JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER COST ESTIMATES

Question. Understanding that numbers will change over time, what is the total current estimate for development of the JSF-previous years through 2003 and then 2004 to completion?

Answer. As reflected in the December 2002 Selected Acquisition Report, the Joint Strike Fighter current total development estimate is $37.3 billion comprised as follows: $9.8 billion, fiscal years 1994-2003, and $27.5 billion, fiscal years 2004-completion.

Question. What is the current estimate of the total number of JSF that will be acquired?

Answer. The Department of the Navy's current Joint Strike Fighter procurement objective is 680 aircraft.

Question. Taking into account the research and development and procurement funds, what is the current estimate of the average cost per aircraft?

Answer. The December 2002 Selected Acquisition Report reflects a Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) of $65.7 million.

Question. What drives changes to this average cost per aircraft-change in the total buy, increased research and development?

Answer. The December 2002 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) reflects Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) increase of $3.8 million ($BY02) from the December 2001 SAR. This change was driven by reduction of Department of Navy planned procurement quantity from 1089 to 680 aircraft in accordance with the Navy/Marine Corps Tactical Aviation Integration Plan; increased Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) for added scope to accommodate JSF international partners, and a revised estimate for General Electric F136 development completion.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING

Question. The Air Force has had a most difficult time in developing and testing the software for the F-22. Have you applied the software development and testing "lessons learned" from the F-22 to the JSF program and if so, what are you doing to ensure the same problems do not affect this aircraft?

Answer. The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program has benefited greatly from the F/A-22 development and test activity and has worked in concert with the F/A-22 to ensure technical, programmatic, and test execution lessons learned are being shared between the two programs. JSF and F/A-22 share the same prime contractor and many of the same avionics suppliers (radar communications/navigation, electronic warfare, etc.). The sharing of lessons learned with F/A-22 and other relevant aircraft programs (e.g. F/A-18 E/F, F-16, Eurofighter, etc.) along with the substantial risk reduction activities completed during the JSF Concept Development Phase, positions the JSF program to leverage those activities and reduce the risk of its avionics development program. Some of the specific lessons learned implemented in JSF planning include the following: preplanning a multi-block avionics program during the development phase to deliver integrated operational capability in smaller and more testable avionics blocks; using an open architecture approach to minimize the cost, time, and regression testing required to modify specific hardware and software elements during System Development and Demonstration (SDD)/production; and implementing a technology refresh program during SDD to capitalize on the ever increasing capabilities of processing power while reducing the costs to replace diminishing manufacturing sources during development and production by targeting technology enhancements to improve the affordability, producibility, or reliability of specific products.

Question. What is the next major milestone in the JSF development and testing program and when will that occur?

Answer. The next major milestone will be the Pratt and Whitney propulsion Critical Design Review in May 2003, leading to Pratt and Whitney's first System Development and Demonstration engine operating in the test cell in September 2003.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER INTERCHANGEABLE ENGINE PROGRAM

Question. For the past nine years, Congress has expressed its strong support for the Interchangeable Engine Program for the JSF in an attempt to ensure that two engines-the Pratt-Whitney and the General Electric engines—are available for a competition at the earliest practical time.

The Committee understands that a recent OMB directed inflation adjustment of $38 million was not spread across the entire JSF program, and was instead levied

against the General Electric engine portion of the program which could potentially delay the program by two years. Is this accurate?

Answer. None of the fiscal year 2003 inflation adjustment of $38 million was applied to the General Electric F136 program. Inflation reductions allocated to planned General Electric F136 effort in fiscal year 2004 and out will likely result in an approximate two-year delay to the General Electric F136 engine schedule. Question. What is the rationale for (1) the reduction and (2) for the decision to apply the reduction to only one piece of the program?

Answer: The Office of Management and Budget issued revised inflation indices in January 2003, which resulted in reductions to planned Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) funding in fiscal year 2003 and out. This required the JSF Program Office to reevaluate funding allocations within the program. To hold schedule to first flight, production start and fielding, and meet the Services' Initial Operational Capability dates, funding was first applied to the Lockheed Martin Air System and the PrattWhitney propulsion contracts. The remainder of the funding was then allocated to the General Electric F136 engine contract and the Government support portions of the program. Reduction of planned General Electric funding in fiscal year 2004 and out, with consequent schedule delay, was a difficult decision essential to keeping this very critical JSF development effort on schedule.

Question. Do you believe the application of this reduction will cause a delay in a potential engine competition?

Answer: The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program office is analyzing ways to limit the impacts of the General Electric F136 funding reductions in fiscal year 2004 and out, but the production engine competition likely will be delayed. The Department will reevaluate General Electric F136 funding and schedule as part of the fiscal year 2005 budget development process.

Question. In fiscal year 2003, the appropriations conferences agreed to a $30 million increase for the interchangeable engine problem. To what extent does this OMB directed reduction eliminate that increase?

Answer. None. The inflation reduction was not applied to fiscal year 2003 General Electric F136 planned effort.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER DESIGN ISSUES OF CONCERN

Question. A recent news article indicates that JSF's prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, discovered in February that the JSF could be up to 20 percent overweight. Specifically, how does this "discovery" affect the program?

Answer. The government parametric estimate for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Air System weight currently is above the targets the government/contractor team established for this period in the program. The JSF team is aggressively working weight reduction initiatives. Weight reduction, along with closure and maturation of design issues, is addressed daily through a combination of the normal teaming processes and insight from numerous external experts from all Services as Preliminary Design Review (PDR) activities progress. The government and prime contractors fully recognize the need to reduce the design airplane weight through a proper systems engineering process that best accommodates performance requirements, schedule, cost, and acceptable risk. A Blue Ribbon Action Team (BRAT) has been established to reconcile weight projection methodologies and identify detail design impacts by late June 2003. PDR remains open pending the final BRAT results. No delay to the overall schedule is currently projected.

Question. While it is not unusual for aircraft development programs to have issues with weight, there is a concern that something in the realm of an additional 20 percent, could threaten schedules and budgets. Are you concerned about this potential? Answer. Department leadership is closely monitoring weight status and progress toward addressing related issues. We will have more insight into this issue when the Blue Ribbon Action Team reports out in June 2003.

Question. Mr. Secretary, to the extent that fixing this problem causes the JSF schedule to slip, what back up plan exists for the Navy and Marine Corps?

Answer. A slip in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) schedule would incur a requirement for the Department of the Navy to fund additional Center Barrel Replacements for both Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18C/D aircraft. Extending the service life of the F/A-18C/D fleet will provide short-term relief in bridging TacAir force structure requirements. The F/A-18E/F production line will remain open through calendar year 2013 (last procurement 2011, deliver 2013), allowing the procurement of additional F/A-18E/F's as an option to bridge force structure gaps in the event of JSF schedule slip. The recently completed AV-8B re-manufacture program provides the USMC some flexibility in their tactical aviation requirements if there are delays in the JSF delivery schedule.

Question. The news article mentions this is potentially a problem with the design of the aircraft. Is this a design problem and if so, what are the options for getting it corrected?

Answer. The Blue Ribbon Action Team is currently assessing the weight issue relative to design. Details_regarding this issue will be better understood when the assessment completes in June 2003.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

Question. Have you considered, and does it make sense, to maybe move the other variants of the JSF forward to help replace aging aircraft sooner and move the STOVL variant to a later point in the schedule to provide additional time for development?

Answer. At this point, 18 months into execution of the System Development and Demonstration contracts, there is still no delay in the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant development. Therefore, reordering of the variants at this time is not practical or affordable. It would require a major program re-structure with attendant significant schedule delays and cost increases.

V-22 AIRCRAFT

Question. The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation fiscal year 2002 Annual Report indicates that the milestone III decision on the V-22 scheduled for November 2000 was delayed due to an independent evaluation conducted by DOT&E. The milestone III decision was then delayed indefinitely after a December 2000 crash. The aircraft returned to flight in May 2002, and the number of aircraft engaged in flight-testing increased to three by December 2002. The fiscal year 2004 budget request contains $1.3 billion for nine Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft. Of this amount, $872.2 million is for procurement, including $39.1 million for advance procurement, and $441.1 million is for research and development.

Update the Committee on the progress of the V-22 program. What is the status of flight-testing for the V-22?

Answer. The V-22 Program is currently mandated to continue production at the minimum sustaining rate until the Secretary of Defense certifies this aircraft meets the requirements outlined in Section 123 of the FY 2002 National Defense Authorization Act. The program continues to ensure a methodical and event driven test flight program to validate all engineering and software changes. Program reviews have been comprehensive; the organizational, technical and programmatic issues are well addressed. The plan represents a rational approach to flight testing.

The V-22 has flown over 350 flight hours (as of April 2003) since its return to flight May 29, 2002.

• 3 Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) aircraft have returned to flight.

3 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft have been modified and delivered early or on time.

Aircraft 9 Benefield Anechoic Facility phase III testing accomplished 40 percent more test points than planned, resulting in flight test savings.

Aircraft 7 is progressing well through multi-mode radar testing to include

flat rolling and isolated peak terrain following.

• Simultaneous deployments to USS IWO JIMA (shipboard suitability) and Ft Bragg, NC (parachute loads testing).

Since its return to flight, the V-22 program has had no hydraulic failures or software anomalies attributed to earlier mishaps.

Question. The DOT&E fiscal year 2002 Annual Report states that the first order of business for V-22 testing is successful completion of high rate of descent (HROD) tests. Has the V-22 successfully completed this aspect of flight-testing?

Answer. The High Rate of Descent (HROD) flight test program is producing significant results to include:

• Recognition and definition of the flight boundary for Vortex Ring State (VRS) onset.

Confirmation of the recovery technique.

Warning system design ready for in-flight evaluation.

• Recognition and demonstration of V-22's superior VRS safety margin. Phase I of HROD flight testing is scheduled to be completed May 2003 to support operational evaluation (OPEVAL).

Question. What are the key issues that need to be resolved, and the capabilities proven, before you place Marines in the back of a V-22 on a regular basis?

Answer. The V-22 program office has established a comprehensive and rigorous "“event driven" flight test program. When all developmental and operational test re

quirements are complete, in accordance with all prescribed directives, Marines will be placed in the back on a regular basis.

Question. Will the V-22's suitability for shipboard operations be adequately tested in the next phase of the program?

Answer. The V-22 successfully met shipboard suitability requirements in the initial operational evaluation (OPEVAL) after a final evaluation of the Blade Fold Wing Stow system. The self-taxi capability enhanced the shipboard operational use of the aircraft. The recent correction of hydraulic and software items, which includes the redesign of the nacelle, and the shipboard suitability development testing underway will support a successful OPEVAL

A-12 AIRCRAFT SETTLEMENT

Question. After an original ruling against the government for wrongful termination of the A-12 stealth attack fighter development program in 1991, an appellate court found the program contractors liable for up to $2 billion in costs incurred by the government due to non-performance on the A-12 development contract.

There have been sporadic attempts by the Department of the Navy to reach some sort of in-kind settlement whereby the contractors would provide up to $2 billion worth of goods and cost savings initiatives to the Defense Department. The Justice Department has objected to this approach and insists on an actual payment of $2 billion to the Treasury. Absent a settlement the contractors plan to appeal the ruling to the Supreme Court.

What is the status of attempts to settle the A-12 suit? What set of goods and services are being offered by the contractor in its attempt to settle the suit? What is the present position of the Justice Department and OMB with regard to actually attempting to collect $2 billion in cash as per the appellate court ruling?

Answer. The Department of Defense and the Department of Justice have been engaged in settlement discussions with the companies on a number of occasions over the past several years. We are maintaining a dialogue with the contractors and, although all parties are still reviewing the recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, we continue to exchange positions and proposals. The parties have discussed different ways of constructing a settlement, including a variety of products and services, as well as cash. The difficulty is in reaching a complete settlement that everyone agrees is reasonable and equitable under the circumstances. The Department of Justice is participating actively in these efforts with DoD. There is no present collection effort.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TACAIR INTEGRATION

Question. The Navy and Marine Corps have recently announced the integration of their respective tactical air (TACAIR) forces. While most observers have focused on the impact this integration will have on overall aircraft purchases, it is more than that it is a major shift in Naval Aviation philosophy.

Please provide a brief description of the elements of TACAIR Integration and the major elements of difference from the previous tactical air forces.

Answer. The TACAIR Integration plan changes from the fiscal year 2003 program of record: total procurement objective, numbers of active and reserve squadrons, Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) in tactical squadrons and the organizational assignment of squadrons.

-Total Department of the Navy (DoN) procurement objective: reduced from 548 F/A-18E/F and 1,089 JSF, totaling 1,637 strike-fighter aircraft to 460 F/A18E/F and 680 JSF, totaling 1,140 strike-fighter.

-Numbers of active squadrons: decommission 3 active USN F/A-18 squadrons, 1 Reserve USN & 1 Reserve USMC F/A-18 squadron. Total DoN strikefighter squadrons reduced from 64 to 59. Note-2 active USN squadrons decommission outside FYDP.

-PAA reduction: 12 USN F/A-18C squadrons will reduce PAA from 12 to 10 beginning in fiscal year 2004. USMC F/A-18 squadrons will reduce PAA from 12 to 10 as they integrate into Carrier Air Wings (4 in fiscal year 2004, 4 more during the FYDP). Exceptions are those USN F/A-18 squadrons identified for transition to F/A-18E/F or squadrons identified for integration into the USMC's Unit Deployment Plan (UDP) rotation.

-Organizational assignment: 6 additional USMC F/A-18 squadrons integrated into Carrier Air Wings, 3 USN F/A-18 squadrons integrate into USMC's UDP rotation.

Note: Final 2 USMC squadrons integrate into Carrier Air Wings outside FYDP. Question. In what specific ways has this change affected the way the Navy and Marine Corps train and work together?

Answer. Navy and Marine Corps TACAIR units have a long history of integrated operations and training. TACAIR integration will increase the degree of integration by bringing an additional six USMC squadrons into the Carrier Air Wing structure and three USN squadrons into the Unit Deployment Plan rotation. Upon assignment, integrated squadrons' operational command chain will change to the Carrier Air Wing or Marine Air Group and the individual squadrons inter-deployment training cycle will be conducted in accordance with the respective operational requirements. Additionally, a USMC 0-6 has already been selected for ultimate assignment to command a Carrier Air Wing.

Question. This integration will also allow the Department of the Navy to reduce the number of primary authorized aircraft by 47 during fiscal year 2004. What is the long-term impact of TACAIR Integration on authorized aircraft?

Answer. TACAIR Integration will reduce the number of primary aircraft authorized (PAA) by 56 (vice 47) in fiscal year 2004. Twelve USN squadrons and four USMC squadrons x 2 aircraft + two reserve squadron decommissions × 12 aircraft = total of 56 aircraft.

Long-term impact of the plan on authorized aircraft is a reduction of 128 PAA. Thirty-four squadrons reduce PAA and five squadrons are decommissioned. The improvement in capability and reliability of tomorrow's strike-fighters enables the PAA reduction while retaining significant increases in overall capability. However, the most significant portion of the reduction in total procurement comes from reduction in procurement overhead rather than PAA. Overhead rates were recalculated by matching procurement attrition rates with historical rates and capturing efficiencies of improved reliability, maintainability and capability rates of new strike-fighters, basing efficiencies, training requirement reduction and improvements in simulatorbased training.

AV-8B HARRIER JUMP-JET

Question. Earlier this year the Marine Corps' AV-8B attack jet program was the subject of an investigative report by the Los Angeles Times. The four part series of articles detailed the Harrier's history as one of the most accident-prone airplanes in the naval aviation fleet.

The report alleged that recurrent failures of the engine, wing flaps, and ejection system coupled with a lack of spare parts and adequate flying time have lead to fatalities that could have been avoided.

What is the Department of the Navy's official response to the issues raised by the LA Times article?

Answer. The problems discussed in the recent LA Time's articles list four primary material problems causing AV-8B mishaps: Flaps Controller, Engine, Ejection System, and Nose Wheel Steering.

-The Flaps Controller was replaced with a new Digital Flaps Controller in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2001. Since installation, there have been no flap related mishaps.

-The engine program underwent an extensive Engine Life Management Plan (ELMP) with increased funding to further test the F402 Engine. Since ELMP was instituted in 2000, there have been no engine related mishaps.

-The Ejection System in the AV-8B is currently being upgraded to address all ejection related mishaps including: 4 line release, Electronic Airspeed/Altitude Sensor, upgraded Helmet and Visor and Parachute Over Inflation Controller (estimated completion is fiscal year 2005). Since the upgrades have begun, there have been no ejection related deaths.

-The Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) system was redesigned and is being incorporated into all fleet aircraft (estimated completion is fiscal year 2005). Since the redesign of the NWS system there have been no NWS related mishaps. Following the AV-8B groundings in calendar year 2000, all Harrier aviation related trends are positive. Mission Readiness, Safety, Pilot Flight Time, and Fleet deployments have all increased. Pilot morale is high, as is their confidence in the aircraft. The aircraft has been performing superbly as indicated by its success while participating in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, and other deployments around the world.

Question. What has been the current safety record of the AV-8B in terms of significant mishaps per flight hour and how does this metric compare to other aircraft in the Navy/Marine Corps fleet?

Answer. The ten-year average mishap rate for the AV-8B is 9.73 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours compared to 6.44 for the F-14 and 2.80 for the F-18. Since the engine life management plan was implemented in 2000, the yearly mishap rate for the AV-8B has continued to decrease below its ten-year average.