All savings from operation and maintenance costs were reinvested back into the KC-135 fleet, directly linked to critical corrosion repairs, replacing the struts on the remaining E-models. Additionally, reinvested manpower and additional flight hours will improve utilization of the fleet.

C-17 REQUEST OF ONLY 11 AIRCRAFT

Question. Last year, Congress added $585.9 million with direction to ensure the Air Force properly budget for a second C-17 multiyear contract. The Air Force request this year only funds 11 C-17s in FY 2004.

Why did the Air Force choose not to fund 15 aircraft in FY 2004 as directed by Congress?

Answer. The congressional add of $585.9 million (three aircraft in fiscal year 2003) presented the Air Force with an opportunity to revamp the remaining program. The new program is not incrementally funded (we buy 11 and get 11); and, unlike last year's request, the Advance Procurement is low (we never go above 15 percent). Additionally, we maintain Multiyear Procurement at the planned economic production rate of 15 aircraft per year. The new program avoids requesting funding early-to-need since the contractor doesn't manufacture and assemble what would have been fiscal year 2004's 12th aircraft until fiscal year 2005, meaning funding above 11 in fiscal year 2004 is early-to-need by one year. The Air Force will take advantage of existing order backlog to only order the number of aircraft required (11) to be started by the end of next year. The new program avoids the need to outprioritize other important defense programs, since adding four early-to-need C-17 aircraft would have required over $600 million in additional funding in fiscal year 2004.

Question. Are any of the 11 aircraft requested in the FY 2004 budget funded early-to-need?

Answer. One of the 11 C-17s requested in the fiscal year 2004 President's Budget is funded slightly (less than one month) early-to-need. The Air Force is attempting to strike a balance between funding as many aircraft as possible, without having to fund aircraft early-to-need. With the current procurement profile presented in the fiscal year 2004 President's Budget, no aircraft are funded early-to-need after fiscal year 2004.

Question. The production schedule accompanying the request indicates that rather than delivering 4 aircraft from June through August of FY04 as was displayed in the 2003 submission, no aircraft will be delivered during this period. Is this correct? Answer. No, a break in production is not expected. Relative to the contract delivery dates, Multiyear Procurement 1 is currently 139 days ahead of schedule. Multiyear Procurement 2 resets the schedule reserve to 90 days. No changes occurred in the production schedule between the fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 submission to Congress. However, the fiscal year 2003 submission was based on multiyear procurement 1 contract dates, and the fiscal year 2004 submission was based on multiyear procurement 1 forecasted early deliveries. Therefore, the perceived 3-month "production break" from June through August of fiscal year 2004 results from showing actual/projected delivery dates for first multiyear procurement 1 and contract delivery dates for multiyear procurement 2. The negotiated schedule reserve is desired to allow for unanticipated events, such as the United Kingdom lease that occurred in 2001.

Question. The final aircraft under the first multiyear contract will be delivered 6 months early in May of 2004 as opposed to November. How has the second multiyear accounted for this?

Answer. Multipleyear Procurement (MYP 2) moves the contract delivery dates forward to shorten the amount of schedule reserve. The MYP 2 contract takes Boeing's internal schedule into consideration since Boeing's schedule maintains a constant production flow, and provides for a smooth transition between the two MYP contracts.

Question. If the Air Force were to modify the delivery schedule in FY 2004, could an additional 4 aircraft be put on contract prior to the start of FY 2005?

Answer. Yes, but the costs and risks outweigh the potential benefits. Modifying the delivery schedule would require increasing plant throughput and could result in increased cost/risk to the Air Force. The multi-year procurement contract was based on an economic production rate of 15 C-17s per year. Production above 15/

yr does not yield any cost benefits. Increasing C-17 production rate also increases C-17 risks, decreases plant reserve/flexibility, and also increases difficulty in implementing aircraft block upgrades on time. The potential ramp-up could require extra funding for retooling and take as much as 12-24 months to implement.

Question. Interim Contractor Support increases from $532 million in FY 2003 to $927 million in FY 2004. Please explain the reason for the increase of $395 million. How many total C-17 aircraft will be fielded by the end of FY 2003? FY 2004?

Answer. The increase in the Interim Contractor Support request is due to requirements to support the +60 buy, standup of new C-17 bases, sustainment support as more aircraft are delivered, aircraft block upgrades, and the purchase of spare engines. Of the $395 million increase, $229.2 million is due to site activation funding for McGuire AFB, NJ, March AFB, CA, Hickam AFB, HI, and Travis AFB, CA. The $85.9 million is for increased sustainment support as more aircraft are delivered. This includes increased spares requirement due to the current operations tempo and Kosovo lessons learned. The $50.7 million is for aircraft block upgrades. The $29.1 million is for the purchase of spare engines. Based on Boeing's projected delivery schedule, 109 C-17s will be fielded by the end of fiscal year 2003 and 125 by the end of fiscal year 2004.

Question. What is the high altitude airdrop mission capability for the C-17? Answer. Normally the C-17 performs airdrop operations at and below 25,000 feet. The 25,000-foot cap is primarily a physiological consideration for the aircrew, because the aircraft must be depressurized for the drop. Above this limit there are limitations to how an individual can perform their duties and stringent regulations on the use of life support equipment. The C-17 has demonstrated airdrops up to 29,000 feet (with special permission) operationally over the past year.

Question. Please provide us with an update on the status of the C-17 commercial variant program and what effect that and a NATO or foreign sale of this variant might have on the program?

Answer. The Commercial Application of Military Airlift Aircraft (CAMAA), and NATO or foreign sales of this commercial variant should have no affect on the current multiyear procurement contract of 60 C-17s (180 total).

The CAMAA program office has developed a business plan that supports a public/ private venture investing in 10 commercial C-17s. The CAMAA program is currently on hold, pending the validation of a military requirement for 222 C-17s, 42 more than the current buy of 180, and demonstration that diverting 10 of those 42 additional C-17s into a CAMAA variant is both cost effective and militarily efficacious.

BOMBER REQUIREMENTS

Question. The Air Force bomber requirement is defined as 157 bombers (a mix of B-1, B-2, and B-52) at their full capacity. This requirement is defined in a November 2001 Long-Range Strike Aircraft White Paper.

Mr. Secretary, could you please define for the Committee the Air Force's numerical bomber requirement by aircraft.

Answer. The November 2001 Long-Range Strike Aircraft White Paper defines a bomber force structure which includes 157 aircraft. The bomber force structure includes the following number of aircraft: B-2 (21), B-1 (60), and B-52 (76).

Question. Are we currently meeting that requirement, including the "full capability" aspect of that requirement?

Answer. Yes, the Air Force is pursuing a time-phased modernization program that will eventually achieve full capability for our 157 bombers by 2015. The objective of the modernization program is to improve lethality, survivability, supportability, and responsiveness, all of which are necessary for the bomber force to achieve the desired "full capability."

Question. Is the Strike Aircraft White Paper of November, 2001, considered by the Air Force to be the bomber roadmap for the future?

Answer. No, as stated in the Long-Range Strike Aircraft White Paper, the document is not the bomber roadmap: The White Paper articulates long-range bomber force structure plans, modernization, capabilities, concept of operations, and replacement timeline. The document is a "snapshot" in time and is designed to reflect strategic guidance and fiscal plans; therefore, changes in the threat environment, advances in weapon technology, unforeseen increases in aircraft attrition, or any number of other variables could drive a modification, addition, or complete re-write. The Air Force's bomber roadmap is now in development at Headquarters, Air Combat Command.

Question. How often is the Strike Aircraft White Paper reevaluated? When will it be reevaluated again?

Answer: The document is a "snapshot" in time and is designed to reflect strategic guidance and fiscal plans. The first Strike Aircraft White Paper was completed in March 1999 and updated in November 2001. The Air Force is currently evaluating guidance and plans to determine if an update is needed.

Question. Please provide for the record a copy of the November, 2001, Strike Aircraft White Paper?

Answer. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management & Comptroller), Congressional Liaison, has provided a copy to the House Appropriations Committtee, Subcommittee on Defense.

B-1B DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS UPGRADE PROGRAM

Question. In a letter to the Committee in December the Air Force notified that it was canceling the Defensive Systems Upgrade Program (DSUP) due to persistent cost overruns and mission failures.

What are the estimated termination costs of the DSUP program in FY03?

Answer: As noted in the "Report to Congress on B-1 Defensive System Upgrade Program (DSUP)," DSUP termination costs could be as high as $90 million. That amount includes government costs to modify two fleet aircraft to replace the two test aircraft currently configured with Block F DSUP, test infrastructure previously shared between B-1 Block E and Block F and Boeing allowable termination costs. The Boeing share of the termination costs will not be finalized until the final contract termination resolution, expected before February 2004. At this time, the Air Force plans on using $82 million of fiscal year 2003 DSUP RDT&E funding to cover anticipated DSUP termination costs.

B-2 BOMBER MODIFICATIONS

Question. The FY04 request includes $76.4 million for additional upgrades to the B-2. The primary modifications in the request are the MK82_JDAM/Smart Bomb Rack Assembly, Link 16/Center Instrument Display/In-flight Replanner, and Low Observable improvements.

What is the status of the MK82 JDAM/Smart Bomb Rack Assembly modernization program for the B-2?

Answer. The B-2 Smart Bomb Rack (SBRA)/Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)-82 integration program is proceeding on schedule. Testing at Edwards AFB began in February 2003. The test period began with a full range of ground testing, which was successful. Flight testing started shortly thereafter. Both captive carry and separation tests have been conducted to date. Communications between the aircraft and the weapons have been successful. The first separation test was conducted on 5 March 2003, and, as planned, sixteen inert, unguided JDAM-82s were successfully released. Analysis of the mission data is currently underway. The next mission is scheduled for 23 April 2003 and flight testing is projected to complete by 10 September 2003.

The production portion of the SBRA program is also on schedule. The baseline contract effort to modify the first bomb racks for use by the 509th at Whiteman AFB may be awarded in early April. This award will insure sufficient SBRA assets are available to meet the RAA (Required Assets Available) requirements of four shipsets by November 2004.

Question. Can you please define for the Committee the increased weapon delivery capability that the smart bomb rack assemblies will bring to the plane in terms of current capability per type of munition, and what the capability will be once the racks are installed.

Answer. Presently, the B-2 can strike up to 16 individual targets with the GBU31 (2000lb class weapon). The weapons are carried on a rotary launch assembly (RLA). The B-2 can carry eight weapons per RLA and with two weapons bays can carry a total of 16 weapons.

The addition of Mk 82 JDAM (GBU-38)/Smart Bomb Rack Assembly allows the B-2 the ability to carry up to 80 GBU-38 weapons. This allows the B-2 the capability to individually strike up to 80 targets in one sortie. The GBU-38 is a 500lb class weapon that can, in certain instances, strike targets where collateral damage concerns prohibit the use of a 2000lb weapon such as the GBU-31.

Question. When does the Air Force anticipate it will begin modifications to integrate the Small Diameter Bomb into the B-2's weapons capability?

Answer. The fielding of the MK-82 JDAM with the SBRA in fiscal year 2004 will dramatically increase B-2's payload from 16 JDAMs to 80 JDAMs. Because of this huge leap in capability in delivering 500lb. near precision weapons, there is no funding in the Future Years Defense Plan for Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) integration

on the B-2. When the SDB's development is complete, opportunities for integration on the B-2 platform will be assessed by the Air Force.

Question. What increased weapon delivery capability would the Small Diameter Bomb bring to the plane in terms of bombs per sortie?

Answer. Given the capability provided by MK-82 JDAM (fiscal year 2004 for B2 integration), the Air Force has chosen not to integrate the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) on the B-2 at this time. However, analysis shows the B-2 could carry_sixtyfour 250lb. weapons (SDBs) loaded on the B-2 Rotary Launcher Assembly (RLA) or 80 on the SBRA.

Question. EHF SATCOM upgrades begin in FY 2005 as compared to last year's request, which had the modification beginning in FY 2007. What is the reason for the acceleration and how was the significant program savings achieved?

Answer. Changes in the EHF SATCOM program between the fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 President's Budget submissions did not result in schedule acceleration or cost savings. In the fiscal year 2003 President's Budget, EHF SATCOM upgrades were scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2005. Due to higher Air Force priorities, funds were reduced in the fiscal year 2004 President's Budget, resulting in the procurement start date slipping from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2007. These funding cuts and the program delay of two years resulted in a slight decrease in funding over the FYDP (fiscal year 2003-fiscal year 2009).

Question. Please explain for the Committee the savings identified in the Radar System Modification program. The FY 2004 budget indicates the program has been accelerated to begin in FY 2006 instead of FY 2007 as proposed last year. The total program cost has been reduced from $1.271 billion to $500 million.

Answer. The B-2 Radar program was mid-way through a trade study when the fiscal year 2003 President's Budget was submitted. Although the trade study examined a range of options, the fiscal year 2003 President's Budget was based on an estimate that included $.65 billion in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $1.27 billion in aircraft procurement for a total cost of $1.92 billion (fiscal year 2003-fiscal year 2009). Program start would begin in fiscal year 2003 and procurement would begin in fiscal year 2007. As the Air Force worked through the trade study, it was determined that the requirement could be met with a less expensive option, which was submitted in the fiscal year 2004 President's Budget request. The option in the fiscal year 2004 President's Budget was phased differently and included a budget of $.77 billion in RDT&E and $.5 billion in aircraft procurement for a total cost of $1.27 billion (fiscal year 2003–fiscal year 2009). Procurement would start one year earlier in fiscal year 2006.

B-2 EXHAUST CRACKS

Question. Last year the Committee expressed concern about the reappearance of surface material cracks aft of the engines. Are you continuing to see this cracking? Answer. Cracks are continuing to appear aft of the engines on the aft deck. As of 13 March 2003, all aircraft except two have cracks and the remaining two are expected to eventually experience cracking as well. Although these cracks do not pose a safety-off-light concern, they will propagate to a point where they impact Low Observable (LO) characteristics. The majority of the cracks are within acceptable limits at this time; it is anticipated that they will eventually grow to a point where repairs are required. Depending on the rate of continued cracking and crack growth, there is the possibility of a serious impact on mission capability.

Question. Is there anything more you know about the cause of these cracks and have they affected the aircraft's performance in any measurable way?

Answer. The root cause of aft deck cracking has not been determined. A team of government and industry experts has been assembled to help monitor the crack growth, conduct tests, and develop a system engineering approach to conclusively determine the failure mechanism. On 25 March 2003, a contractor team started work, using fiscal year 2003 funding, to complete the structural root cause analysis. The results of that investigation will help to derive viable short- and long-term solutions.

Aft deck cracks have affected the Low Observable (LO) performance on two aircraft. External patches have been installed temporarily on these two aircraft to contain excessive cracking. The patches are considered temporary, since they do not maintain the desired LO performance.

Question. Have you determined a fix for this problem?

Answer. At this time, no permanent fix has been determined for this problem. The Air Force has developed an interim solution for aircraft with limited cracking that will maintain the desired Low Observable (LO) performance. In addition, the Air Force is pursuing an interim repair for seriously cracked aft decks that will also

maintain LO performance. The root cause analysis will help determine the way ahead for a permanent solution.

Question. Is there anything in the request to address this problem?

Answer. Our government and industry team is using the available fiscal year 2003 funding to complete structural root cause analysis scheduled to be completed by September 2004. There is currently no funding budgeted for this problem beyond the fiscal year 2003 appropriation.

B-52 STAND-OFF JAMMING PLATFORM

Question. The Air Force plans to use B-52s as an Airborne Electronic Attack platform by developing a pod capable of covering early warning and ground control intercept radars with particular attention to radars feeding advanced long range SAMS. The Situational Awareness Defensive Initiative (SADI), which is the follow on to the B-52s current early warning and jamming capability, is being rebaselined in FY 2004 to include this new initiative.

Why is the B-52 the best platform for this mission? Why not use a 767 or other aircraft?

Answer. The B-52 is the best platform for this mission since it is available and will be in service until 2040, can perform the electronic attack mission in conjunction with the attack missions it currently performs, has high electrical generating capability, and has the long range and loiter characteristics necessitated by the stand-off jamming role. Use of a 767 or similar aircraft as a stand-off jamming platform is not as advantageous because of the additional costs to acquire the aircraft and to operate and maintain an additional fleet of single mission aircraft. The OSD sponsored Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) study concluded, to be survivable in an anti-access threat environment, the services needed both stand-in and stand-off jamming capability. To be effective at the longer ranges posed by these threats, stand-off jamming requires a large amount of Effective Radiated Power (ERP). The B-52 can generate the necessary electrical power to power a high ERP jamming pod while maintaining its weapons carriage capability. In addition, the B-52 platform provides both the range and persistence necessary to support other assets within the Global Strike Task Force.

Question. How would a standoff jamming capability affect the current weapons employment capability?

Answer. B-52 weapons employment capabilities will not be impacted. The B-52 maintains its existing vast combat capabilities, delivering Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile, Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile, Joint Direct Attack Missile, Joint Stand Off Weapon, Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser, and the Miniature Air Launched Decoy weapons, while performing as a stand-off jammer simultaneously.

Question. What requirement/capability changes are being made to the B-52 stand off jamming mission?

Answer. The B-52 has an ALR-20A panoramic receiver that due to serviceability issues needs replacing. An existing requirement to replace the ALR-20A with the Situational Awareness Defensive Improvement (SADI) has been modified to incorporate enhanced capabilities to control the jamming pod. The jamming pods will be composed of electronically steerable arrays and will replace the external fuel tanks on the B-52.

Question. Funding provided in FY 2003 is to carry the program through FY 2004. What efforts will this $22.4 million be used for over this two year period?

Answer. The $22.4 million will be used for risk reduction efforts and trade study analysis to define the new program cost and schedule and aid in final source selection of the new Situational Awareness Defensive Initiative architecture.

F-16 AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT CANCELLATIONS

Question. In the FY 2003 request, the Air Force had proposed to begin purchase of an additional 6 aircraft in FY 2004 and 6 aircraft in FY 2005 at a total cost of $459 million. The FY 2004 budget deletes the request for any additional aircraft and realigns $63.7 million of the proposed funding to F-16 modifications for a net savings of $395 million.

What is the Air Force's argument for deleting funding for the additional aircraft as proposed in the FY 2003 request?

Answer. The Air Force determined that it would be more cost effective to invest the funds originally to be used to procure the remaining (12) F-16 Block 50s into programs that will upgrade the F-16 Block 40 to a similar capability as the F-16 Block 50. To accomplish this, funds were placed into Common Configuration Imple