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Weapons Of Mass Destruction—Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST)
Question. The WMD-CST teams are response units that support civil authorities when responding to a weapons of mass destruction situation. The Congress currently has authorized 32 Civil Support Teams. In the 2003 Defense Authorization Act, language was inserted requiring the Army to provide at least one WMD Civil Support Team to each state, and to report within six months on a plan for the establishment, manning, equipping, and training of these additional teams.
Mr. Secretary, what is the status of that report?
Answer. The draft report regarding section 1403 of the 2003 Defense Authorization Act was sent to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. They will forward it to Congress after their review and approval. We expect the report will be submitted to Congress before the June 2, 2003, deadline.
Question. How long do you estimate it will take the Army to establish 23 additional teams for those states that do not currently have one?
Answer. We estimate that it will take between 18 and 24 months to establish the additional 23 teams. This period includes manning, equipping, training, and certification of these teams.
Question. What is the total cost for standing up those remaining 23 teams, and what is the number of full-time National Guard personnel that will be required to man them?
Answer. The total cost to stand up the remaining 23 teams is approximately $192.6 million in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006. A total of 506 Active Guard/ Reserve positions are required to accomplish the manning piece. This personnel increase requires an end strength authorization increase by the same amount.
Question. Break out, for the record, the cost per team for the National Guard personnel costs, their training and equipment costs.
Answer. The total cost to stand up each team is approximately $8.5 million in fiscal year 2005. This figure includes approximately $1.5 million for military construction costs per team. Personnel costs to the Army Guard are $1.66 million and about $356,000 for the Air Guard. Training and equipping costs will run about $1.6 million in operation and maintenance for the Army Guard and about $817,000 in operations and maintenance for the Army. Equipping costs for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program items will cost approximately $2.57 million.
Question. Are there any funds included in the budget request for these additional teams?
Answer. No. There is currently no funding in the fiscal year 2004 budget to establish additional WMD Civil Support Teams.
Rising Cost Of Readiness
Question. One of the recurring challenges the Army faces in managing operation and maintenance accounts is the rising cost of operating equipment, be it M-l Tanks, Bradleys, or helicopters. Growth in operating costs is squeezing out desired investment in new systems. In a February 2003 report, the General Accounting Office found that the military services pay little attention to operating and support costs and readiness during development, when there is the greatest opportunity to affect those costs positively. Rather the services focus on technical achievement, featuring immature technologies during development and fielding. Then the services pay the price down the road when operating and support costs greatly exceed expectations. And even though operating and support costs make up, on average, about 72 percent of the life cycle cost of a system, the operators and maintainers have little input to the development process.
Do you agree with the assessment that little attention is paid to operating and support costs and readiness during weapon system development, when there is the greatest opportunity to affect those costs?
Answer. We agree that in the past, the Army did not put enough emphasis on reliability, availability, and maintainability during development for some of its weapon systems, which resulted in increased operating and support costs and difficulty in maintaining readiness standards. However, that is not the case today. The Army has undertaken several initiatives to reduce weapon system operating and support costs while achieving higher levels of readiness.
The Army has placed greater emphasis on operational requirement documents for weapon systems, as well as ensuring reliability, availability, and maintainability requirements are clearly stated and designated as key performance parameters, when appropriate, to ensure requirements are achieved. This increased emphasis will ensure that established levels of reliability, availability, and maintainability are designed into weapon systems and result in lower operating and support costs and higher readiness levels.
The Army is participating with OSD in a program called Reduction of Total Ownership Costs, which focuses on reducing weapon systems operating and support costs. The Department of Defense established 30 pilot programs, 10 from each service, with a goal to reduce total ownership costs by 20 percent by fiscal year 2005. Many of these pilot programs are developmental programs. While these programs are still ongoing, many have met the 20 percent goal, and others have made substantial progress in reducing total ownership costs. OSD sponsors quarterly pilot program forums to provide continuous assessment of the programs' progress and keep them on track. In addition, the Army has established an office to provide oversight and emphasis on weapon systems supportability and operating and support cost reductions. This office conducts assessments of weapon system programs to improve supportability and cost effectiveness throughout their life cycle.
Question. What do you propose as process improvements to gain control of total ownership costs of our military equipment?
Answer. The Army is working to identify and analyze the increase in operating and sustaining costs and is leading a multi-organizational operating and sustaining cost analysis work group to develop near-term tactical and long-term strategic plans for reducing operating and sustaining costs.
Question. When the Army first developed and procured the current fleet of combat vehicles and aircraft nearly 20 years ago, planning figures for the life span of this equipment were significantly different from the OPTEMPO the Army experienced in the 1990s and thus far this decade, particularly since 9-11. What impact has this had on Army recapitalization plans, and on the rising costs of spare parts and maintenance for equipment that is aging faster than originally anticipated?
Answer. High OPTEMPO along with the operation and support costs associated with aging equipment are the main reasons that the recapitalization program exists. In fiscal year 2002-2009 the Army will spend over $21 billion in operation and maintenance and procurement appropriations to address 17 weapon systems that are critical to Army Transformation. However, recent operations and the rising costs of Transformation have caused the Army to significantly reduce the procurement spending on its recapitalization program. As a result, less than 40 percent of the combined fleets of the 17 systems will be recapitalized. Currently, there is no synchronized sustainment strategy to address the remaining fleets.
Question. How are these costs being managed over the Army Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP)?
Answer. A working group was created to identify and analyze the increase in operation and support costs over the FYDP. An increase in operation and maintenance funding for the Army's depot maintenance program, of which recapitalization is a subsidiary, has been projected to increase from $1 billion in fiscal year 2003 to over 1.6 billion in fiscal 2009. This funding will allow the Army to meet the goal of funding 90 percent of its depot maintenance requirements.
Consolidation Of The Military Personnel Accounts
Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget request recommends consolidating the six Guard and Reserve military personnel accounts with their respective active duty military personnel appropriations. The budget request proposes that the Reserves personnel pay accounts be Budget Activity 7, and the National Guard's personnel pay accounts be Budget Activity 8 under the active duty accounts.
Mr. Secretary please explain the reasons the OSD Comptroller had for merging the pay accounts into one appropriation per Service.
Answer. The military personnel pay accounts were merged to provide increased management flexibility, specifically in terms of reprogramming. Further, the Office of the Secretary of Defense anticipates the consolidation will result in an eventual net reduction of administrative workload and streamline execution for all components.
Question. What level or degree of increased flexibility does the Army gain from this consolidation?
Answer. Consolidating Guard and Reserve funds with Active Army funds reduces the number of budget activities and so increases Guard and Reserve flexibility.
Question. Will the Chiefs of the Reserve Components have full management and control of their financial resources in order to execute their Title 10 responsibilities for trained and ready forces?
Answer. Yes. Under the consolidation, the Army Reserve and the National Guard will both continue to exercise full management and control of their resources under Title 10. The consolidated appropriation preserves the current appropriation act language applicable to the Reserve and National Guard.
Question. Having separate appropriations accounts for the Active and Reserve Components allows Congress to monitor how well the services are executing their programs. What assurance can you give the Committee that the Active Component will not use the Reserve budget activities to fund their own bills or shortfalls?
Answer. The Army can give complete assurance that the Component budgets will be executed with the intent of the appropriation. Each Component's execution will remain visible and cannot be impacted without reprogramming actions, which require Office of the Secretary of Defense oversight and Congressional approval if greater than $10 million.
Reserve Component Missions
Question. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review directed a comprehensive review of the Reserve Components contributions to National Defense. One aspect of transformation, addressed in this Review, is the appropriate mix of Active and Reserve forces to meet Department of Defense's missions and responsibilities.
Mr. Secretary, are you considering transferring some combat support missions that are primarily performed by Reserve forces to the active duty military?
Answer. Yes. We are considering several options.
Question. If so, explain what Reserve forces you would restructure and the reasons for the shift.
Answer. The Army's Active and Reserve Component force mix is the result of deliberate actions to balance risks and priorities in light of operational requirements as well as resource constraints. The Army continues to adjust its force structure based on the "1-4-2-1" force-sizing construct. The Army's force mix is designed to support the geographic combatant commander's requirements and is determined using the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process. To stay within constant end strength levels, adding capabilities to the Active force will require the transfer of some mission capabilities between the Active and Reserve force. A number of options exist to reduce risk, including the conversion of lower demand structure inside the active force, converting key capabilities held in the Reserve Component (RC) but needed intermittently, and changes in Reserve personnel management to increase access by enhancing volunteerism and diminishing involuntary mobilization.
Currently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense in conjunction with the Joint Staff has undertaken a study to improve operational availability of all military forces. As part of this study, the Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) mix is being studied in the context of short notice, short duration major combat operations. This study is incomplete and will be continued as part of Defense planning for fiscal year 2005 to determine any recommended force structure changes.
Question. The 'Total Force" concept has resulted in a large percentage of the combat support and combat service support units being located in the Reserves. Would moving capabilities from the Reserves to the Active Component eliminate Reserve units, or reduce the Reserve Components' end strength levels?
Answer. I do not believe shifting capabilities between the Active and Reserve Components would impact Reserve Component end strength. As you are aware, much of the force found in the Reserve Components today is a result of decisions made to support the Total Force Policy and previous defense strategy. With the draw down during the 1990s, the Army could not maintain all of its warfighting capability in the active force and decided to place many highly specialized capabilities in the Reserve Components. The Reserve Components were configured and resourced to provide many specialized capabilities anticipated to be needed only in a protracted major theater war. Given the requirements of the new defense strategy and the high level of Reserve Component use, these force structure decisions are under review to determine the proper active and reserve force mix. We are exploring the impact of Active and Reserve Component transformation initiatives on mobilization and readiness before we make a final determination as to the proper AC/RC force mix. However, among the RC transformation initiatives is an endeavor to eliminate unready units by bringing force structure levels down to better match end strength. This will dramatically increase readiness by focusing resources on highdemand, high-OPTEMPO forces and creating rotational depth in capabilities such as civil affairs, psychological operations, biological detection, military intelligence, and military police units.
Question. Do you have an estimate of what it will cost to shift Reserve force capabilities to the active military?
Answer. No, we do not have an estimate at this time.
Spare Parts Shortfalls
Question. The Committee often hears from military units at their home bases, or when they are deployed, that the Army suffers shortages of key spare parts. In the budget request for fiscal year 2004, the Army has realigned substantial funding, over $650 million, to increase the spare parts inventory.
Please discuss the spare parts issue, and the trade offs the Army has made in order to free up the additional funds for spare parts.
Answer. The Army has had a long-standing problem with spares. In the mid 1990's, the Army systematically reduced our strategic inventories supporting all major weapon systems. This decision was made in response to DoD's attempt to right size inventories and implement stock funding of depot level reparables while adjusting the force structure after the end of the Cold War. For several years, high weapon system readiness rates and high supply stock-availability rates were maintained by redistribution of excess inventories and localrepair of components. However, in recent years, the combination of increased OPTEMPO, aging weapon systems, and reduced national level stocks negatively impacted weapon system readiness and supply availability.
In early 2000, the Army logistics and financial communities started working to develop, validate, and fund the increased requirement for spares. The Army continued to work the issue internally, but this requirement was competing with a multitude of other force structure and operational requirements. As the global war on terrorism started to unfold, the requirement continued to grow until the fiscal year 2003 unfinanced requirement reached $1,563 billion in August 2002. Based on a critical readiness need to replenish depleted peacetime inventories of repair parts and support the global war on terrorism, the Army decided to take the necessary level of risk in the base operations support accounts in the active and Reserve Component operations and maintenance appropriations for both fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004. By initiating this action, the Army is able to order long lead-time parts for inventory in anticipation of unit demands in fiscal year 2004. Because readiness of the force is especially paramount during the global war on terrorism and the uncertainty of a war with Iraq, the Army took this measured risk with the base operations support accounts.
Question. The Army's recapitalization program is shown to be fully funded for fiscal year 2004, with program growth of about $200 million.
What is your assessment of the progress being made in the Army Recapitalization Program?
Answer. The Army's Recapitalization Program continues to achieve success. During fiscal year 2002, the Army exceeded expectations achieving 102 percent of the projected systems for induction to be recapitalized. Through the second quarter of fiscal year 2003, we have already achieved 60 percent of the total fiscal year 2003 goal. Certain systems scheduled for recapitalization in the third and fourth quarters of fiscal year 2003 are ahead of the original projected quarterly goals and are already inducted for recapitalization. We again expect to achieve the goal of 100 percent of the projected systems for induction to be recapitalized in fiscal year 2003.
Question. Have you added or deleted items for fiscal year 2004?
Answer. There, have been no recapitalization system additions or deletions for fiscal year 2004. The 17 Army recapitalization programs are the AH-64D Apache; UH-60 Black Hawk; CH-47 Chinook; Ml Abrams; M2/M3 Bradley; M270A1 Multiple Launch Rocket System; Patriot Ground Support Equipment; Field Artillery Ammunition Supply Vehicle; Ml 13 Family of Vehicles; Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck; M88 Recovery Vehicle; Electronic Shops Shelter; High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle; TPQ-36 Firefinder Radar; M9 Armored Combat Earthmover; Small Emplacement Excavator; and the Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge.
The following variants within the 17 will receive no recapitalization funding starting in fiscal year 2004: M1A2 Abrams SEP retrofit; M2A3/M3A3 Bradley; M88A2 Recovery Vehicle; and the Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge.
Aircrew Training Hours
Question. Please discuss Flight School XXI. Does Flight School XXI change the Army's flying hour requirement of 14.5 hours per crew per month?
Answer. Implementation of Flight School XXI will enhance unit capabilities by providing better-trained aviators. Flight School XXI will achieve this result by assuring more aviator time in the cockpit of their primary rated aircraft, with less time in training-specific aircraft. Therefore, Flight School XXI will positively impact the quality of aviator training, even as it complements ongoing Army efforts with parts, maintenance, and deployment readiness issues to help assure the consistent execution of the established quantitative standard of 14.5 hours per crew per month.
All of Flight School XXI is funded within the aviation training base and does not change the Army's requirement of 14.5 hours per crew per month. Additionally, with a five-week average shorter course length, Flight School XXI will assist in decreasing pilot shortages in units.
Question. Is the 14.5 hours per crew per month requirement fully funded in the fiscal year 2004 budget request?
Answer. First, let me assure you that the Army intends to meet its fiscal year 2004 flying hour goal of 14.5 hours per active duty crew per month. We continue to train to maintain readiness and remain committed to achieving goals established that assure readiness, like that of 14.5 flying hours per month.
It is true that achievement of this aviation flight-training goal is sometimes impacted by factors beyond the control of the unit commander. Those external factors include aircraft downtime due to Safety of Flight maintenance issues and, to some extent, transformation and deployments. Our recent history with these factors has led the Army to budget for the fiscal year 2001 through 2002 historical average of 13.1 hours per crew per month, with plans to internally finance up to 14.5 hours as the impact of these factors for fiscal year 2004 emerge. Having said that, it is true that the Army is taking some small risk in the flying hour program for fiscal year 2004. However, this risk is prudent because it allows the Army to invest more heavily in depot maintenance and spare parts to reduce aircraft downtime. The better we do at arresting potential aviation parts and maintenance issues, the better we will do at consistent execution of our flight hour training standard. We will closely monitor execution of the flying hour program in fiscal year 2004 and make necessary adjustments to ensure that funding is not the reason for not executing the full 14.5 hour per month aviation training standard.
Question. Since student pilots spend a snorter overall time in flight school, is there a cost savings?
Answer. Although pilots spend less time in Flight School XXI and fly fewer hours there, they spend more time in simulation training and fly more hours in modernized "go to war" aircraft instead of legacy aircraft. Although the total number of hours in Flight School XXI decreases, the hours saved are offset as a result of the increased operating cost associated with flying modernized aircraft.
Facilities Sustainment, Restoration, And Modernization
Question. In the fiscal year 2004 budget request, Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM) of facilities is funded at 84 percent overall, with the sustainment piece funded at 93 percent as mandated by OSD.
What is the status of the Army's Barracks Upgrade Program?
Answer. Congressional establishment of major command baselines for SRM funding which eliminated our centrally managed OMA-funded barracks upgrade program renovations in fiscal year 2002 and 2003, in addition to internal Department priorities in fiscal year 2004, have caused us to delay completion of our barracks modernization beyond 2009. The Army does not meet DoD's goal of eliminating inadequate permanent party barracks by 2007.
Question. Please describe the Army's progress toward achieving the DoD goal of a 67-year recapitalization rate by 2007.
Answer. The Army-wide recapitalization rate for fiscal year 2004 is 144 years. Our goal is to increase recapitalization investment and meet the 67-year rate by 2007.
Question. What is the impact on mission accomplishment of the current state of facilities?
Answer. The overall condition rating of Army facilities is C—3, which impairs mission performance.
Question. In what geographic areas are the more severe facilities maintenance problems?
Answer. The geographic areas with the most severe facilities maintenance problems are those with extreme climatic conditions such as areas affected by very cold temperatures, corrosive salt, sand, and high humidity. Some of the worst geographic locations include facilities in Korea and Germany.
Army Installation Management Agency
Question. The Army has taken aggressive action to transform the management of installations. Integral to that effort has been the creation of the Installation Management Agency. The new Army field agency, activated on October 1st of 2002, is