This left no armoured vessel remaining except the Sevastopol, for the Poltava had already been sunk by a chance 11-inch shell in her main magazine before the hill was taken. . . . [The Sevastopol ran to the outside roads, and after a brave defence was sunk by the commander on orders from Port Arthur. The fortress itself capitulated on January 2, 1905.] Thus the Japanese once again entered into possession of the great naval base after a siege of 154 days, watched with the closest interest by the whole civilized world, and conducted from first to last for the vital purpose of weakening the enemy's maritime position. The effort had cost the victors 60,000 men, and compelled them to undertake their Manchurian campaign with a much smaller force than would have otherwise been available, but it disposed of all the Russian Pacific Fleet and left the enemy with only one fortified seaport in the East. The prestige attaching to such a feat of arms was necessarily immense, and the practical benefits were proportionate."-G. A. Ballard, Influence of the sea on the political history of Japan, pp. 251-256, 260.-"The two great offensives of Kuropatkin

JAPAN, 1902-1905

in fact, it was about to turn them on the west. Of the existence of Kawamura's Army, Kuropatkin appears to have had little or no suspicion. The Japanese army numbered some 400,000. According to Japanese calculations, Kuropatkin had 300,000 infantry, 26,000 cavalry, and 1,368 guns with which to parry Oyama's blows. The Russians Iwere divided into four armies. The Second, under General Kaulbars, was on the right wing, occupying a line sixteen miles long. Cavalry detachments prolonged Kaulbars's right across the Liao-ho. East of Kaulbars was Bilderling with the Third Army astride the Liao-yang-Mukden railway. The left wing was formed by the First Army under General Linievitch, disposed along a thirty-mile front, reaching to the head waters of the Sha-ho. South and east of the Upper Sha-ho were detached bodies operating in the mountainous region between the Sha-ho and the Tai-tzu-ho. The Fourth Army, known as the 'General Reserve,' was south of Mukden. To mystify Kuropatkin and to weaken the forces holding this fiftyseven mile long line between the Liao-ho on the west and the headwaters of the Sha-ho on the

had failed, but, owing largely to the energy of Prince Khilkoff, a constant stream of reinforcements from Europe was flowing into Manchuria, and Kuropatkin would soon have on the Sha-ho an army of half a million men. If Oyama delayed his attack till April, the break-up of winter, by rendering the ground impassable, would enable the Russians to complete their entrenchments round Mukden [where they had fallen back after their defeats in August]. . . . Oyama proposed, before the roads became impassable, to strike at the Russians, and the Mikado and his ministers responded energetically to his requests. Reserve brigades were added to the divisions of Oku, Nodzu, and Kuroki. A new army (the Fifth) under General Kawamura, formed of reservists, was secretly brought up and placed on the Japanese right wing, and Nogi's victorious forces from Port Arthur were with equal secrecy sent to reinforce Oyama's left. They were kept well in the rear of Oku and Nodzu until Kawamura's turning movement had produced the desired psychological effect on Kuropatkin's mind. To deceive the latter, a portion of Nogi's troops operated with Kuroki, and he was led to believe that the Japanese army from Port Arthur was trying to turn his lines on the east, when,

GENERAL KUROKI

east, the Japanese commander-in-chief employed two devices. The activities of the mounted brigands in Mongolia were stimulated, raids in February being made against the Harbin-Mukden railway. Reports reached Kuropatkin that a force of over 10,000 troops was in Mongolia preparing to cut the line on which the safety of his whole army depended. Alarmed for his rear, he weakened his field army to strengthen the lineof-communication troops. The second device consisted in the landing of Japanese troops in Northern Corea who might attack Vladivostok. . . . These feints of Oyama exercised considerable influence on the series of battles known as 'The Battle of Mukden,' which began on February 23. Between the last-mentioned date and February 28 the left wing of the Russian army in the mountainous region between the Tai-tzu-ho and the Sha-ho was attacked by unexpectedly large bodies. of the enemy, including troops from Nogi's Army. It was Kawamura's Army, driving Rennenkampf's detachment before him, and turning Linievitch's left. Believing that the Japanese were about to repeat their manœuvre at Liao-yang, Kuropatkin heavily reinforced Linievitch and Rennenkampf. On the 28th he learnt, however, that masses of infantry and cavalry, afterwards ascertained to

be Nogi's Army, were marching between the Liaoho and the Hun-ho towards the west of Mukden. The objective of Nogi was the Russian communications between Mukden and Harbin. To counter him, reinforcements of more than fifty battalions were added to Kaulbars's Army, and Kaulbars was ordered to take the offensive. In the fighting that ensued Kaulbars was generally unsuccessful, and Nogi's turning movement each day became more menacing. On March 7 Kuropatkin drew back Bilderling and Linievitch to the fortified positions south of Mukden. From March 9 to March 16 a desperate battle raged round the capital of Manchuria. With the greatest difficulty Kuropatkin extricated himself from his perilous position and effected his retreat on Tiehling, whence he retired to a position between Tiehling and the River Sungari. The Russians had lost, according to Oyama's reports, 27,700 killed, 110,000 wounded, and a vast quantity of war material; the Japanese losses up to March 12 were estimated at 41,222. Kuropatkin, who in his report to the Tsar very honourably stated that he considered himself 'the person principally responsible' for the defeat, was superseded by Linievitch on the 20th. A single-minded patriot, Kuropatkin consented to serve under his erstwhile subordinate."-R. P. Porter, Japan, pp. 203-205.-"The greater part of the Russian Atlantic fleet under command of Admiral Rovjestensky [Rojdestvensky] left Libau on October 12th, 1904, for the seat of war in order to go to the assistance of Port Arthur. The capture of the fortress and the destruction of the fleet here struck a severe blow at this maritime enterprise, but did not decide its fate. It was possible for the Russian squadron to destroy the Japanese fleet which equalled theirs in number, or at least to reach Vladivostok and thence to conduct surprise attacks on the Japanese coast, and endanger the transports of Japan on their way to the seat of war. Part of the Russian fleet took the route round the Cape of Good Hope, and another part that through the Mediterranean. At the request of Admiral Rovjestensky, the Czar despatched the rest of the Atlantic fleet on February 5th, and it took the shorter Mediterranean route. The Russian squadrons met off the coast of Annan, and proceeded together to the north. The Japanese fleet had secretly taken up its position in the straits of Korea. Vladivostok could be reached by three routes: through the straits of Korea, through the straits of Tsugaru between the islands of Honto and Ezo, and through the straits of Soya, between the islands of Ezo and Saghalien. It was impossible for the Japanese navy to defend all three straits at one time, for they would not when divided have been equal to the Russian fleet. Togo reckoned that the enemy, through the strictest secrecy regarding the Japanese position, would take the nearest route through the straits of Korea. His assumption was correct. The Russians had no knowledge of the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet, and proceeded up the straits of Korea. At 5 a. m. in the morning of May 27th, one of the guardships posted in the south, sent the following message to Admiral Togo by wireless telegraphy: 'The enemy's squadron has been sighted at point No. 203. The enemy is apparently steering towards the eastern passage.' Between 10 and II o'clock the cruiser squadron under Vice-Admiral Kataoka, the division under Rear-Admiral Dewa came into touch with the enemy between the islands of Iki and Tsushima. They did not answer their fire and contented themselves by telegraphing every moment all details of the enemy's posi

tion to Admiral Togo. Thus Togo knew before he came in sight of the enemy's fleet that its fighting line consisted of the whole strength of the second and third Atlantic squadron which were accompanied by about seven special service ships, that the ships were formed in two fore and aftlines, that the chief strength was at the head of the right line and the service ships were at the end, and that the whole armada was steering north-east at a speed of about 12 knots, Togo could now make plans in accordance, and give his orders. The battle was begun at 2 o'clock by the Japanese, near Okinoshima. Togo signalled to all ships in sight the following message: 'The existence of the Empire depends on this battle. Japan expects this day the courage and energy of every officer and every man in the fleet.' Togo with the chief strength, the Dewa and Uriu divisions, went against the head of the left column; the cruiser squadron and the Togo (Masaji) squadron steered south and attacked the enemy in the rear. The Russian fleet fell into disorder, the two columns came to blows, and sought in vain to free themselves and escape from the net prepared for them by the Japanese. Battle lasted till sunset. At 20 minutes past seven Togo ordered his fleet to assemble at the island of Ullong. The issue of the fight was decidedly favourable to the Japanese. A large number of the finest Russian ships were sunk, the rest were almost without exception badly damaged. The Japanese suffered no losses. In the night the destroyers and torpedo boats began to be active, and showed great boldness; some of them approached so close to the Russian ships that the latter could not shoot at them. The Japanese did an enormous amount of damage, but themselves only lost 3 torpedo-vessels. The next morning (May 28th) the Japanese fleet with its whole strength continued the work of destruction. At half-past

the Russian fleet was entirely surrounded at a point 18 nautical miles south of Takenoshima. Soon after the Japanese opened fire, Rear-Admiral Nebugatov declared the surrender of the 4 ships under his command. The battle against the rest continued until noon. Then the destroyer Bjedovie, on board of which was Admiral Rovjestensky [Rojdestvensky] and his staff, hoisted the white flag. Of the whole Russian fleet which had consisted of 38 ships, only two returned to Vladivostok. Of the rest, 23 were sunk, 7 were captured and 6 disarmed at Shanghai. The Japanese lost only the 3 torpedo-boats. This brilliant and remarkable naval victory signified not only the end of the Russian fleet, but also the end of the severe and momentous struggle. In spite of her heavy losses and of the revolution that had taken place at home during the war, the great Russian empire was not by a long way at the end of ber power. It was not difficult for Russia quickly to reinforce and increase her Manchurian army, and in spite of the defeats she had suffered, to make a successful stand against victorious but exhausted Japan. But the terrible impression of the last Japanese naval victory deprived Russia of courage to prosecute the war farther and inclined her to consider proposals for peace."-H. Saito, History of Japan, pp. 245-248.

ALSO IN: Great Britain, Official history of the Russo-Japanese War.-N. L. Klado, Russian navy in the Japanese War.-H. M. E. Brunker, Story of the Russo-Japanese War.-Official history of the Russo-Japanese War.

1904.-Influence of Russo-Japanese War ⚫on China. See CHINA: 1900-1908.

1904-1905.-Work of Young Men's Christian

RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS AFTER THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN (After the original drawing by R. Caton Woodville)

Association during Russo-Japanese War. See
Y.M.C.A.: 1854-1905.

1904-1905.-Conventions with Korea, establishing a protectorate.-Arrangement for submitting financial and diplomatic affairs to Japan. See KOREA: 1904-1905.

1904-1909.-Formation of submarine flotilla. See SUBMARINES: 1900-1918.

1905.-Treaty negotiations with Russia.-"The uselessness of further struggle had been long apparent to the rest of the world, as well as to the Russian and Japanese statesmen. Russian armies had not shown the slightest promise of ability to turn back the Japanese, and on the other hand, evidently it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, for the bearers of the Sunrise Flag to carry their standard into Russia. In this situation, . . . President Roosevelt suggested to both governments the desirability of negotiations, between plenipotentiaries of the contesting nations, to ascertain whether a treaty of peace might not be mutually acceptable. The suggestion was accepted, and after some deliberation Washington was chosen as the meeting-place; but in summer Washington is hot, so the peace conference met near Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in the General Equipment Building of the Navy Yard. The Tsar sent Count Sergius Witte, and the Ambassador to Washington, Baron Roman Romanovitch Rosen; the Japanese, Baron Jutaro Komura and the Minister to Washington, Mr. Kogoro Takahira. The negotiations began August 5th, and were conducted in secret. But from day to day the large corps of newspaper correspondents ascertained the proceedings, and the accuracy of their information, in general, is confirmed by both parties. Baron Komura proposed a number of conditions, which were refused in bulk by the Russian commissioners, whereupon the Japanese proposed consideration of each condition in detail. To the greater number of the demands of Japan the Russians acceded, with little debate. The contested paragraphs, as they came up for discussion, were deferred until the last. The main points of difference were the question of an indemnity of perhaps $600,000,000, to be paid by Russia, and the cession of the island of Sakhalin to Japan. Before these points had been decided, Mr. Sato, the first secretary of the commission, had announced to the correspondents that he expected a favorable issue of the conference. But during the discussion of them there ensued a period of gloom. Neither side seemed disposed to relinquish its standpoint. But after several conferences at Washington between the President and Baron Rosen and Baron Kaneko, a special envoy from Japan, the Russians agreed to cede half of Sakhalin, and the Japanese agreed to forego the cession of the other half, and the indemnity. This concession came to pass on August 26th, and a treaty was forthwith drawn up and sent to the Mikado and the Tsar for ratification. As published, October 16th, the agreement consists of fifteen articles. Russia acknowledged Japan's paramount interest in Korea; transferred the lease of Port Arthur, Ta-lien, and the adjacent territory, and the railway connecting Port Arthur with Chang-chung-fu and Kuan-chang-tsu, as well as the coal mines in the neighborhood, and the southern part of Sakhalin, below the 50th parallel, with the proviso that no military measures should be taken by the Japanese which might impede navigation in the straits of La Perouse and Tartary. The contracting Powers mutually agreed to evacuate Manchuria-excepting the Liaotung Peninsula-within eighteen months, and to

JAPAN, 1905-1914

restore the control thereof to China; not to obstruct any commercial measures, common to all countries, which China might take in this region; and to develop their railways for commercial purposes only, except in the Liao-tung Peninsula. Russia was to arrange with Japan for the granting to Japanese fishermen of rights to pursue their trade in the Japan, Okhotsk, and Bering seas, and the Japanese agreed to respect the rights of Russian subjects in the ceded territory. Finally, both Powers were to make estimates of the cost of taking care of prisoners, and Russia agreed to pay to Japan the difference caused by the large number of Russian prisoners who fell into Japanese hands. In both Japan and Russia this treaty was badly received. A large party in Russia desired to continue the war, feeling that, with an available army of perhaps 600,000 men opposed to the Japanese, Russia was not yet defeated. The Japanese people had hoped for an indemnity and the whole of Sakhalin, and in Tokyo there were serious riots. Martial law had to be proclaimed, and stones were thrown at Marquis Ito," who was held accountable for the concessions to Russian demands. But rebellion, which threatened to be revolution, in Russia at once threw the Japanese question into the shade. And in Japan the agitation calmed as the people saw how much more they had gained than they had demanded at the beginning of the war. The result of the struggle put Japan in the position of a firstclass Power-the dominant Power, indeed, in Eastern affairs."-D. Murray, Japan, pp. 449-453. -For text of treaty, see PORTSMOUTH, TREATY OF. 1905. Report on opium problem in Formosa. See OPIUM PROBLEM: 1905. 1905 (December).-Treaty with China relative to Manchuria. See CHINA: 1905 (December); 1905-1909.

1905-1909.-Administration in southern Sakhalin. See SAKHALIN: 1905; 1905-1909.

1905-1909.-Korea under Japanese control.Rule of Prince Ito.-Insurrection and its suppression. See KOREA: 1905-1909.

1905-1909.- Disputes with China. - Fa-kumenn and Antung-Mukden railway questions. -Japanese ultimatum. See CHINA: 1905-1909; MANCHURIA: 1905-1908.

1905-1914.-Consolidation and expansion of power and beginnings of racial conflict.-Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1905).-RootTakahira agreement (1908) concerning "open door" and territorial integrity of China."Gentlemen's agreement."--Russo-Japanese convention of 1910.-"As in 1895, the conclusion of the war only marked the commencement of a period of enormous military and naval increase. At this time Japan had no rival in sight. Russia was weakened, England was her ally, America had certainly no hostile intentions at this early date. France, Germany, and Italy were prevented geographically from collusion. Nevertheless Japan straightway went about doubling her Army and Navy, though she loaded herself with debt in order to do so. Her dockyards were so improved that in addition to repairs she could build all of her own ships, up to the largest Dreadnoughts. The scanty iron resources were developed so as to enable her arsenals to be independent of imports, her trade increased so that she should suffer from no financial dependence or inferiority. In all these endeavours Germany had been more and more her model. German science, art, customs, codes, tactics, philosophy, were diligently studied and admired. It is no small wonder that the popularity of the Anglo-Saxon began to