What is the current status of the Future Combat System? Please outline for the Committee the upcoming steps in the development process for FCS.

Answer. The FCS program is in the latter stages of the concept and technology development phase of the DoD acquisition model. The Army and DARPA have identified the concepts and technologies necessary to develop, integrate, field, and sustain FCS Increment I. The Army will recommend to DoD that the program transition from concept and technology_development to system development and demonstration at the FCS Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board in May 2003. The next major milestone is at the initial production decision in 2008 leading to the Army's initial operating capability at the end of the decade.

Question. The Committee understands that the Army has recently released 24 requests for proposal (RFPs) for various technologies that will comprise FCS. Please explain the primary areas of emphasis of these RFPs.

Answer. The 23 sub-contract RFPs and one sub-contract released by the Army are primarily focused on unmanned systems; supportability; training; and command, control, communications, and computers, and intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Fully 12 of the 23 RFPs emphasize C4ISR, because the Army recognizes that network connectivity and data fusion are the most critical aspect of the FCS system of systems concept.

A unique aspect of FCS versus other individual program developments is that a Lead Systems Integrator is horizontally integrating all of the RFPs. This horizontal integration is occurring across all manned, unmanned, unattended sensors, and munitions within the FCS. In the past, larger emphasis was placed on vertical integration rather than horizontal integration. Horizontal integration is an attempt to improve connectivity between systems and capitalize on potential force effectiveness increases from the synergistic application of combat power across a force.

Question. The Committee is aware that the Milestone B decision for FCS is approaching in May of 2003. Explain what this decision represents for the development of the FCS.

Answer. The Milestone B decision represents the Office of the Secretary of Defense's approval for the FCS program to transition from concept and technology development phase to the system development and demonstration phase. A decision to proceed to the systems development and demonstration phase allows the Army, DARPA, and the Lead Systems Integrator to start the systems integration and demonstration activities necessary to enter production. More importantly, the FCS Milestone B decision represents a major step in the Army's desire to transform and achieve Objective Force capability before the end of the decade.

Question. The Committee is aware of discussions within the Army indicating that the FCS program is between $40 and $50 million short of funds to support the program through the Milestone B decision. Why? What work must be performed or accelerated in order to keep the program on schedule?

Answer. The Army and DARPA team need to reprogram $30 million dollars from within the Army to support FCS modeling and simulation (M&S) efforts. The Army believes it must build and sustain a state-of-the-art M&S capability to accomplish the engineering effort required for the FCS program. This M&S capability will increase the efficiency and quality of the design effort, allow the design team to prototype subcomponents in a three-dimensional synthetic environment, and test performance on a synthetic battlefield from different locations in a collaborative fashion. The Army sees M&S as the only way to design the FCS system of systems and make it work efficiently. Specifically, these resources will provide government licenses and services required to deliver, maintain, and improve the services of the FCS advanced collaborative environment. Included is the software and hardware backbone to integrate government-owned data and applications.

Question. The Army has chosen an acquisition strategy that relies on a Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) to coordinate the early stages of the program. Why has the Army chosen this strategy? What is the primary contribution of the LSI to development of the FCS?

Answer. The Army and DARPA chose an LSI to help manage and integrate FCS because of the magnitude and complexity of the task. The Army studied the acquisition approach of other large and complex programs, such as the National Missile Defense and International Space Station programs, to determine the best method of managing and horizontally integrating a large engineering effort. The Army concluded that the LSI concept provided the most efficient and lowest risk approach to integrate the system of systems concepts required by FCS. The Army believes that with a LSI, that it can integrate architectures and platforms, and manage the interface requirements more efficiently and effectively. Additionally, the Army is transforming away from functional mission areas and related platform development, to a more horizontally integrated process. To break the functional mission area

mold, the Army chose to competitively select an LSI to provide horizontal systems engineering development and management across the FCS system of systems.

Question. This program is the joint responsibility of the Army and DARPA. Please explain the respective roles and funding responsibilities for the Army and DARPA in development of the FCS.

Answer. DARPA and the Army combined their talents to define concepts, identify technologies, and begin development of FCS using a memorandum of agreement (MOA). The Army and DARPA have a 55/45 cost share agreement, respectively, for the concept and technology development phase of the FCS program effort. This MOA extends through 2005 and both parties are currently updating the MOA to define the FCS Increment II concept and technology demonstration phase activities. Generally, DARPA has focused on its forte of thinking outside of the box and developing novel and higher risk technologies. The Army has focused on leveraging and maturing DARPA work and technologies to the degree that they can be integrated into weapons systems.

NON LINE OF SIGHT CANNON

Question. In fiscal year 2003, the Administration proposed a budget amendment to terminate the Crusader artillery system. This proposal recommended $195.5 million to continue developing an indirect fire support element for the Future Combat System (FCS). To this, the Congress added $173 million, for a total of $368.5 million. The funding was intended to develop a firing platform as well as weapon system integration. This funding was provided specifically to the program management staff that had been developing Crusader.

Mr. Secretary, the Congress provided nearly $370 million to continue developing an indirect fire weapon for the Army including the development of a more deployable chassis. What has the Army accomplished to date with this funding?

Answer. To date, the Army/United Defense/General Dynamics team has entered the preliminary design phase for the non-line of sight cannon (NLOS-C). The NLOS-C is a manned ground vehicle that is deployable on a C-130 aircraft. The NLOS-C embodies the major design drivers that will effect an overall design for all of the other manned ground vehicle variants (mortar, direct fire cannon, etc.) in the FCS. The team has made significant up-front system engineering effort to generate and allocate the performance and functional requirements to support component design activities. The team has performed the majority of the design, analysis, and development efforts necessary to conduct detailed individual subsystem and component design within the vehicle. The team has accomplished preliminary design analyses, design option assessments, and architecture development for the electronics, software, propulsion, suspension, crew station, ammunition handling, armament, cooling, and survivability.

The engineering, architecture analysis, and design work apply not only to the NLOS-C, but to all of the other FCS manned ground vehicles. In addition, a best technical approach for the NLOS-C was presented to and accepted unanimously by the program manager, user, and Lead System Integrator. Overall, the funding has enabled the Army to substantially reduce the schedule and cost risk to the FCS manned ground vehicles and has provided a head start for the FCS system design and development phase. Finally, the FCS NLOS-C demonstrator is scheduled to begin testing this summer.

Question. An area of concern in the Committee's fiscal year 2003 deliberations was integration of a large artillery piece onto a relatively light chassis. What progress has been made to solve this problem?

Answer. The physical and dynamic forces exerted on a firing platform have been analyzed using high-fidelity computer modeling techniques. These computer models have proven to be extremely accurate in the past for measuring force loads and vehicle properties. Various suspension and propulsion options were also analyzed to determine the effect of the force transfers. Results have indicated that the addition of stabilizers to the rear of the vehicle provide sufficient support to reduce the vehicle settling time and forces experienced by the crew. Timeline analyses have also been done and confirm that this solution will support the user's aggressive response requirements. A system demonstrator is being manufactured to confirm these analyses and will undergo live testing at Yuma Proving Ground this summer.

Question. The Committee understands that the Line of Sight variant of the Future Combat System (FCS) and the NLOS cannon will share a common chassis. What engineering and design challenges confront the Army in developing a common chassis for these systems?

Answer. The current development approach for all FCS manned ground vehicles is to share a common chassis design with common subsystems where practical. The

various mission profiles and demands of the manned ground vehicle suite pose a design challenge to package required mission equipment within the power, weight, and volume constraints. Computer aided design and engineering models have confirmed the feasibility of this solution approach. By maximizing basic component commonality, the Army expects to realize significant savings in development, production, training, maintenance, and logistics costs. The challenge will be to maximize commonality without compromising the overall vehicle performance capabilities throughout the vehicle variants. The driving philosophy is to maintain commonality where it saves money and provides an operational benefit to the user. Question. Congress provided NLOS funding to the Army program management staff responsible for development of artillery systems. In fiscal year 2004, the Army budget request proposes combining this into the funding line for the FCS. Why? Answer. Realigning the FY04 program will more accurately reflect the true characterization of the program. FCS is a system of systems linked by a battle commandnetwork, rather than a collection of various independent platforms. Furthermore, the realigned FY04 program also more accurately reflects the execution of the work being accomplished. Since the Army is developing all variants through one system of systems Lead Systems Integrator, the Army expects to achieve improved efficiencies in the FCS program. The system of systems contractor will maximize commonality and also ensure supportability is engineered across the system of systems. Question. What changes in program management does the Army propose as a result of realigning, funding for NLOS development?

Answer. Realigning the program funding for NLOS has not resulted in any substantial changes to the program management of the NLOS-C program. The Crusader management staff has transitioned to form the NLOS-C management staff to support the initial FCS program in general.

TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE SHADOW 200

Question. The Army's Tactical UAV recently underwent its Operational Test and Evaluation.

Please give a summary of the operational test and evaluation report-was the Shadow 200, the Army's tactical UAV, found to be operationally suitable and operationally effective?

Answer. The TUAV Shadow 200 system is deployed with the 4th Infantry Division and with the first and second Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. These systems have the full confidence of the senior commanders of those combat units. The TUAV Shadow system was one of the DoD's most successful acquisition programs achieving a Milestone II to III decision in less than three years to include a successful initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E). One of the key elements in this success was an Army approved acquisition based on a blocking strategy to achieve early success with anticipated block upgrades.

The DoD Joint Interoperability Test Center remarked that the TUAV Shadow was the "model for future C4I development." As tested by the Army's Test and Evaluation Command in the Block I configuration, and the rapid acquisition strategy, the TUAV Shadow is effective, suitable, and survivable. Finally, the Army has deemed the Shadow system affordable, and full rate production go ahead was approved in September 2002 with the full rate production contract being awarded in December 2002.

Question. What is the Army plan for continuing the TUAV program?

Answer. The Army acquisition objective is 83 systems while the Army procurement objective is 41 systems based on the fiscal year 2004-2009 Program Objective Memorandum. Thirteen systems had been procured under low rate initial production contracts; the full rate contract award in December 2002 was for nine systems with procurement for the remaining 19 systems to take place from 2004 to 2008. Systems will eventually be fielded to each of the Army's divisions, Stryker Brigades, and the training center.

The Future Combat Systems Lead Systems Integrator released requests for proposal for four classes of UAVs in February 2003 that would include at least two UAV capabilities possibly met by the TUAV Shadow 200 or a growth version of that same system. In addition, the Army continues to work towards further improvement of the TUAV Shadow 200 with a series of targeted upgrades including improvement of target location error, incorporation of a tactical common data link, and conversion to a heavy fuel (JP-8) engine. The TUAV Shadow will deploy in the Persian Gulf region as part of the 4th Infantry Division.

Question. Has the TUAV program presented in the fiscal year 2003 budget been restructured in the fiscal year 2004 budget request?

Answer. The TUAV budget has not been restructured in the fiscal year 2004 budget request.

Question. How many Shadow 200 systems does the Army intend to acquire in fiscal year 2003 and 2004?

Answer. The Army will procure nine TUAV Shadow systems in fiscal year 2003 and eight systems in 2004. The maximum production capacity is 12 systems per

year.

Question. In what ways does the TUAV not satisfy the Army's requirement for a longer-range, more robust UAV capability? What program are you pursuing to meet this requirement?

Answer. While the Shadow 200 TUAV is an outstanding asset-easily deployed, and focused on the needs of the tactical maneuver commander, it has limitations. The TUAV has a small payload capacity, cannot carry multiple payloads, and has a limited range. These limitations are due to its smaller size. In accordance with Objective Force guidelines, the Army is pursuing an extended range/multi-purpose (EŘ/MP) UAV that is light, mobile, and flexible to meet projected division/corps requirements beyond the 50-kilometer range the Shadow 200 TUAV operates in.

At the same time, the U.S. Air Force Predator and Global Hawk UAVs, while outstanding platforms, cannot meet the Army ER/MP UAV requirements due to limited assets, requirement for extensive logistical support, and differing Army missions. Additionally, neither Predator nor Global Hawk is responsive enough to provide support at multiple echelons at once. Given the nature of the anticipated roles of division and corps under Army Transformation, the requirement for an ER/MP UAV is critical.

The operational requirements document for this capability is undergoing final adjustments in preparation for a May Army requirements oversight council, and we hope to have this important capability to the Army beginning in fiscal year 2006/ 2007. We do not intend to develop a new ER/MP UAV capability; rather, we will conduct a fly-off in fiscal year 2004 among current UAV platforms to determine the air vehicle the Army will select to meets its extended range UAV requirements. Finally, the ER/MP UAV must be compatible with the Shadow 200 UAV ground control equipment to ensure commonality of equipment, reduced training requirements, and overall cost savings of not having to maintain two separate ground control sys

tems.

AERIAL COMMON SENSOR

Question. With the cancellation of the Joint SIGINT Avionics Family (JSAF) program, the Army was required to restructure its Aerial Common Sensor program. Please summarize the new acquisition strategy for your Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) program.

Answer. Due to the cancellation of the JSAF program, the Army rated the communications intelligence (COMINT) sub-system for ACS as a high-risk area. Therefore, the milestone decision authority approved a change to the acquisition strategy allowing two contractor teams to proceed through the technology development phase to reduce risk. The exit criteria for the phase were adjusted to include the demonstration of a prototype COMINT sub-system in a system integration laboratory environment. The technology development phase began in April 2002 and will conclude with contractor technical demonstrations in early July 2003.

Upon completion of the technology development phase, the Army will select a single contractor team in an open competition to complete the system architecture, develop, test and produce the system, and develop the sustainment plan for the life of the system. The first ACS unit will be equipped in fiscal year 2009.

Question. What are the major milestones in the decision-making process and what are the timeframes for these milestones?

Answer. The next program milestone is the Milestone B decision planned for September 2003. The Milestone B decision will formally initiate the program and authorize entrance into the system development and demonstration phase. The system development and demonstration phase will begin with the award of the system development and demonstration contract in January 2004 and conclude in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007.

Key events during this phase are the developmental tests of the ACS prototype. Developmental test #1 is scheduled in fiscal year 2006 and developmental test #2 is scheduled for fiscal year 2007. Developmental test #2 and a follow-on limited user test will provide the necessary system evaluation to proceed to Milestone C in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007. The Milestone C decision will authorize low-rate initial production of the ACS system. Initial operational test and evaluation will

occur in fiscal year 2009 and supports the full rate production decision, also in fiscal year 2009.

UH-60 BLACK HAWK FIELDING PLAN

Question. Among the systems proposed for restructuring in the fiscal year 2004 budget request is the UH-60 Black Hawk. The restructuring is tied to the Army Aviation Modernization Plan (AAMP) which proposed a reduction to the total number Black Hawks the Army will field. The fiscal year 2004 budget request is consistent with an overall decline in the number of Black Hawks as the number of aircraft requested drops from 12 to 10.

How many UH-60 Black Hawk aircraft are requested in the fiscal year 2004 budget? How does this compare to the requested and enacted levels of the last two years?

Answer. The Army has requested 10 UH-60 aircraft in the fiscal year 2004 budget. The Army requested 12 UH-60s each in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Congress provided seven additional UH-60s in fiscal year 2003 and 10 additional UH-60s in fiscal year 2002.

Question. Please explain the modified fielding plan for the UH-60 Black Hawk as a result of the Army Aviation Modernization Plan (AAMP).

Answer. The 2003 AAMP continues the Army's efforts to retire all legacy aircraft quickly, structure the Active and Reserve Components with like units, and field all these units with modernized aircraft. The plan also eliminated or reduced the size of a number of units to align the aviation force structure with current and future warfight requirements. The RAMP retires all operational UH-1s by the end of fiscal year 2004, reduces the number of UH-60s in the Active Component, cascades aircraft to the Army National Guard and the aviation training base, and continues Black Hawk procurement to reach the Army's total UH-60 requirement of 1,680 aircraft.

Question. Does the AAMP propose a lower number of aircraft to support Army requirements?

Answer. The Army has reduced its total requirement for UH-60s from 1,956 to 1,680.

Question. How will the number of aircraft proposed in the AAMP change for the Active Army versus the Guard and Reserve?

Answer. The Army will reduce the total number of UH-60s in Active Component warfight units by 28 percent. The Army National Guard UH-60 warfight requirement will be reduced by five percent. However, the number of UH-60s on hand in the Army National Guard will grow by 32 percent from 2002 to 2007. The number of UH-60s in the Army Reserve does not change.

Question. The Committee understands the result of the AAMP, together with retirement of older aircraft such as the UH-1 and OH-58, is that some Army aviation units will be at between 50-70 percent of fill. Is this correct? If so, for how long? Answer. At the end of 2002, the Army had fielded approximately 92 percent of its total Black Hawk requirement (1,550 of 1,680 required), and the Army National Guard had 85 percent of its requirement on hand (587 of 687 required). As units transition to their new structure in 2003 and 2004, there will be approximately 10 to 15 companies in the National Guard that will be filled at the 50 to 70 percent level for 12 to 18 months. By the end of 2Q04, the National Guard should have approximately 610 of their 687 UH-60s on hand. This provides enough aircraft to fill all of the National Guard high-priority units at 90 to 100 percent and the remaining units at no less that 80 percent.

Question. Does the reduction in the total number of aircraft proposed in the AAMP give rise to the need for a more robust recapitalization plan for the Black Hawks that are currently fielded? If so, how is that supported in the fiscal year 2004 budget request?

Answer. The Army is currently funding two UH-60 recapitalization_programs. The UH-60A to A program is funded to recapitalize 20 UH-60As in fiscal years 2004 through 2013. The UH-60M recapitalization/upgrade program is funded for continued development and certification in 2004 and initial production beginning in 2005.

CH-47 CHINOOK HELICOPTER

Question. The Army plans to rebuild the aging CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopter. The program is in the second year of Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP). $327.1 million is included in the fiscal year 2004 budget for 16 aircraft. The current Army program will produce 340 aircraft compared to a requirement of 513. Of the total planned production, 53 aircraft will support Special Operations requirements.