Security Cooperation Finally, we are refining theater security cooperation plans with our friends and allies in each region to focus on building the right partnerships in the future. We are also establishing a disciplined assessment process to evaluate how the activities of our combined forces over time help us achieve specific security outcomes. ARE OUR FORCES CURRENTLY READY? "DoD will undertake a comprehensive re-engineering of its current readiness reporting system. The new system will allow measurement of the adequacy of the force to accomplish all its assigned missions, not just major combat operations.” Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review September 2001 Like other aspects of operational risk, deciding how well prepared the U.S. military force is to perform its missions is part art, part sci ence. Defense Readiness Reporting System For many years, we have relied primarily on the classified Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) reports maintained by all the military services to track actual personnel levels, equipment stocks, and training performance against standard benchmarks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior civilian leaders then assess these data against a range of operational scenarios during the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review and Senior Readiness Oversight Council meetings. The resulting evaluations are summarized along with key readiness trends in the Department's classified Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress. The SORTS system, however, does not capture performance information for joint missions or for the full range of missions beyond a major regional contingency, such as those required to prosecute a successful war on terrorism. Accordingly, we have undertaken a fundamental overhaul of our readiness reporting process. DoD Directive 7730.65, Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System, orders three fundamental changes to how we evaluate force readiness: • Unit readiness will be measured against missions assigned to combatant commanders, rather than against doctrinal tasks unique to a military service. • Real-time status reporting and scenario modeling will be used for assessments, not only during peacetime, but as a crisis unfolds and while operations are ongoing. • Tighter linkages will be established between readiness planning and budgets. The Defense Readiness Reporting System successfully completed a proof-of-concept demonstration in the fall of 2002. With the awarding of the prime development contract, we are working toward an initial operating capability in FY 2004 with full fielding planned during FY 2007. Current Force Assessment The annual Current Force Assessment, conducted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, compares risk across a range of contingencies and geographic areas. It uses collaborative analysis and war-gaming to pinpoint risks and constraints in potential near-term scenarios that could change our international posture of engagement or explode into a small-scale contingency. This assessment process, which is entering its fourth year, has proved exceptionally effective at highlighting problems and quickly developing alternatives. It has allowed us to act quickly to shift forces among combatant commanders to better deter an emerging crisis. Perhaps most significant, it provides a mechanism to intensively manage low density/high demand assets to optimize effectiveness while reducing the adverse effects of high operational tempos. Adaptive Planning "We can identify threats, but cannot know when or where America or its friends will be attacked. We should try mightily to avoid surprise, but we must also learn to expect it...Adapting to surprise - adapting quickly and decisively - must therefore be a condition of planning" Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review We are most ready when we can adapt our plans to emerging condi- ARE OUR FORCES EMPLOYED CONSISTENT WITH OUR It is not enough to plan effectively-we must manage how forces are allocated and employed so we act in a manner consistent with the overarching objectives of the defense strategy. In practice, this can be hard to do, as the press of day-to-day business favors a singular focus on immediate events. However, if we are ever to effectively "buy down" operational risk for the Department, we must learn to analytically evaluate each individual, nearterm task in the wider context of our strategic priorities over the long term. Thus, we are developing analytic tools that will help our senior leaders weigh the balance among the actual deployment and employment of forces against the needs of non-combat activities, such as training, exercises and contingencies supporting a full range of enduring security missions. The measures will help the Secretary and his senior advisors decide "how much is enough,” help them balance the need to win quickly in a conflict with the need to maintain strong deterrence against other threats. We must also build a strong, effective interagency process that allows the Department to leverage the talent and capabilities of other elements of national power. This analytic tool set includes developing: • Alternative courses of action and joint operational concepts for our operational and contingency plans. Common, comparable operational risk metrics for strategic priorities, individual events, and operations and contingency plans. • Models and simulations to help refine near-term options, supported by a data process that keeps information on U.S. and aggressor capabilities up-to-date and in a form readily available for analysis. Right now, we are taking clear, specific action to streamline our decision process-our leaders cannot act wisely unless they can get the information they need, at the right time. We must drive a better understanding of how overhead and indirect costs relate to military capability-we must build a base of facilities that are ready and able to meet the highest standards for quality and readiness. And as we transform our military force, we must re-align our support structure to embrace new ways of working, and pursue creative technology solutions. The Secretary's performance priorities for institutional risk in FY 2003 are Streamline DoD Processes, Optimize Intelligence Capabilities, and Enhance Interagency Process, Focus and Integration. |