*Does not include Operation IRAQI FREEDOM combat losses.

Question. Is the AV-8B program adequately financed in the current Future Years Defense Program to ensure that its mishap rates are no higher than the average for the rest of the fleet?

Answer. The AV-8B program is adequately funded. The single issue to address is the engine life management plan. This issue has been included on the Navy's fiscal year 2004 Unfunded Program List (priority number 20) and it is also moving forward as part of the fiscal year 2005 President's Budget development process. If this funding were to be made available, it would continue the Accelerated Simulated Mission Test (ASMET) series of tests to improve engine readiness, availability, and safety. The three-year trend of the AV-8B is clearly comparable to other tactical aircraft (TACAIR) legacy platforms such as the F-14, F/A-18 and EA-6B, and is sustainable even under the more demanding circumstance of single engine flight in a Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing environment. The relatively small number of aircraft and flight hours of the AV-8B when compared to F/A-18 may, in the future, result in some larger variations as compared to the TACAIR mean. That is the statistical reality of comparing different population sizes, and should be viewed more broadly over several years.

UNMANNED COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLE (UCAV)

Question. General Jumper, the Air Force Chief of Staff, was recently quoted as saying that the investment in unmanned strike aircraft is worth the cost only if it can deliver significant additional warfighting capability. That, in general, pursuing this technology for the sole purpose of getting a man out the cockpit is not worth the cost-the investment pays off if the aircraft can deliver significant additional capability.

Given that the Services often argue that the single greatest advantage the United States has over its adversaries, is the talent of our men and women in uniform, General Jumper's comments cannot be discounted.

Admiral Clark and General Hagee, what are you views on this subject?

Navy answer. As with any system, the cost effectiveness of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) should be determined by comparison of capability delivered versus cost. Taking humans out of the cockpit is not an end unto itself, but it does allow UAVs to offer increased endurance, more effective signature control, and the potential for reduced costs. In addition, inherent risk to aircrew results in significant limitation of employment options in some missions-taking the human out of the cockpit in these situations greatly expands available alternatives in the application of force. The Navy concurs that the single greatest advantage that the United States has over its adversaries is the talent of our men and women in uniform. However, in some cases the best place for those men and women to contribute those talents is outside of a cockpit.

Marine Corps answer. Should the Marine Corps choose to initiate an acquisition strategy for an unmanned combat aerial vehicle sometime in the future, the missions and capabilities of this technology would serve as a force multiplier vice replacing aviators.

Question. What role will the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle have in the Navy and Marine Corps of the future and how is that reflected in your SEAPOWER 21 and Marine Corps Strategy 21 documents?

Navy answer. The Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) will play a critical role in providing persistent, penetrating surveillance and reconnaissance capability, and in addressing time critical targets through the combination of lethality and persistence. The UCAV is envisioned to contribute to all aspects of Sea Power 21-the strategy specifically states that the Sea Services will "use unmanned platforms: air, land, sea, and undersea for combat and reconnaissance."

Marine Corps answer. The UCAV is not specifically mentioned in SeaPower 21 or Marine Corps Strategy 21. However, UCAV would be used primarily as a Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) asset in an environment populated with numerous and highly capable surface to air missiles. A UCAV would also be used as a deep strike asset well beyond friendly lines.

Question. The fiscal year 2004 request for Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UČAVs) is $275 million. Of this amount, how much is for the Navy's variant of the UCAV?

Answer. A total of $123 million (including $5 million for the Joint Program Office) was requested in fiscal year 2004 for the Navy's Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) demonstration effort. In addition, DARPA is expected to contribute $13 million to the Navy's UCAV demonstration effort in fiscal year 2004.

Question. How much is included in the Navy's 2004 request for the Joint Program Office?

Answer. $5 million is requested for the Navy's share of Joint Program Office efforts.

Question. What is the current estimate of the production unit cost of the Navy UCAV?

Answer. The Navy Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle effort is insufficiently mature to justify a production unit cost estimate. Further demonstration of technical feasibility and final validated requirements are required before an analytically based cost estimate can be provided.

TACTICAL UAV FIRE SCOUT

Question. In fiscal year 2003, the Navy announced that it would complete the Engineering, Manufacturing, and Demonstration (EMD) phase of its Tactical UAV— Vertical Take Off and Landing system called Fire Scout. The Navy's proposal was to conduct concept of operations work with the five systems purchased with the EMD contract, but to not move forward into production because the system could not meet the stated requirement. This action essentially terminated the Fire Scout UAV program and Congress provided additional funds for needed upgrades to existing Pioneer Tactical UAV in order to meet near term requirements for the Navy and Marine Corps.

The fiscal 2004 budget request appears to reverse the 2003 decision by including $4 million to continue development of the Fire Scout. In addition, the Navy's Unfunded Requirements list includes another $35 million for Fire Scout. This does not sound like a terminated program.

What is the story on Fire Scout?

Answer. In 2002, the Navy restructured the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) program to end with the completion of Engineering and Manufacturing Development (E&MD) and one Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) system.

In January 2003, the Navy identified VTUAV as a candidate system for deployment aboard the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Flight 0. According to our mission analysis, adopting existing, and near-term available surface warfare, mine warfare, and anti-submarine warfare sensors and weapons to the VTUAV and employing them from LCS Flight 0 would increase LCS combat capability, reduce reliance on manned helicopters, and push the sensor and (eventually) weapons envelope outward. Navy requested $4 million in fiscal year 2004 to complete shipboard developmental testing associated with the current VTUAV program. An additional $35 million was identified on the Chief of Naval Operation's (CNO) Unfunded Programs List to develop LCS mission-unique capabilities. This effort would include additional VTUAV research and development to facilitate the integration of a VTUAV with the emerging Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) requirement.

Despite the 2002 restructuring of the VTUAV program, the Marine Corps does not feel Fire Scout meets their Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare requirements for range, transportation to and use from primitive sites, and survivability as laid out in Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) operations.

Question. Just 12 months ago you were arguing that the system did not meet the requirement, what has changed?

Answer. The original VTUAV program was developed in support of Marine Corps requirements. In the past 12 months, the Navy initiated the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program to fill a gap in surface warfare, mine warfare and anti-submarine warfare. LCS will rely heavily on unmanned systems to provide combat capability in these areas. The current VTUAV program supports LCS surface warfare and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Adaptation of additional sensor and weapons will address the LCS Flight 0 requirements in all three focused Mission areas.

The Marine Corps understands the need for a VTUAV on the LCS, but, even with planned improvements, the Fire Scout falls short of meeting Marine Corps requirements for performance, deployability, reliability, survivability, cost, and schedule.

Question. Considering the other options available for you with respect to other Tactical UAVs available with other manufacturers, why are you pursuing a system that does not provide the endurance and the speed you state you need?

Answer. An improved Fire Scout with upgraded speed, range endurance, survivability, payload capability and weaponization will meet all the endurance and speed requirements for the LCS core missions of mine warfare, surface warfare and antisubmarine warfare with an initial operating capability (IOC) of fiscal year 2007. No other Tactical UAV is in development to meet all of the Navy's requirements by fiscal year 2007.

Since the improved Fire Scout does not meet Marine Corps mission requirements, the Marines are considering an alignment with the Coast Guard's Deep Water UAV program, Eagle Eye. In accordance with the Deputy Secretary of Defense's guidance to explore additional production of previously developed programs or to join in cooperative development programs with other governmental agencies, the Marines believe teaming with the Coast Guard is in the best interest of the service since Eagle Eye VUAV capabilities will surpass even the improved Fire Scout capabilities. A Marine Corps demonstration system can be delivered in fiscal year 2005 with a program IOC of early fiscal year 2008.

Question. Will you consider a re-competition of the contract?

Answer. Fire Scout was selected in a full and open_competition. The Fire Scout meets the current VTUAV Operational Requirements Document (ORD). If a significant change in requirements necessitates a new ORD, the acquisition strategy will be revised to best balance resources to meet the warfighters' needs.

Question. How much will it cost the Navy to "grow" the Fire Scout into a system that meets the requirement or are you prepared to revise the requirement? If the requirement is revised will you re-compete the contract?

Answer. The Navy does not expect to see significant changes to the requirements in order to meet Littoral Combat Ship mission focus areas; therefore, Navy does not intend to recompete the contract at this time. The Navy does envision an estimated $147 million would be required for development and fielding. This includes the nonrecurring engineering and four LRIP systems. A new acquisition strategy for a VTUAV would be developed if a new Operational Requirements Document with significant new requirements becomes necessary.

Question. Please provide a detailed explanation for the $4 million requested in the fiscal year 2004 request as well as the $35 million identified on the unfunded requirements list.

Answer. The $4 million requested in fiscal year 2004 funding is for shipboard testing associated with the completion of the current Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical UAV (VTUAV) Engineering and Manufacturing Development program. The $35 million identified on CNO's Unfunded Programs List would be used to conduct additional VTUAV research and development to facilitate the integration of a VTUAV with the emerging Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) requirement.

BROAD AREA MARITIME SURVEILLANCE

Question. Beginning in fiscal year 2002, Congress has supported the Navy's concept of using high altitude UAV's to conduct a majority of its maritime surveillance mission. The original objective was to use UAVs in conjunction with manned surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft to accomplish the surveillance and anti-submarine warfare missions.

What is the status of the Navy's BAMS program?

Answer. The Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Program is proceeding to a Milestone B in the third quarter of fiscal year 2004. Requirements (Concepts of Operation, Operational Requirements Document, Analysis of Alternatives, and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Support Plan) and acquisition documentation (acquisition strategy report, Test and Evaluation Master Plan, manpower estimate report, etc.) are in preparation to support the milestone.

Question. The Navy requested, and Congress provided, funds for the acquisition of two Global Hawk UAVs so that it could test and demonstrate maritime surveillance sensors. When will these UAVs deliver to the Navy and when will the test program be complete?

Answer. The two Global Hawk UAVs will deliver in the 2nd and 4th quarters of fiscal year 2005 respectively. The Navy intends to obtain maximum value from the Global Hawks through an extended test and experimentation program. The Global Hawks will be used for persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) doctrine development and continuous refinement of concept of operations, and tactics, training, and procedures generation. The Global Hawks will continue as en

during test beds for UAV maritime sensors development. There is presently no defined completion date for the program.

Question. Is it the intent of the Navy to use the Global Hawk UAV as the platform for its BAMS Program or do you anticipate a competition for an alternate platform.

Answer. An Analysis of Alternatives is underway and is considering a number of platforms for Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. Concurrently, acquisition strategy options are being formulated. The results of these two efforts will assist the Navy in determining the most cost effective acquisition strategy to meet the warfighting requirement.

PIONEER UAV

Question. General Hagee, there was great confusion last year as to the Marine Corps' requirement for a tactical UAV. The budget request included funds to upgrade the existing Pioneer UAV for connectivity and maintainability issues. However, last minute differing viewpoints on the Marine Corps' UAV needs lead the Committee to question the necessity of upgrading the Pioneer in favor of an alternative UAV.

What is the Marine Corps requirement for a tactical UAV?

Answer. The Marine Corps has a requirement for an organic UAV system that is interoperable with Joint C4I systems, is capable of operating from ships or seabases, and will seamlessly transition to operations ashore. This future UAV system should have the capability.to support expeditionary maneuver warfare, and therefore, must be deployable by organic USMC aviation assets. The UAV system should be organized to provide scalable support to Marine Expeditionary Units, Marine Expeditionary Brigades, and Marine Expeditionary Forces. Most importantly, the UAV system must be responsive to the needs of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander by providing, through the use of modular payloads, reconnaissance, target designation, communications/data relay, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities. Without compromise, the UAV should be able to launch from an amphibious ship or seabase, provide persistent support to a MAGTF commander during movement to the objective, as well as during actions on the objective, and have the capability to return to the ship, seabase or a pre-designated site ashore. The future ÛAV system must be very reliable with low Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and low Maintenance Man Hours Per Flight Hour (MMPFH). The UAV must be maintainable in austere environments while requiring minimal manpower for servicing.

Question. Does the fiscal year 2004 budget request support your needs?

Answer. The 2004 budget provides an upgrade to the Pioneer UAV system. The system was fielded in 1988 and the upgraded Pioneer is intended to provide UAV capability to the Marine Corps until a common tactical vertical UAV (VUAV) is fielded in approximately FY 2009.

Question. What is the program of record that the Marine Corps supports-the Pioneer as upgraded or some other UAV?

Answer. The Marine Corps supports the Pioneer upgrade as a stopgap system until FY 2009. The budget priorities for the Pioneer system provide safety, sustainment, and minor capabilities enhancements.

Question. With the submission of its fiscal year 2004 Budget, the Navy has proposed retiring DD-963 class destroyers, and earlier versions of the Aegis Class Cruisers. These actions would take the Navy's ship force structure below 300 ships in total, and below 116 surface ships.

Admiral Clark, what is the requirement for the total fleet size given the present national security strategy and threat environment?

Answer. In order to meet the key goals outlined by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and National Security Strategy (NSS), and to transform in a way that assures continued operational effectiveness in a changed security environment, the Navy-Marine Corps team has embraced Sea Power 21. Sea Power 21 is implemented via a Global Concept of Operations (CONOPs) that widely distributes the firepower of the fleet to bolster both homeland and theater security, improve crisis response reaction time, and position us to win decisively in war. In the past, strategies focused on regional challenges. Today, we must think more globally to be ready to defend the vital interests of the United States against a broad range of potential challenges. Specifically, we need to increase the probability that we will be in the right place at the right time to deter and respond rapidly to terrorism and other transnational threats. The Global CONOPS will more broadly distribute combat power by creating additional independent strike groups (from 19 today to 37 in the

future) capable of responding across the spectrum of conflict simultaneously around the world.

While many features of the Global CONOPS can be executed with today's forces, a fleet of approximately 375 battle force ships will be required in the future to fully implement the concept and execute the defense strategy. Independently, or as part of a Joint Task Force, this dispersed, netted, and operationally agile fleet will deliver the tailored mission capabilities needed to sustain homeland defense, provide security in four theaters, swiftly defeat two aggressors at the same time, and deliver decisive victory in one of those conflicts.

Question. Admiral Clark, what is the basis for the Navy's proposal to retire ships with remaining useful service life?

Answer. Accelerating the retirement of the SPRUANCE Class destroyers, the baseline one TICONDEROGA Class cruisers, and selected OLIVER HAZARD PERRY Class frigates was a difficult decision-but the right decision-and one based on the capabilities needed for both today's and tomorrow's threat environment. These ships are significantly less capable in the near-land threat environments we'll see in the future. They require more maintenance, modernization and additional manning to operate because they lack many of the optimal manning technologies of our newer platforms. Most importantly, they provide either redundant or significantly less effective strike and air defense capabilities than our other platforms. In every case, continuing to operate these ships for the few years remaining in their service lives adds little to our aggregate warfighting posture. Our ability to move forward with critical recapitalization and transformation efforts is improved from an affordability standpoint with savings from the higher ship and shore infrastructure costs associated with the unique life cycle requirements of the less capable DD 963's and baseline one cruisers. Current Navy warfighting analysis of likely combat scenarios over the next ten years indicates that the warfare missions for surface combatants are not well met by these less capable ships and accelerating their retirement adds little or no risk in the near-term, but helps significantly in facilitating our transition to the numbers, type and mix of ships we will require to execute the range of missions we anticipate in the 21St Century. In the long term, we need the next generation destroyer, DD(X), the next generation cruiser, CG(X) and the Littoral Combat Ship to address these missions.

Question. Do you believe that simply counting hulls is a useful metric when determining the effectiveness of today's fleet? What are some other ways of measuring the offensive and defensive capabilities of the fleet?

Answer. The global nature of the war on terror demands a global Navy that can muster at the far corners of the earth to deny sanctuary to the enemies of our country. If we are to be there when the nation calls upon us, then numbers do matter. That said, it is the offensive and defensive capabilities that count if we are to use the maneuver area of the sea to our nation's advantage. We can-and do-measure those capabilities in terms of weapon range, sensor fidelity, data processing speed, and other measures of effectiveness. The best metric then is the synergy between these capabilities and the right number of platforms to truly measure the combat power of today's-and tomorrow's-Navy.

Question. What are the risks associated with a reduced fleet size can this risk be mitigated with a better mix of effective platforms?

Answer. The global nature of the war on terror demands a global Navy that can muster at the far corners of the earth to deny sanctuary to the enemies of our country. If we are to be there when the nation calls upon us, then numbers do matter. So in the simplest terms, reduced fleet size incurs some risk in the Navy's ability to be where it's needed, when it's needed.

That said, our analysis indicates that our proposed near-term inactivations and our remaining war fighting capability provide an acceptable level of risk without compromising our ability to accomplish our mission. The reason for this is threefold.

First, because we've made important gains in the current readiness of our legacy force these last few years; it produced the more responsive force we've seen on deployment this year.

Second, because the types of combatants scheduled for decommissioning— SPRUANCE Class (DD 963) Destroyers, Baseline 1 TICONDEROGA Class (CG 47) Cruisers (non-Vertical Launch System (VLS) capable), and older OLIVER HAZARD PERRY Class (FFG 7) Frigates-are not well suited to take on the threats projected to develop over the next 10 years, especially in the areas of missile defense and warfare in littoral waters.

Third, because we are investing the savings garnered from these decommissionings to invest in precisely the new ship capabilities needed to deal with these future threats. The next generation destroyer (DD(X)) and the Littoral