and others. No one can overstate the effect of this episode. Redmond's personal ascendancy in the convention had become

very great.... The Ulstermen had more than once expressed their views that if Home Rule were sure to mean Redmond's rule, their objection to it would be materially lessened. Now, they saw Redmond thrown over, and by a combination in which the clerical influence, so much distrusted by them, was paramount. [Illness prevented Redmond from attending a conference of delegates with the Prime Minister in London on February 13, and on March 6, the members of the Convention were shocked by the news that he was dead]."-S. L. Gwynn, John Redmond's last years, pp. 310-335.

1918-1922.-General strikes. See LABOR STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS: 1918-1922: General strikes in Ireland.

1919.-Meeting of Dail Eireann.-New proclamation.-Escape of De Valera.-Philadelphia convention.-Stand taken by Ulster.-"Civil Army."-Outbreak at Fermoy.-"It was soon evident that the government would do much to avoid a collision. The Sinn Fein adherents styled themselves the Irish Republican Party. In January, many of the members just elected [all of