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pie invested on the ground to go and bring to finality all the other things that we can do.

If you want to look at the issue of precision and that gets a lot of attention because

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Precision, fire power, we have got it.

General Shinseki. It is sometimes described as a counterpoint to ground capability, and I don't think it is ever intended to be that way, nor do I think it is a very accurate way of describing what our capabilities are or our professions are. Precision has a value to the way we prosecute this business of combat.

But there is precision with fires and there is also precision with maneuver, and in the business of precision with fires, you have two components of that. You have the accurate location of a target and then you have the accurate delivery of fires. Accurate delivery of fires, I think we have demonstrated that we have the technology to be able to do that. We are always challenged with that first

Eiece, and that is the accurate location of a target. Unless you can ring target location error and circular error probability of a location of a target and a strike of a weapon, precision is sort of less than we would like it to be.

Where ground forces provide contributions is resolving the front end of that, and that is locating, fixing, isolating that target so that you can bring to bear precision fires, and so there is a complement here. And certainly in the ground warfighting doctrine, fires and maneuver are always talked about as complementary capabilities.

In the joint arena, maneuver and fire still have that relationship, and a final resolution of most of the scenarios that we look at and prepare for ultimately end up on the ground. You have those situations in which a target not only cannot be identified or located, but even if identified and located are conflicted because you have innocents around them, and so your fires are not able to be necessarily employed to the extent you would like, and it takes, then, ground capability to go in there, get the separation you want or to take targets down.

I think we have seen all of our services mobilized for this potential operation, and I think all of us have demonstrated. As General Jim Jones and I used to say, we were never on an overly crowded battlefield. There is enough work for everybody.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Great. Thank you.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. Visclosky.

ABRAMS AND BRADLEY MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service. Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, the Abrams and Bradley Fighting Vehicles were modernized, were two divisions, but that the proposal now is to terminate the modernization program, despite the fact that it has not occurred, for the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment. What is the rationale for the termination of that?

Secretary White. Up until this year, our plan had been to fully modernize three and a third divisions. The three divisions of III Corps: 1st Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division, 3rd ID and its cavalry regiment, 3rd ACR. This year we had to make some tough choices about how much we could modernize, and the core of the modernization is the M1A2, most advanced variant of the Abrams, and the Bradley A3 variant.

This year in making trades that I referred to in my opening remarks and needing the money to support Transformation, we had to reduce the modernization to six brigades, two divisions, the 1st Cav and 4th ID, and forego the modernization of the other division and the ACR. And it was a choice that we had to make in order to fully fund Transformation, and we had to limit the degree that we would otherwise would have liked to have done in modernization of the existing force, and that is the call that we made.

Mr. VlSCLOSKY. How much money would be involved, Mr. Secretary, approximately? What was the trade-off moneywise then?

Secretary White. I will have to get the details as to how much four brigades' worth would have been to modernize Bradley and Abrams, but I will get you those numbers.

[The information follows:]

To provide both the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 3rd Infantry Division with the same vehicle mix that the rest of the Counterattack Corps has, consisting of the Abrams M1A2-SEP tank and the Bradley M2/3A3 Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the cost would be $1,936 billion for Abrams tanks and $1,589 trillion for Bradley Fighting Vehicles. If the Army were to use M1A1 AIM-D with second-generation forward-looking infrared radar, the cost would be $165.4 million plus $1,589 billion for the Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Other variations of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle could also be assessed for such an upgrade.

Mr. Visclosky. I have one or two questions for the record on the Abrams Tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.

[clerk's Note.—Questions submitted by Mr. Visclosky and the answers thereto follow:]

Question. In order to pay for the Army of the future (the Objective Force), this Committee has supported the Army's termination and reduction of dozens of current programs over the past two years. In fiscal year 2004, the Army again asks us to support program terminations and reductions—this time a total of 48 programs impacted.

Two of these programs are the Abrams Tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle. These are the current force's most potent weapons to ensure both enemy defeat and soldier survivability. The Army now proposed to terminate Abrams and Bradley modernization after fielding of modern versions of each vehicle to only two divisions. This leaves the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment—the other unit in what the Army calls the Counterattack Corps—with Abrams and Bradley vehicles that are more than 10 years old.

Please explain your rationale for terminating the M1A2 SEP tank and Bradley A3 Fighting Vehicle before fielding to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Answer. The Army favors a pure Abrams tank fleet for III Corps; however, as with many other major weapons systems, it is cost prohibitive to procure a M1A2 SEP tank for every armored crew. This is especially true when considering the significant bills we are faced with in order to transform the Army. As a result, the Army has made some difficult decisions on equipping the armor corps. The end state for the tank fleet based on these decisions will be M1A2SEP tanks in the 4th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry, and M1A1HA, M1A1AIM or M1A2 tanks in the rest of the active force. We are currently working options to buy back MlA2SEFs and M3A3's or M1A1AIM-D+ tanks and M3A20DS++ for 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment giving them the digital architecture to communicate with the rest of the digitized III Corps.

Question. Please provide your analysis of this decision that shows how the need to tercninate these programs for affordability reasons outweighs the operational combat risk.

Answer. The Army has made some difficult decisions on equipping the current force with the most modern and capable equipment. Although we have assumed some risk by not producing enough M1A2SEP tanks to equip the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and 3rd Infantry Division, we still maintain both survivability and lethality overmatch with the current tank force. The delicate balance required to transition from the current force to the Objective Force will require some acceptable risk, but never to the extent of putting our troops at an unacceptable risk.

Although every armor unit will not be equipped with the M1A2SEP tank, all Active Component units, less 3rd Infantry Division, will receive a new AIM tank providing even greater survivability, mobility, and increased operational readiness rates. The 3rd Infantry Division is scheduled to keep their newer M1A1 heavy armor tanks providing them with a similar level of armor protection.

The Army is preparing a response to a Congressional report requirement requesting a study on the compatibility of a mixed tank fleet and the adequacy of such a mixed fleet to meet the heavy corps mission. We except this study to be finished in July 2003.

Question. Can this Committee be assured that if it provides the Army additional resources to procure the required M1A2 SEP tanks and Bradley A3 vehicles that the Army will spend the funds for that purpose and that the Army will provide the balance of funding required to complete that procurement?

Answer. Yes, to the extent that the Army is continually reviewing the delicate balance of the Army's contributions to the Joint war fight. Modernizing the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment is one of the Army's top priorities and every effort will be made to use all available assets to accomplish that goal.

Question. Would the Army be willing to work with the contractors for each of these combat vehicles to find an innovative solution to resourcing the needed M1A2 SEP tank and Bradley A3s to include zero sum movements of funding within each program?

Answer. The Army shares your concerns about the long-term viability of United Defense LP and General Dynamics Land Systems. We have initiated a series of discussions with corporate representatives in an effort to ensure these facilities can successfully bridge the gap between the end of the production of legacy systems and the initial production of the Future Combat Systems. We will continue to support the Abrams fleet as the Army transitions to the Objective Force, maintaining minimal risk on all fronts.

[clerk's NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Visclosky.] COUNTERATTACK CORPS ARMOR REQUIREMENTS

General Shinseki. May I add to this discussion, Congressman? Three years ago when we began this review of the state of the Army, in fact we had a focus on this counterattack corps, three and a third divisions. And as we projected forward the investments at the end of 10 years, at that would accomplish for us if we were to do everything we had described, we would have three and a third divisions that were quite capable, quite modernized, essentially a heavy force that we have today, and the ability to transport it rapidly would still be challenging.

It is on that basis that we went back and took a look at whether the Army would be best served with one piece of it, this one corps that was wholly modernized, whether it was strategically more important for us to go back and look at the entire Army and put in place a modern transformation program that would give us all of our divisions that would be in the same condition as that one corps, all of them capable of being moved quickly, being lethal, and having the descriptors that I used earlier. A strategic change for us. And we decided to refocus our dollars and our energy and to make some tough decisions that would give the Army, the entire Army, the capabilities that we had been sort of husbanding for a single piece of it.

We think in the long run that will bear out as having been the right decision. We understand that whenever you go through this transformation, there are pressures on existing members in the industrial base. We understand that. And 3V2 years ago we made very clear in our early presentations that we could not do this, this major change in transformation, without the support of industry, and we invited industry to join us. We told everyone this would be a bold step, but we needed their help to step off, and we would do the best we can to resolve risks and work through this.

There are a number of early beneficiaries of this. The NLOS cannon, common chassis FCS business, has already identified some members of industry who have already begun to make that return on early investments because they are part of this effort to make the change. Others took risk on their own and stepped off smartly with us and are yet to have the benefit of those decisions. Others were a little slower to step off for reasons of their own. There may be even some who chose not to step off. But there are a variety of categories of situations for industry. For the most part, industry has stepped up with us. We would not be where we are today— even if we had the funding available, we would not be where we are today if industry as a whole hadn't supported us in this effort.

We will continue to look at those concerns that are expressed by Members that say they have got periods here that have to be bridged, but it is not too late to step off with us, and I think it is

FISCAL YEAR 2003 FUNDS FOR ABRAMS AND BRADLEY

Mr. Dicks. Would the gentleman yield just briefly?

Mr. Visclosky. Sure.

Mr. DlCKS. What are you going to do with the 2003 money for these upgrades and the tanks?

Secretary White. Spend it.

Mr. Dicks. On something else or on

Secretary White. No. In other words, to get the fully modernized capability

Mr. Dicks. At the Corps you have got to spend the money on the 2003

Secretary White. Right. We are talking about 2004 money, not 2003.

Mr. Dicks. Right.

General SHINSEKI. The 2003 dollars were assigned against risks that we did not want to take, and so those dollars are being focused on that. It is the 2004 monies that we begin to—Congressman, it is really beyond the 2004 and it is really 2005 and 2006, that some of these trend lines begin to drop more significantly.

LIFE CYCLE COSTS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I have a lot of reasons to be proud to serve with the members on this Committee. Besides their focus on the quality of life of those individual troops, it is also the issue of operation and maintenance and spare parts and all those things that don't capture headlines. And I share their concern particularly as far as the rising cost of readiness and the issue of paying attention to life cycle costs during system development. And my sense is that that life cycle cost of a system generically on average is about 72 percent of the overall cost.

What programs or proposals do either of you gentlemen have in place to try to better address that issue? And I understand there is always that impulse, and I think it is a natural impulse, to get right to that cutting edge of that technology or new system but not look at the overall cycle costs in maintenance problems that may impose?

Secretary White. That thrust line is a central part, a critical part, of the Future Combat System development. We absolutely must reduce the logistic burden associated with the Future Combat System over the current heavy force that drives the life cycle cost.

Another part of it is robotic technology. If you look at Crusader, and now the FCS Non-Line of Sight Cannon, the biggest classed element in the life cycle is the cost of the crew. And so if you go to unmanned systems and robotics and become more efficient with people going forward, it will also have an enormous impact on the O&M cost. So the automatic loader that we are transferring over to the cannon in the Future Combat System, which allows us to put a significantly smaller crew on the cannon, will also have a significant impact on the life cycle question.

So I absolutely agree with you and that is a central thrust on the Objective Force. The same with Comanche.

Mr. VlSCLOSKY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lewis. Mr. Tiahrt.

BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL

Mr. TlAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to add my voice in thanking you for your service to the country. You could have done a lot of other things with your life. You chose to serve our country, and so thank you very much.

I want to make a comment to start with. You have started an Army Business Initiative Council. I think it is very innovative. The Federal Acquisition Regulations are lethargic, cumbersome, and they block getting new technologies into our soldiers' hands. And I would like to extend an offer to work with you to change the process if we can, so we can shorten the time it takes to get a good idea in the hands of the people who defend this great Nation.

Secretary White. I look forward to that.

TRANSFORMATION

Mr. Tiahrt. Second, we used to call it modernization, it is now transformation. We have an aging Legacy Force and in our efforts to upgrade them sometimes we have come up with multiple systems out there. We have about four different models of an M-l tank, I am told three models of the M-2 Bradleys, a couple models of the helicopters, Apache helicopters. The Black Hawks nave more versions than that out there.

So we have these upgrades that cost a lot with O&M, and I think it consumes our resources. How do you balance between maintaining some of these items in our Legacy Force with new procurement, new ideas? What is the criteria that we are going to use in the future to decide whether we maintain an existing system or discard it for a new technology?

Secretary White. Well, let me start, and the Chief can—let us take aviation, for example. We have invested over the years to put together an aviation fleet with Apache, Black Hawk, and currently Kiowa Warrior and, in the future, Comanche, that we are paying to upgrade to digital capability and to have a common set of heli

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