ANTITERRORISM AND FORCE PROTECTION Question. Over the past three years, Congress has provided the Navy over $5 billion for Antiterrorism and Force Protection (AT/FP) initiatives. The Committee's staff recently concluded a classified report of the Navy's efforts to mitigate the terrorist threats against the United States naval vessels and raised some concerns about the Navy's efforts. The review indicates that: • Efforts to develop effective programs to combat terrorism have been largely ad hoc, reactive and tied to major terrorist events; There is no mission needs statement or requirements document for either ashore or afloat requirements and therefore no understanding of how the Navy wants to proceed with its program; and, • There is a perceived lack of guidance from the Navy leadership on the establishment of anti-terrorist capabilities. Admiral Clark, what do you think about these general concerns raised by the staff's review? Answer. The House Appropriations Committee's Surveys and Investigative (S&I) staff inquiry into the Navy's Antiterrorism and Force Protection (AT/FP) efforts was very thorough and it noted several of the critical issues on which the Navy is making progress. Antiterrorism/Force Protection continues to be one of our top priorities. The AT/FP budget has been used to develop a deliberate program to improve AT/ FP afloat and ashore. As our program moves forward, recent advances include the validation of a comprehensive AT/FP Mission Needs Statement, complemented by the ongoing development of the Force Protection Mission Capabilities Package, an analytical tool which identifies future (afloat) AT/FP requirements and the resources that will be needed to acquire them. Effective October 1, 2003, I am aligning all major shore claimants under a single Echelon II command (Commander, Naval Installations), which will ensure that requirements are properly defined, and resources are programmed to support AT/FP efforts at our installations. My staff is coordinating a capabilities assessment process that incorporates both afloat and ashore requirements. The Navy will continue to use its Systems Commands (SYSCOMS) for development and acquisition of technology to support fleets in their AT/FP programs. However, better integration between the SYSCOMS is being coordinated thru the Systems Acquisition Lead Teams (SALT) process. The SALT process was established over seven months ago to ensure uniform Navy-wide program management for AT/FP issues. Navy AT/FP continues to move in the right direction, making visible progress in a number of key areas, and ensuring effective use of Congressional funding. Question. Mr. Secretary, how would you rate the Navy and Marine Corps, overall, in terms of AT/FP preparedness? Answer. The importance of maintaining a strong Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) posture has been stressed at every level within the Navy. AT/FP and physical security awareness throughout the Service is high. We have put into place a training and education program that provides quality AT/FP training for our operators at the deck plates, as well as for the officers who lead them. Additionally, our Integrated Vulnerability Assessment program has been proven to effectively measure the overall successes of our program efforts, and conversely, to identify and prioritize our weaknesses, then facilitates corrective measures. Where needed, we have fielded an array of commercially available technologies to enhance the security of our waterfronts and flight lines around the world. Other focus areas include: Critical Infrastructure Protection, emergency preparedness, consequence management and participation in various Joint Service programs for installation protection and emergency response. The Navy Shore establishment is focused on Installation Protection (IP) in accordance with Joint programs/policy and participates in the Joint Staff Installation Pilot Program (JSIPP). Our Systems Commands (SYSCOMS) are coordinating, integrating and implementing Joint policy regarding shore facilities design, construction, modification and operations, as well as emergency response programs. Through the Systems Acquisition Lead Teams (SALT) process our SYSCOMS also facilitate integration of existing AT/FP programs related to CBRNE issues for base operations, security, medical, fire fighting, industrial safety and others. Given all of these efforts combined, I consider the Navy's level of preparedness to deter, defend, mitigate and respond to today's terrorist threat to be solid. The Marine Corps is well prepared to execute its Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) responsibilities. The nature of the threat requires a robust and continuously evolving AT/FP program. Personnel and resources for AT/FP continue to be a priority in our combat development process. For fiscal year 2003, the Marine Corps has either developed or sustained the following: • United States Marine Corps organized, trained and equipped units capable of incident response, deterring, detecting, and defending against asymmetric threats against U.S. territories, populations and critical infrastructure. • The 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) Antiterrorism (AT) to support commanders with rapidly deployable, specially trained, and sustainable forces for combating terrorism. A Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) capable of deploying in response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive incidences. Rapidly deployable quick response forces to support United States Northern Command. Marine Emergency Preparedness Liaison officers organized by Federal Emergency Management Agency region. • Enhanced First Responder training on Marine Corps installations as well as enhanced coordination with community-wide local authorities. • Developed and implemented Electronic Security Systems (ESS) to include biometrics, access control, video surveillance and assessment. Question. Admiral Clark, have you published guidance on the minimum anti-terrorism capabilities that should be present at the region, base and ship class level? Answer. The series of instructions and publications published by the Department of Defense and the Navy (by the Secretary and myself) delineate Antiterrorism/ Force Protection (AT/FP) program standards, and individual protective measures that ships, installations, and regions must be able to perform at escalating threat levels and Force Protection Conditions. Additionally, I have published policy that includes tools and prioritized AT/FP requirements for the various categories of ships and aviation assets. Published staffing standards identify minimum capabilities and manpower needed to meet physical security and AT/FP requirements at our installations, including waterside, both at home and abroad. AT/FP capabilities are developed and reviewed by my staff annually through a Mission Capabilities Assessment process designed to define future capabilities, and the resources needed to acquire them. Question. Do you have an overall program plan for the development and acquisition of technology and staff for antiterrorism and force protection? Answer. The overall plan for AT/FP technology acquisition is based on the need to take a systematic approach to AT/FP technology that will ensure the interoperability of individual AT/FP technology subsystems. Furthermore, we must ensure that this plan will allow force protection officers to tailor AT/FP solutions to the unique requirements of their own local command. The Navy's AT/FP technology requirements for afloat units are developed through a series of programmatic analytical tools. The Combating Terrorism and Force Protection Mission Capability Packages determine the warfighting capabilities required to effectively counter the asymmetric threat. The AT/FP investment strategy uses these required capabilities to lay the foundation for an "afloat technology roadmap". We're also leveraging existing shipboard systems to establish an afloat AT/FP "program of programs" that are designed to deter, detect, classify, identify, deny, disable, and neutralize the asymmetric threat. The AT/FP viability of these programs is reviewed on a continuous basis within our Afloat AT/FP Working Group. In October 2003 the Commander Naval Installations (CNI) will be established as the single echelon II command responsible for all shore installation programs. CNI will be responsible for AT/FP programs, and will work closely with Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) and Regional Commanders to ensure program requirements are properly defined. CNI will collaborate with CNO N46 (Ashore Readiness Division) to program required resources to meet AT/FP program needs. Implementation of AT/FP programs will be the responsibility of Regional Commanders, with support from selected Systems Commands. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) will centrally procure and install all physical security equipment beginning in fiscal year 2004. NAVFAC will also provide technical guidance to CNI and Regional Commanders for Emergency Management Planning, Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear/high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) programs, and Critical Infrastructure Protection programs. The Navy's Staffing Standards are published in a Navy instruction and provide guidelines as to the personnel requirements for various positions and requirements. The Navy validates these requirements, and manpower needs and staffing requirements are adjusted based on this metric and the needs of the Navy. Question. Have you identified a central authority within the Navy for anti-terrorism programs, to include responsibility for program management, technical eval uation, acquisition and fielding to ensure that each fleet doesn't create it's own program? Answer. The problem of alignment within AT/FP is one of my greatest concerns and one that is being addressed. To better align the program, I have assigned the Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command as the executive agent for CONUŠ AT/FP. Additionally, they are responsible for identifying all AT/FP requirements for the Navy. These requirements are documented and then forwarded to the Navy Staff for consolidation, validation, and procurement. We have been working closely with our Systems Commands to determine the most effective way to manage the procurement of technology and other equipment to ensure program continuity. One of the difficulties in establishing a single central authority for AT/FP acquisition program management is that AT/FP technologies cut across the mission areas of multiple Navy acquisition communities. To place this office within only one of those organizations would hinder our ability to tap into the needed subject matter expertise at the excluded organizations. We are therefore exploring new organizational structures that will identify the AT/FP roles and responsibilities of each acquisition community while ensuring that the necessary cross-organizational collaboration occurs. Question. Mr. Secretary, in fiscal year 2003 this Committee provided the additional funding to address anti-terrorism/force protection issues; the fiscal year 2004 request does not sustain this increase. Do the lower amounts requested in fiscal year 2004 indicate that you have made sufficient progress in the AT/FP area so that the higher fiscal year 2003 funding level is no longer necessary or is this an affordability issue? Answer. This is mostly an issue relating to the maturing of the Navy AT/FP program. Post-COLE and 9-11-01 supplemental funding has been used to meet valid requirements and was used effectively. However, the sheer volume of requirements generated after September 11th complicated the development of a firm program. We believe there are sufficient funds in the fiscal year 2004 request to meet our needs. Our approach for fiscal year 2004 and out is to first conduct a bottom-up review of the baseline program, adjusting the program as necessary so that the right priorities receive funding. In some cases, this means that program elements previously funded may be used as offsets to fund new, higher priority requirements identified by Combatant Commands and Navy Component Commanders. The lower amount requested in fiscal year 2004 reflects this approach and our belief that the Navy AT/FP Program is approaching a steady state condition. PRODUCT QUALITY DEFICIENCY REPORTING SYSTEMS Question. Secretary, it is our understanding that the Navy's Air Systems Command-NAVAIR-is setting up its own Product Quality Deficiency Reporting (PQDR) system. The Navy's Sea Systems Command-NAVSEA-already has a PQDR in place that is connected to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and other services. According to some DoD officials, NAVAIR is basically recreating the NAVSEA system at a cost of $3 to $5 million a year, with an additional $1 to $2 million a year to operate the system and connect it to other Navy systems. These officials also say that NAVAIR could use the NAVSEA system and not incur the expense and effort of creating another database that then has to be connected to the ÑAVSEA system (GAO-01-923) What is the justification for a separate NAVAIR Product Quality Deficiency Reporting (PQDR) reporting system? Answer. NAVAIR is not developing a separate NAVAIR Product Quality Deficiency Reporting (PQDR) reporting system but rather creating a single entry point for the warfighter for all discrepancy reports that will seamlessly integrate with the NAVSEA PQDR database where appropriate. The Naval Aviation Maintenance Discrepancy Reporting Program (NAMDRP) website should not be considered a stand-alone NAVAIR PQDR system. Rather it is a one-stop input point for all Naval Aviation discrepancy report submission and tracking of which Product Quality Deficiency Report (PQDR) is only one of ten reports. The NAMDRP web application is tasked with providing a single data entry point for all Naval Aviation discrepancy reports required by OPNAVINST 4790.2й consisting of: Engineering Investigations (EI). • Hazardous Material Reports (HMR). • Conventional Ordnance Deficiency Reports (CODR). • Explosive Mishap Reports (EMR). • Product Quality Deficiency Reports (PQDR). reprogramming action, as is currently required. This will be particularly beneficial in view of the increased flexibility to transfer Reserve Personnel (RP) dollars during periods of mobilization when Reservists are paid from Active Military Personnel (MP) account. Flexibility will be limited, however, by the $10 million realignment threshold between budget activities. Question. Will the Chief of the Navy Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve have full management and control of his financial resources in order to execute their title 10 responsibilities for trained and ready forces? Answer. Yes. This consolidation, while offering greater flexibility and responsiveness in the fiscal process, does not, in any way, inhibit the abilities of the Chiefs of Naval and Marine Corps Reserve from managing financial resources to execute their respective responsibilities under Title 10 United States Code. Funds will continue to be allocated to them in the same manner as today, but with a different nomenclature and set of rules governing their use. Question. Having separate appropriations accounts for the Active and Reserve components allows Congress to monitor how well the services are executing their programs. What assurance can you give the Committee that the active components will not use the Reserve budget activities to fund their own bills or shortfalls? Answer. Under current law, the Services have limited authority to move funds between budget activities. No more than $10 million may be realigned into Active or Reserve budget activities without prior congressional approval. Additionally, historic Military Personnel (MP) shortfalls of $100 million, or more, cannot be accommodated from the Reserve Personnel (RP) account. RP funding will be a separate budget activity (BA) within the MP account. Any request to transfer funds between Reserve and Active BAs within the MP account will be fully vetted through the existing resource allocation decision-making process. As is currently the case, fund managers will be responsible for ensuring that resourcing specifically programmed and budgeted for reserve requirements is maintained. PERSONNEL ISSUES Question. Please explain your active duty military personnel end strengths levels to the Committee. What was the number of personnel on board in October when you started fiscal year 2003? Was that number over the authorized end strength level for the Navy and the Marine Corps? Answer. Navy's active duty end strength was 383,108 at the beginning of fiscal year 2003. This exceeded our fiscal year 2002 authorized end strength of 376,000, but was within the 2 percent flexibility provided for in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). At the beginning of fiscal year 2003, the Marine Corps' active duty end strength was 173,733. While this is 1,133, or 0.6 percent, over the fiscal year 2002 authorized end strength of 172,600, it was within the 2 percent flexibility authorized in the NDAA. Question. Did that increase of personnel include those under a stop/loss action? Did it include any mobilized Reservists? If so, what were those numbers? Answer. Navy's end strength on September 30, 2002 included 301 Sailors who were transitioning as Navy stood down from the post-9/11 stop loss but does not include mobilized Reservists. For the Marine Corps, the beginning fiscal year 2003 end strength of 173,733 inIcluded 306 Marines on stop loss (298 enlisted and 8 officers). No mobilized Marines are included in that number since Title 10, United States Code, excludes from active end strength computations those mobilizations accomplished under Presidential Reserve call-up. Question. To date, what is the number of Navy Reserve soldiers currently on active duty in support of the mobilization? Answer. As of March 19, 2003, 9,979 Naval Reserve members are on active duty in support of the mobilization. As of April 22, 2003, 21,118 Reserve Marines are on active duty in support of the mobilization. Question. What is the Navy's current mobilization cap? The Marine Corps? Answer. Based on March 2003 OSD guidance, Navy's current mobilization cap is 33,000 and the Marine Corps' is 40,786. Question. What stop/loss action is currently in effect, and how many military personnel does that affect? Answer. Navy Hospital Corpsmen in paygrades E-1 through E-6 with Navy Enlisted Classification Code (NEC) of 8404 (Field Medical Service Technician) are the only Sailors currently under stop/loss. This policy affects 2,616 Sailors who have an more manpower intensive platforms are taken off line and replaced by more efficient ships and aircraft the requisite end strength decreases in concert. The decrease in fiscal year 2004 end strength is the result of the net changes (commissionings/decommissionings) in the Navy's force structure. Question. With the Navy playing such a large role in the Global War on Terrorism, why would you be reducing end strength and force structure rather than increasing it? Answer. Current end strength authorization, with the flexibility you have granted to +3%, is sufficient to meet all commitments. Given our current and near term strength profile, we have seen no impact on deploying battlegroups in fiscal year 2003 and do not anticipate any impact on fiscal year 2004 deployments. In conjunction with the execution of our overall investment strategy, we continue to conduct extensive reviews focused on balancing current and future force operational requirements and capabilities, while operating within established fiscal constraints. In proposing the budget submission for fiscal year 2004, we determined that reducing the number of less capable, manpower intensive platforms would free valuable resources essential to future plans for enhancing transformational capabilities. The manpower associated with these force structure changes results in a smaller requirement. Additionally, Navy has various efforts underway that are helping improve manpower efficiency and reduce future manpower requirements. Task Force Excel is exploring innovative techniques to improve how we train our Sailors. Sea Swap and Optimal Manning projects are finding ways to keep our Battle Forces at sea longer while also exploring potential areas to restructure crew manning. FORCENET is aimed at improving manpower efficiency by integrating warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms and weapons into a networked distributed combat system. Sea Enterprise maintains core capabilities; optimizes investments; and applies selected business reforms to our organizations and processes. Sea Warrior is the enhanced assessment, assignment, training and education of personnel. We believe these initiatives, when completed, will yield increased capabilities, while permitting us to man our forces in the most efficient and economical manner possible. Question. Does the Navy still have "gaps" in billets at sea? If so, why would you reduce personnel if you still have requirements to fill? Answer. While isolated unit shortfalls exist, as of February 2003, Fleet manning stood at 99.0% or a shortage of 1,784 personnel. At this same point shore manning was 96.1%. We expect that personnel in training pipelines (who do not count as shore manning) will flow to the Fleet over the course of the rest of fiscal year 2003 and reduce this shortage to near zero by the end of the year. Based on historical trends and projections, we expect fiscal year 2004 to remain at these high levels in the 97-99% band. CONSOLIDATION OF THE MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCOUNTS Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget request recommends consolidating the six Guard and Reserve military personnel accounts with their respective active duty military personnel appropriations. The budget requested that the Reserves' personnel pay accounts be Budget Activity 7, and the National Guard's personnel pay accounts be Budget Activity 8 under the active duty accounts. Mr. Secretary please explain the rationale for merging the pay accounts into one appropriation per Service. Answer. Departmental budget guidance directed consolidation of active and reserve appropriations into the fiscal year 2004 President's Budget submission. Reserve Personnel Navy (RPN)/Military Personnel Navy (MPN) and Reserve Personnel Marine Corps (RPMC)/Military Personnel Marine Corps (MPMC) mergers are the first step in providing DoD greater financial flexibility in fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and future conflicts. Benefits include: • Expedited funding transfer between Active and Reserve accounts to meet operational requirements; Greater flexibility during contingency operations; and Given the degree of utilization of mobilized reserves in the GWOT and enhanced integration with Active forces under the total force concept, this consolidation would provide the necessary flexibility for the Department to more efficiently manage its overall resources to meet emerging and rapidly evolving military requirements. Question. What level or degree of increased flexibility does the Navy gain from this consolidation? Answer. Within Congressionally approved reprogramming thresholds, funds may be moved between Active and Reserve accounts without prior approval for formal |