Answer. The Joint Logistics Warfighting Initiative (JLWI) adds a capability to the legacy_logistics systems at the operational level that the Army has not had in the past. This capability greatly widened the access to more timely supply and maintenance information through web-based tools. JLWI works well in base support and garrison operations and was used in Operation Enduring Freedom and in Iraq. However, without a more robust communication's architecture, JLWI and other webbased applications will have limited use during combat operations. The logistical functionality in JLWI is viewed as a capability that must be addressed when the Army transforms its logistics enterprise and converts to an enterprise resource planning based logistics solution.

Question. Does the Army plan to continue and expand use of the Joint Logistics Warfighting Initiative?

Answer. The Army will continue to use JLWI until the introduction of the enterprise resource planning software. There is no plan for the Army to expand JLWI beyond those units already programmed.

FISCAL YEAR 2004 PROGRAM TERMINATIONS

Question. The fiscal year 2004 Army budget request proposes terminating 24 programs and restructuring an additional 24 to free up the financial resources needed to support the Future Combat System and transformation to the Objective Force. Many of the terminated and restructured programs are so-called Legacy Force programs such as the M1A2 SEP, Bradley Fighting Vehicle A3 upgrade, and related programs. The Army estimates that $2.3 billion becomes available in fiscal year 2004 because of these actions, and $2.6 billion becomes available in fiscal year 2005. Please highlight the major system terminations proposed in the fiscal year 2004 budget request.

Answer. The Army terminated the 24 programs listed on the following table in the fiscal year 2004-2009 Future Years Defense Plan.

Question. What are the associated savings estimated for fiscal year 2004? Over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP)?

Answer. The Army reallocated the $13.9 billion to its Transformation efforts over the FYDP period. For fiscal year 2004 $1.6 billion was garnered from these terminations for Transformation.

Question. The budget request proposes terminating the M1A2 SEP and Bradley A3 programs. In light of these proposed terminations, do you have concerns about maintaining the industrial base needed to produce the Future Combat System (FCS) beginning in fiscal year 2008?

Answer. Army Transformation required cancellation of certain programs to fund a variety of transformational initiatives to achieve greater war fighting capability over the long term. We assessed the risks to the industrial base from these program cancellations and, where we judged necessary, we have taken steps to mitigate adverse impacts. We saw two major risks to the industrial base as a result of the decision to not modernize the Counterattack Corps. Both of these risks involved maintaining viable armor system production capabilities at two production facilities: the Lima Army Tank Plant at Lima, Ohio, and the United Defense combat vehicle production facility at York, Pennsylvania.

The first risk involves the General Dynamics' combat vehicle fabrication capability at the Lima Army Tank Plant. We judged that risk as unacceptable since Lima initially had an insufficient workload to remain viable as a production facility for the fabrication of the Marine Corps' Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle and the Army's FCS ground vehicles. To mitigate this risk, the Army has restructured some programs and now has sufficient work to sustain Lima in active production until these new programs are brought into production.

The second risk involved maintaining the United Defense's combat vehicle production facility in Pennsylvania. We recognize that this facility would also be a likely candidate to manufacture FCS ground vehicles in the future. We expect that the production facilities in Pennsylvania will remain viable and open through calendar year 2004 because of a continuation of their current fiscal year 2003 Bradley upgrade work. With this expectation and acceptance of risk, we did not program fiscal year 2004 funding for Bradley upgrades to protect that portion of the industrial base.

While we cannot guarantee additional work from support for fielded systems, foreign sales, and reprocessing vehicles from operations in Iraq, the Army is looking hard at workload projections after calendar year 2004 and identifying fiscal year 2005 options which might be needed to protect any United Defense combat vehicle fabrication capability determined essential for future production. Those options will consider United Defense work on development of manned FCS non-line of sight gun system, unmanned ground systems, foreign sales, and other new non-traditional business. All of the other industrial base risks from not funding the Counterattack Corps are judged acceptable.

We expect fiscal year 2003 funding and other work to keep essential skills active through the end of calendar year 2004, given that final vehicle deliveries are scheduled for June 2005. The program funding for Bradley system sustainment and technical support will transition in fiscal year 2006 from procurement to the Operation and Maintenance, Army account. We believe United Defense's engineering staff and the Army's own in-house staff will be able to sustain the vehicles made by United Defense.

The shortage of Bradley upgrade funding is manageable, but there are two key issues we must address. The first issue is how we will fund the required technical support to the fielded fleet. For fiscal year 2003, the Army will have to fund the technical support from operation and maintenance accounts. That will present a problem for us because we will be addressing not only peacetime requirements but operational requirements associated with the global war on terrorism and operations in Iraq. Obviously, we will finance the highest priority operational requirements first and defer those which are lower priority. A second issue is whether key suppliers will abandon the supplier network as we reduce requirements. This is a continuing problem, and we will do more tradeoff analysis to support decisions, for example, to either stockpile components or find alternate suppliers.

Question. The budget request proposes terminating production of the M919 depleted uranium cartridge for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Are the stocks of this round sufficient to meet requirements from now through the retirement of the Bradley?

Answer. The Army has not funded the M919 program due to other higher-priority requirements. However, the program has received funds through Congressional plus-ups in fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003. Procurement will end with the fiscal year 2003 appropriation unless the Congress directs additional funds into the program. The Army will have produced a quantity of approximately 2.14 million cartridges through the end of fiscal year 2004. The Army acquisition objective stands at 5.3 million cartridges. There is a $30 million critical unfunded requirement in the fiscal year 2004 budget. Stocks of the M919 cartridge, along with stocks of its less-capable predecessor cartridge, the M792, are sufficient to meet the needs of the

Bradley Fighting Vehicle through its retirement. The Bradley family of armored combat vehicles will be an integral part of the Army force structure until fiscal year 2045. During this timeframe, the M919 depleted uranium cartridge will provide soldiers with a lethal fighting capability that also enhances their survival on the battlefield.

Question. In fiscal year 2003, the Army proposed 18 systems terminations. Some are being reconsidered. For example, in fiscal year 2003 the Army terminated the Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures (ATIRCM) system, yet this program received $75 million in the fiscal year 2004 budget request. Please explain the apparent inconsistency.

Answer. The ATIRCM program was not officially terminated in the fiscal year 2003 budget submission. With the fiscal year 2003 submission, the Army zeroed the ATIRCM procurement but left research, development, test, and evaluation funding in place to examine cost-reduction strategies within the program. The Army eliminated funding for procurement because of several factors including, poorly defined requirements, escalating costs, and to a lesser extent, because the Air Force and the Navy in 2000 withdrew from the Common Missile Warning System (CMWS). The Army transferred funding to the Special Operations Command for procurement of 97 ATIRCM/CMWS systems through fiscal year 2008.

In the fiscal year 2004 budget submission, the ATIRCM program contains funding for a new procurement strategy to develop an affordable counter-infrared program. The Army completed an aircraft survivability study to determine the optimal strategy to field survivability equipment to its conventional forces. The strategy proposes installing wiring harnesses for the modernized fleet (AH-64D Longbow, UH-60M Black Hawk, and CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter) and procuring countermeasure systems (ATIRCM, CMWS, improved countermeasure dispensers, and advanced infrared countermeasure munitions) in unit size sets. A unit size set is defined as a corps-, division-, or brigade-sized element. This revised procurement strategy offers an affordable solution to counter-infrared technology fielding and is funded in the fiscal year 2004 budget submission.

Question. Are there systems on the fiscal year 2004 list over which the Army has reservations?

Answer. Based on lessons learned from the war on terrorism, the Army reviewed ongoing operations and revalidated limited numbers for four systems, that had been terminated during the preparation of the fiscal year 2004 budget submission: Tactical Exploitation System (TES), M919 25mm ammunition, Stinger missile, and the Joint Tactical Terminal. As part of the fiscal year 2004 budget submission, the Army also generated a list of critical unfunded priorities. Three of the revalidated systems were placed on this list (TES, M919, and Stinger). In all cases, the unfunded priorities procure systems to meet an identified Army shortfall in the global war on terrorism.

STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT CAPABILITIES

Question. The Army plans to establish six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTS) to be supported by approximately 300 Stryker vehicles per team. From fiscal year 2000 through 2003, $2.8 billion has been provided to purchase 1,100 vehicles. The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes $955 million to purchase 301 additional vehicles. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has recently reconsidered the extent of the Stryker program. Vehicles to support the first four SBCTs have been fully funded through the fiscal year 2004 budget request. The fifth and sixth brigades have been put on hold pending an Army study due to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in July 2003. Section 8121 of the fiscal year 2003 Defense Appropriations Act requires the Department of Defense to program and budget for no less than six Stryker Brigades.

Please provide your assessment of the state of the Stryker program.

Answer. SBCTs provide an invaluable means of spearheading Army Transformation. The SBCT trains junior officers and noncommissioned officers-tomorrow's commanders and command sergeants major-in the tactics, techniques, and procedures that will inform employment of the Objective Force. The Army has resourced six SBCTS in the Future Years Defense Program to contribute to fulfilling the "1-4-2-1" defense construct and national security requirements. However, at this time, the Secretary of Defense has only authorized the procurement of the first four brigades. The Army will provide the Secretary of Defense with a plan for Stryker Brigades five and six.

Question. Has development of all variants of the Stryker been completed? Answer. No. Development of the Mobile Gun System and the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle continues. The initial low-rate production de

cision for both vehicles is scheduled for December 2003 with first unit deliveries scheduled for December 2004.

Question. What is the status of the Mobile Gun System (MGS) and Reconnaissance variants of the Stryker? Is the development of these variants complete?

Answer. Development of these variants continues with the initial low-rate production decision scheduled for December 2003 and first unit deliveries scheduled for December 2004. Reconnaissance Vehicle (RV) development is near completion, with 66 to be fielded by mid April 2003. Modifications to the RV are a result of lessons learned coming out of testing and are designed to ensure the vehicle meets its requirements and is safe for soldier use.

Question. What type of test ammunition is required to support completing the development of the MĜS? Are the stocks of this ammunition sufficient to support development of the MGS?

Answer. Qualification testing of six types of 105mm ammunition cartridges supports MGS development. They include the M900 armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot; M456A2 high-explosive, anti-tank (HEAT); M393 high explosive; and training rounds for each. MGS development will use about 500 rounds of each during ammunition compatibility and safety qualification testing. The Army has sufficient, serviceable stocks of existing M900 sabot and M456 HEAT cartridges and their associated training cartridges for use with the MGS. The Army does, however, lack sufficient, serviceable stocks of high explosive and anti-personnel cartridges to support the MGS. These cartridges have passed their 20-year service life. In parallel and in conjunction with the MGS development, the Army is re-procuring a replacement for the M393A2 high explosive plastic and a matching training cartridge. In addition, the Army is developing a canister cartridge to meet the antipersonnel requirement.

STRYKER/M113 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Question. Section 113(c) of the fiscal year 2001 Defense Authorization Act required the Army to conduct an evaluation of Medium Armored Vehicles. The results of the evaluation were submitted to the Congress in January of 2003. The evaluation compared the capabilities and characteristics of the Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) and the M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC). The Army evaluation concludes that the ICV provides advantages in the areas of force protection and survivability, support to the dismounted assault and close fight, and mobility. Given this conclusion, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved obligation of funds appropriated for the Stryker. The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes $955 million for an additional 301 vehicles.

What are the main differences in the survivability of the Stryker compared to the M113 (with and without armor kits)? Which vehicle is superior in this regard and why?

Answer. The primary difference in survivability is that the Stryker has protection against 14.5mm threats, while the M113A3 provides protection from 7.62 mm threats. The M113A3 needs several hours of preparation if 14.5mm armor protection is required. The Army does not own any M113A3 14.5mm armor sets. With addon armor kits, both vehicles can provide protection against rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). The Army will have RPG armor for the Stryker, but does not have any RPG armor kits for its M113A3s. Stryker does not have the additional noise associated with "track slap." With its lower acoustic signature, Stryker is less likely to be detected than a M113A3. Additionally, the automatic fire extinguishing system in the Stryker ICV can put out a fire after the vehicle is hit and provides a better chance of preserving the lives of the crew and enabling the vehicle, if still mobile, to continue the mission. The lack of an onboard automatic fire detection and extinguishing capability places the M113A3 crew at greater risk than the crew of the Stryker ICV. Overall, the Stryker is significantly more survivable than the M113A3 and, therefore, has a greater capability to safely deliver soldiers to the fight than the M113A3.

Question. What are the differences between these systems for "limp home" capability? Which vehicle is superior in this regard and why?

Answer. The Stryker has superior "limp home" capability-also referred to as residual mobility. Immobilized vehicles result in the loss of combat power-each vehicle and its squad is one-quarter of the platoon's combat power. It is likely that a vehicle will remain under enemy fire following a mine strike or other engagement that results in damage. If an M113A3 loses a track, it becomes immobilized and the squad must defend the vehicle while the crew repairs it-requiring at least an hour to prepare the vehicle to "limp home." However, even after losing one or more

wheels, the Stryker can immediately "limp home" and self-evacuate to a protected position to make repairs or continue the operation.

Question. What are the performance differences in supporting dismounted assault and close combat? Which vehicle is superior in this regard and why?

Answer. The Stryker is superior in its ability to support the infantry squad in combat. With its superior armor and the remote weapon station (RWS), the Stryker commander can operate the integrated RWS under protection and provide accurate direct fire against targets from a stationary position to support dismounted infantry operations. Conversely, a M113A3 commander must operate his pintle-mounted weapon from exposed position. Moreover, RWS day and night sight pictures can be shown on the squad leader's display, which is visible to the entire squad riding in the Stryker and allows the squad a 360 degree view of the surrounding area before dismounting. This increases the fidelity of the squad's situational awareness, enhancing their survivability and likelihood of mission success. To replicate this capability, the M113A3 gunner must scan the surrounding area with binoculars or a night vision scope while exposed, and communicate his observations to the squad verbally.

Question. What are the performance differences between these vehicles in the areas of mobility (both on- and off-road), transportability, and recovery?

Answer. The Stryker has much greater fuel economy than the M113A3 over flat, level primary roads, and is self-deployable by highway. The M113A3 may require transportation support for longer intra-theater moves and movements to and from ports of debarkation/embarkation. The comparison evaluation results reflected that the Stryker is able to deliver an infantry squad to the fight faster when employed in the projected operational terrain mix. The Stryker's superior road movement capability enables the entire Stryker Brigade Combat Team to self deploy in parallel with other means of intra-theater transport, such as C-130 aircraft and theater support vessels, or when other transport means are not advantageous or available, to concentrate combat power or fight dispersed as required.

The Stryker and the M113A3 are air transportable in C-130, C-5, and C-17 aircraft. One vehicle, a Stryker or M113A3, can be transported in a C-130. A C-17 can transport three vehicles of either type. The M113A3 is smaller and lighter, enabling strategic air deployments by C-5 to carry two additional vehicles. The M113A3 has better capability in soft soil, but when it gets stuck, it requires extraction by external recovery assets. The Stryker's self-recovery and likevehicle-recovery capabilities reduce its disadvantages in terrain favorable to the M113A3. With pivot steering, the M113A3 does have a better turning radius than the Stryker.

Question. Please summarize the Army's experience with operational vignettes at Fort Lewis, the National Training Center, and elsewhere comparing the performance of these vehicles.

Answer. The Army is pleased with the Stryker's performance at Fort Lewis and the National Training Center. During the comparison evaluation operational vignettes, both vehicles adequately supported platoon missions, but the Stryker provided better overall operational capability. Analysis of the comparison evaluation technical data identified differences between the vehicles and the results of operational vignettes complemented those findings. Soldiers participating in these vignettes overwhelmingly favored the Stryker over the M113A3. When capabilities of both vehicles are compared, considering the variables of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available, the Stryker provides a greater capability across a wider range of possible operating conditions.

During Millennium Challenge 2002, the Stryker proved itself quite mobile in the mountainous terrain of the National Training Center. The opposing forces remarked that the Stryker surmounted terrain that no other vehicle, wheeled or tracked, had been able to climb. While both vehicles provide the basic capabilities to conduct required tasks and subtasks, mission success is impacted by how soldiers employ the vehicle. The Stryker provides significant advantages in the areas of force protection and survivability, support to the dismounted assault and close fight, and mobility.

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Question. The Army describes the Future Combat System as its number one priority supporting transformation to the Objective Force. The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes $1.7 billion in Army research and development funding. This includes FCS System Design and Development (SDD) funding, as well as funding for Netfires and the Objective Force Indirect Fire system. The later two elements of FCS were included in the Crusader budget amendment proposed by the Administration for fiscal year 2003.