ers to verify lessons learned and validate required items. In November 2002, PEOSoldier fielded 15 types of equipment units preparing to deploy in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. PEO-Soldier used $11 million of internal funds for this equipment.

The Army organized a team to extend RFI to the remainder of the Army and compiled a list of equipment that would be most useful to soldiers in the field. After reviewing and prioritizing the list, a standard "kit" for each BCT was approved and validated. The RFI kit is in the process of being fielded and includes items that soldiers were most commonly buying for themselves.

Question. The Committee understands that the Army and other services have taken steps recently to ensure that our soldiers have the right equipment should we face chemical or biological weapons attacks in Southwest Asia. Please comment on the state of readiness in this area and what you've done to prepare for this possibility.

Answer. Over the past nine months, the Army has aggressively addressed over 60 chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) issues and taken preparatory actions in support of combatant commanders. In broad terms, the Army has increased force readiness and combat capability in individual protective equipment, biological warfare defense, decontamination, collective protection, medical support to CBRN defense, radiological detection, chemical detection, and sensitive site exploitation and elimination operations.

U.S. forces serving in Iraq and throughout the Gulf region are trained and ready to operate in contaminated environments. Nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination on the battlefield poses significant challenges and difficulties, but these challenges are not insurmountable. Our forces are trained, and they have the equipment they need to survive and sustain operations in such an environment.

Question. What is the Army doing to insure that non-deployed units are receiving the same high levels of equipment, and not having to sacrifice training funds to buy individual equipment?

Answer. Non-deployed units have continued to conduct tough, realistic training. The Army's OPTEMPO funding program remains intact, and nondeployed units are executing aggressive home station and combined arms training strategies. Acquisition project managers are funded to acquire and field modernized individual equipment, and units are budgeted to enable them to replenish the equipment to which they are authorized.

GUARD AND RESERVE FORCE PROTECTION MISSION

Question. Mr. Secretary, please explain how the Reserve component forces have been or are involved in anti-terrorism/force protection missions this year.

Answer. Reserve component (RC) forces have been and are still involved in antiterrorism/force protection missions by supporting Active component forces within and outside continental United States locations, with security forces conducting access control and military police duties on Active and Reserve installations. RC forces also provide military intelligence support for anti-terrorism programs and other operations. Additionally, RC forces support the Active component by working in military operation centers and support federal government agencies in intelligence analysis and foreign language interpretations.

Question. What is the number of Reserve forces currently mobilized for Operation Noble Eagle to fill those requirements?

Answer. The Army has approximately 18,100 National Guard soldiers providing force protection augmentation at Army and Air Force installations. The Army has approximately 9,600 National Guard soldiers providing force protection augmentation at Army installations and approximately 8,500 National Guard soldiers providing force protection augmentation at Air Force installations.

Question. The Committee understands that the Air Force lacks the required number of security forces to provide the appropriate level of security for their facilities worldwide. Please explain why the Army National Guard is supplying soldiers to support the Air Force for their security requirements.

Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force asked the Army to provide force protection augmentation to Air Force installations. After analysis and further coordination with the Air Force, we determined the Army could support the request. The Army and Air Force developed a memorandum of agreement where the Army would provide force protection augmentation to selected Air Force installations for up to two years. Before the end of the first year, the Army and Air Force will meet to determine the level of support for the second year. The Army expects to complete this mission in December 2004.

Question. What is the number of Reserve personnel mobilized, and the length of time they will be providing security forces?

Answer. The Army has approximately 18,100 National Guard soldiers providing force protection augmentation at Army and Air Force installations. The Army rotation policy requires soldiers and units executing missions outside the continental United States to serve for six months and soldiers and units executing missions within the continental United States to serve for 12 months. We expect the mission to end in December 2004.

At this time, we cannot give a firm time when Reserve personnel force protection augmentation will cease. The requirement to provide force protection augmentation is based on threat and vulnerability assessments, commitment of Active Component forces at various installations, identification of critical infrastructure sites, and the force protection condition level. As we prepare for the follow-on rotation of forces, we review each one of these factors to determine if we can reduce or eliminate the augmentation.

Question. What are the incremental personnel and O&M costs associated with this mission for the Army? Describe the funding agreement between the Army and Air Force.

Answer. The current memorandum of agreement between the Air Force and Army provides for full reimbursement for the Army's force protection support at Air Force installations. Under this agreement, there are no incremental costs to the Army, as the Air Force pays all costs.

ANTI-TERRORISM AND FORCE PROTECTION (AT/FP)

Question. The fiscal year 2002 Army budget provided $345 million for anti-terrorism and force protection. That amount funded nearly 100 percent of the perceived requirement. In the current fiscal year Army funding for anti-terrorism and force protection grew to $505 million as a result of congressional increases. However, the requirement for fiscal year 2003 is assessed at $615 million. In the fiscal year 2004 request, the Army has sustained the increased level of AT/FP funding from 2003, but the estimated requirement has grown to $945 million.

Please discuss the Army's method or management framework for establishing anti-terrorism/force protection requirements, and the progress being made in achieving goals.

Answer. The Army is directed by Department of Defense directives and instructions to establish its own guidance, which is accomplished in Army Regulation (AR) 525-13, a regulation for all Army Major Commands (MACOMS) to execute their AT programs. The regulatory requirements and taskings provide an assessment checklist for each MACOM level AT program manager to assess their AT program as well as their subordinate units' AT programs. For several years, the Army has conducted Force Protection Assessment Team (FPAT) assessments of each of the Army MACOM AT programs by using the requirements in AR 525-13 to assess the MACOMS.

The Army also manages the overall FP programs by funding MACOM regulatory requirements. Based on the findings of these FPAT assessments, the improving of the overall FP program requirements, and the shift to controlled-access status at all Army installations, funding requirements have increased in recent years. The Army prioritizes MACOM funding requirements based on threats and vulnerabilities to their installations. The Army has made significant progress in meeting the new AT/ FP requirements for our installations. In fiscal year 2003 approximately $211 million will be spent on AT/FP military construction projects related to installation access control. In addition, approximately $302.4 million of Other Procurement, Army funds will be spent on physical security equipment controlling installation access. Question. How do you rate the Army, overall, in terms of AT/FP preparedness? Answer. The Army rating scheme is based on red, amber, and green scores. The Army rates itself in the area of AT/FP preparedness as amber. This reflects that some deficiencies still exist, but with a limited impact on mission accomplishment. Our annual FPAT assessment of MACOM AT/FP preparedness and the overall rating of their FP programs show steady improvement. In addition, the Army's initiative to control installation access has given command emphasis to the AT/FP_preparedness, which will increasingly improve our overall rating. The access control initiative is being accomplished through both enhanced physical security improvements and deployment of security forces to conduct force protection within and outside the continental United States.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION-CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS (WMD-CST)

Question. The WMD-CST teams are response units that support civil authorities when responding to a weapons of mass destruction situation. The Congress currently has authorized 32 Civil Support Teams. In the 2003 Defense Authorization Act, language was inserted requiring the Army to provide at least one WMD Civil Support Team to each state, and to report within six months on a plan for the establishment, manning, equipping, and training of these additional teams.

Mr. Secretary, what is the status of that report?

Answer. The draft report regarding section 1403 of the 2003 Defense Authorization Act was sent to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. They will forward it to Congress after their review and approval. We expect the report will be submitted to Congress before the June 2, 2003, deadline.

Question. How long do you estimate it will take the Army to establish 23 additional teams for those states that do not currently have one?

Answer. We estimate that it will take between 18 and 24 months to establish the additional 23 teams. This period includes manning, equipping, training, and certification of these teams.

Question. What is the total cost for standing up those remaining 23 teams, and what is the number of full-time National Guard personnel that will be required to man them?

Answer. The total cost to stand up the remaining 23 teams is approximately $192.6 million in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006. A total of 506 Active Guard/ Reserve positions are required to accomplish the manning piece. This personnel increase requires an end strength authorization increase by the same amount.

Question. Break out, for the record, the cost per team for the National Guard personnel costs, their training and equipment costs.

Answer. The total cost to stand up each team is approximately $8.5 million in fiscal year 2005. This figure includes approximately $1.5 million for military construction costs per team. Personnel costs to the Army Guard are $1.66 million and about $356,000 for the Air Guard. Training and equipping costs will run about $1.6 million in operation and maintenance for the Army Guard and about $817,000 in operations and maintenance for the Army. Equipping costs for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program items will cost approximately $2.57 million.

Question. Are there any funds included in the budget request for these additional teams?

Answer. No. There is currently no funding in the fiscal year 2004 budget to establish additional WMD Civil Support Teams.

RISING COST OF READINESS

Question. One of the recurring challenges the Army faces in managing operation and maintenance accounts is the rising cost of operating equipment, be it M-1 Tanks, Bradleys, or helicopters. Growth in operating costs is squeezing out desired investment in new systems. In a February 2003 report, the General Accounting Office found that the military services pay little attention to operating and support costs and readiness during development, when there is the greatest opportunity to affect those costs positively. Rather the services focus on technical achievement, featuring immature technologies during development and fielding. Then the services pay the price down the road when operating and support costs greatly exceed expectations. And even though operating and support costs make up, on average, about 72 percent of the life cycle cost of a system, the operators and maintainers have little input to the development process.

Do you agree with the assessment that little attention is paid to operating and support costs and readiness during weapon system development, when there is the greatest opportunity to affect those costs?

Answer. We agree that in the past, the Army did not put enough emphasis on reliability, availability, and maintainability during development for some of its weapon systems, which resulted in increased operating and support costs and difficulty in maintaining readiness standards. However, that is not the case today. The Army has undertaken several initiatives to reduce weapon system operating and support costs while achieving higher levels of readiness.

The Army has placed greater emphasis on operational requirement documents for weapon systems, as well as ensuring reliability, availability, and maintainability requirements are clearly stated and designated as key performance parameters, when appropriate, to ensure requirements are achieved. This increased emphasis will ensure that established levels of reliability, availability, and maintainability are designed into weapon systems and result in lower operating and support costs and higher readiness levels.

The Army is participating with OSD in a program called Reduction of Total Ownership Costs, which focuses on reducing weapon systems operating and support costs. The Department of Defense established 30 pilot programs, 10 from each service, with a goal to reduce total ownership costs by 20 percent by fiscal year 2005. Many of these pilot programs are developmental programs. While these programs are still ongoing, many have met the 20 percent goal, and others have made substantial progress in reducing total ownership costs. OSD sponsors quarterly pilot program forums to provide continuous assessment of the programs' progress and keep them on track. In addition, the Army has established an office to provide oversight and emphasis on weapon systems supportability and operating and support cost reductions. This office conducts assessments of weapon system programs to improve supportability and cost effectiveness throughout their life cycle.

Question. What do you propose as process improvements to gain control of total ownership costs of our military equipment?

Answer. The Army is working to identify and analyze the increase in operating and sustaining costs and is leading a multi-organizational operating and sustaining cost analysis work group to develop near-term tactical and long-term strategic plans for reducing operating and sustaining costs.

Question. When the Army first developed and procured the current fleet of combat vehicles and aircraft nearly 20 years ago, planning figures for the life span of this equipment were significantly different from the OPTEMPO the Army experienced in the 1990s and thus far this decade, particularly since 9–11. What impact has this had on Army recapitalization plans, and on the rising costs of spare parts and maintenance for equipment that is aging faster than originally anticipated?

Answer. High OPTEMPO along with the operation and support costs associated with aging equipment are the main reasons that the recapitalization program exists. In fiscal year 2002-2009 the Army will spend over $21 billion in operation and maintenance and procurement appropriations to address 17 weapon systems that are critical to Army Transformation. However, recent operations and the rising costs of Transformation have caused the Army to significantly reduce the procurement spending on its recapitalization program. As a result, less than 40 percent of the combined fleets of the 17 systems will be recapitalized. Currently, there is no synchronized sustainment strategy to address the remaining fleets.

Question. How are these costs being managed over the Army Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP)?

Answer. A working group was created to identify and analyze the increase in operation and support costs over the FYDP. An increase in operation and maintenance funding for the Army's depot maintenance program, of which recapitalization is a subsidiary, has been projected to increase from $1 billion in fiscal year 2003 to over 1.6 billion in fiscal 2009. This funding will allow the Army to meet the goal of funding 90 percent of its depot maintenance requirements.

CONSOLIDATION OF THE MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCOUNTS

Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget request recommends consolidating the six Guard and Reserve military personnel accounts with their respective active duty military personnel appropriations. The budget request proposes that the Reserves personnel pay accounts be Budget Activity 7, and the National Guard's personnel pay accounts be Budget Activity 8 under the active duty accounts.

Mr. Secretary please explain the reasons the OSD Comptroller had for merging the pay accounts into one appropriation per Service.

Answer. The military personnel pay accounts were merged to provide increased management flexibility, specifically in terms of reprogramming. Further, the Office of the Secretary of Defense anticipates the consolidation will result in an eventual net reduction of administrative workload and streamline execution for all components.

Question. What level or degree of increased flexibility does the Army gain from this consolidation?

Answer. Consolidating Guard and Reserve funds with Active Army funds reduces the number of budget activities and so increases Guard and Reserve flexibility.

Question. Will the Chiefs of the Reserve Components have full management and control of their financial resources in order to execute their Title 10 responsibilities for trained and ready forces?

Answer. Yes. Under the consolidation, the Army Reserve and the National Guard will both continue to exercise full management and control of their resources under Title 10. The consolidated appropriation preserves the current appropriation act language applicable to the Reserve and National Guard.

Question. Having separate appropriations accounts for the Active and Reserve Components allows Congress to monitor how well the services are executing their programs. What assurance can you give the Committee that the Active Component will not use the Reserve budget activities to fund their own bills or shortfalls?

Answer. The Army can give complete assurance that the Component budgets will be executed with the intent of the appropriation. Each Component's execution will remain visible and cannot be impacted without reprogramming actions, which require Office of the Secretary of Defense oversight and Congressional approval if greater than $10 million.

RESERVE COMPONENT MISSIONS

Question. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review directed a comprehensive review of the Reserve Components contributions to National Defense. One aspect of transformation, addressed in this Review, is the appropriate mix of Active and Reserve forces to meet Department of Defense's missions and responsibilities.

Mr. Secretary, are you considering transferring some combat support missions that are primarily performed by Reserve forces to the active duty military?

Answer. Yes. We are considering several options.

Question. If so, explain what Reserve forces you would restructure and the reasons for the shift.

Answer. The Army's Active and Reserve Component force mix is the result of deliberate actions to balance risks and priorities in light of operational requirements as well as resource constraints. The Army continues to adjust its force structure based on the "1-4-2-1" force-sizing construct. The Army's force mix is designed to support the geographic combatant commander's requirements and is determined using the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process. To stay within constant end strength levels, adding capabilities to the Active force will require the transfer of some mission capabilities between the Active and Reserve force. A number of options exist to reduce risk, including the conversion of lower demand structure inside the active force, converting key capabilities held in the Reserve Component (RC) but needed intermittently, and changes in Reserve personnel management to increase access by enhancing volunteerism and diminishing involuntary mobilization.

Currently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense in conjunction with the Joint Staff has undertaken a study to improve operational availability of all military forces. As part of this study, the Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) mix is being studied in the context of short notice, short duration major combat operations. This study is incomplete and will be continued as part of Defense planning for fiscal year 2005 to determine any recommended force structure changes.

Question. The "Total Force” concept has resulted in a large percentage of the combat support and combat service support units being located in the Reserves. Would moving capabilities from the Reserves to the Active Component eliminate Reserve units, or reduce the Reserve Components' end strength levels?

Answer. I do not believe shifting capabilities between the Active and Reserve Components would impact Reserve Component end strength. As you are aware, much of the force found in the Reserve Components today is a result of decisions made to support the Total Force Policy and previous defense strategy. With the draw down during the 1990s, the Army could not maintain all of its warfighting capability in the active force and decided to place many highly specialized capabilities in the Reserve Components. The Reserve Components were configured and resourced to provide many specialized capabilities anticipated to be needed only in a protracted major theater war. Given the requirements of the new defense strategy and the high level of Reserve Component use, these force structure decisions are under review to determine the proper active and reserve force mix. We are exploring the impact of Active and Reserve Component transformation initiatives on mobilization and readiness before we make a final determination as to the proper AC/RC force mix. However, among the RC transformation initiatives is an endeavor to eliminate unready units by bringing force structure levels down to better match end strength. This will dramatically increase readiness by focusing resources on highdemand, high-OPTEMPO forces and creating rotational depth in capabilities such as civil affairs, psychological operations, biological detection, military intelligence, and military police units.

Question. Do you have an estimate of what it will cost to shift Reserve force capabilities to the active military?

Answer. No, we do not have an estimate at this time.