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dominance as part of the Joint Force. We will continue to work closely with the combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop and ensure the appropriate posture to meet both the current strategic requirements and the future challenges to our national security.

Question. Are all military construction projects in Europe on hold and is it because of this? Or something else?

Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is withholding fiscal year 2003 military construction funding for Germany while General Jones conducts a review of force structure, stationing, and related infrastructure requirements in Europe. The Secretary of Defense has asked him to revalidate projects for the fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 military construction program within 30 to 60 days. This allows the Army to perform a more detailed assessment of facility requirements. Upon receipt of this assessment, project level execution plans will be developed to accommodate required changes to the current program.

Question. Is there the same situation for military construction projects in Korea? Answer. Yes, the Korea combatant commander is also conducting a review of force structure, stationing, and related infrastructure requirements. We plan a similar relook at our construction program.

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE PERSONNEL

Question. In a September 13, 2002, letter to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, with a copy to you (Secretary White), I complained about the misuse of the Guard and Reserve. Part-time reservists are being turned into full time soldiers through extended and unpredictable active duty assignments. While reservists are more than willing to do their share, especially in a time of crisis, they signed on with the expectation that periods of active service would be relatively short.

Are we using the Guard and Reserve instead of asking for the higher level of Active Component troops actually needed?

Answer. When our endstrength was reduced to 480,000 several years ago, the Army chose to put the preponderance of some low-density specialties into the Reserve Component in order to maximize the Active Component combat power available for response to contingencies. Since that time, the level of contingency operations has risen, forcing us to draw from the Reserve Component for the soldiers with the right skill sets to support these deployments. We have had over 30,000 Reserve Component soldiers mobilized continuously since 9/11. I have testified that I believe the active Army is too small for its current mission profile. That said, there are a number of initiatives in process to address this issue. We are working to ensure that we optimize the mix of specialties in the Active and Reserve Components, as currently sized. We are also striving to use existing endstrength most efficiently through our Third Wave initiative, which aims to keep soldiers and Army civilians assigned to positions that are part of the Army's core competencies. Finally, we are using the flexibility Congress has provided us to mitigate the stress on our Reserve Components.

Question. What is your active strength and what should it be?

Answer. The Congressionally mandated fiscal year 2002 Active Army end strength was 480,000. However, nothing has changed since my last testimony-the Army is too small for its mission profile. The reality is that our operations tempo, already challenging before 9/11, has increased dramatically in the post 9/11 environment. Over the past 18 months, mobilizations have maintained a steady state of approximately 30,000 Reserve Component soldiers, effectively increasing our active duty strength to approximately 510,000. We recognize the necessity to ensure we look internally to obtain all possible efficiencies prior to making any determinations on potential end strength increases.

A study is currently underway to review Army non-core competencies-the Third Wave-with the expectation that some personnel savings will be generated for use in mitigating "force stress." Additionally, we are fully cognizant of the stress that this steady state mobilization is placing on our Reserve Components. Studies are underway to determine the correct balance of Active and Reserve forces, including an analysis exploring options for mitigating the current stress to the Reserve Component by ensuring that the correct type units are resourced within the Active Component.

Question. What percent of the mission is done by the Active Component, the Guard, and the Reserve?

Answer. First of all, the Guard and Reserve personnel we have mobilized have done an outstanding job and have been a valuable asset in the fight against terrorism. As for the percentage, the Active Component does roughly 60 percent of the mission and the Reserve Component does about 40 percent of the mission. As the

war on terrorism continues, we will continue to rely heavily on the Reserve Component for critical specialties such as civil affairs, Special Forces, military police, and military intelligence.

Question. Do the Guard and Reserve requests for equipment and military construction projects reflect their share of the mission?

Answer. The Guard and Reserve continue to play an important role in the Army's missions and are being modernized and transformed along with the active forces. Equipment and military construction projects for all components are based on the requirements generated from The Army Plan and the Defense Strategy. This equipping is taking place across mission sets.

In recognition of the vital role played by the Reserve Components, the Army plans to convert a Reserve Component brigade in Pennsylvania to a Stryker Brigade. This conversion will enhance our strategic reserve and support the war on terrorism, small-scale contingencies, and homeland defense missions. All associated critical equipment and military construction projects are funded for this conversion. Similarly, for the Army's Aviation Transformation Plan, the Reserve Components have been funded alongside their Active Component counterparts.

Additionally, the Army continues to implement the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS Phase I & II), a process that will convert six Army National Guard combat brigades to combat support and combat service support structure. In addition to ADRS, the Army has begun planning for the implementation of the Army's National Guard Restructure Initiative, an initiative that will convert additional heavy combat brigades to mobile light infantry brigades in order to take into account the new strategic roles and missions of our Reserve Components.

Finally, there are many other force structure changes that will require new equipment and construction for the Reserve Components, and these are based upon the requirements of the Defense Strategy. These changes include additional biological detection companies, civil support teams, military police, military intelligence, engineers, and other similar units. Guard and Reserve forces are being equipped for these critical missions.

ABRAMS AND BRADLEY MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS

Question. In order to pay for the Army of the future (the Objective Force), this Committee has supported the Army's termination and reduction of dozens of current programs over the past two years. In fiscal year 2004, the Army again asks us to support program terminations and reductions-this time a total of 48 programs impacted.

Two of these programs are the Abrams Tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle. These are the current force's most potent weapons to ensure both enemy defeat and soldier survivability. The Army now proposed to terminate Abrams and Bradley modernization after fielding of modern versions of each vehicle to only two divisions. This leaves the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment-the other unit in what the Army calls the Counterattack Corps-with Abrams and Bradley vehicles that are more than 10 years old.

Please explain your rationale for terminating the M1A2SEP tank and Bradley A3 Fighting vehicle before fielding to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Answer. The Army favors a pure Abrams tank fleet for III Corps; however, as with many other major weapons systems, it is cost prohibitive to procure a M1A2 SEP tank for every armored crew. This is especially true when considering the significant bills we are faced with in order to transform the Army. As a result, the Army has made some difficult decisions on equipping the armor corps. The end state for the tank fleet based on these decisions will be MIA2SEP tanks in the 4th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry, and M1A1HA, M1A1AIM or M1A2 tanks in the rest of the active force. We are currently working options to buy back M 1 A2SEP's and M3A3's or M1A1AIM-D+ tanks and M3A2ODS++ for 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment giving them the digital architecture to communicate with the rest of the digitized III Corps.

Question. Please provide your analysis of this decision that shows how the need to terminate these programs for affordability reasons outweighs the operational combat risk.

Answer. The Army has made some difficult decisions on equipping the current force with the most modern and capable equipment. Although we have assumed some risk by not producing enough M1A2SEP tanks to equip the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and 3rd Infantry Division, we still maintain both survivability and lethality overmatch with the current tank force. The delicate balance required to transition from the current force to the Objective Force will require some acceptable risk, but never be to the extent of putting our troops at an unacceptable risk.

Although every armor unit will not be equipped with the M1A2SEP tank, all Active Component units, less 3rd Infantry Division, will receive a new AIM tank providing even greater survivability, mobility, and increased operational readiness rates. The 3rd Infantry Division is scheduled to keep their newer M1A1 heavy armor tanks providing them with a similar level of armor protection.

The Army is preparing a response to a Congressional report requirement requesting a study on the compatibility of a mixed tank fleet and the adequacy of such a mixed fleet to meet the heavy corps mission. We expect this study to be finished in July 2003.

Question. Can this Committee be assured that if it provides the Army additional resources to procure the required M1A2SEP tanks and Bradley A3 vehicles that the Army will spend the funds for that purpose and that the Army will provide the balance of funding required to complete that procurement?

Answer. Yes, to the extent that the Army is continually reviewing the delicate balance of the Army's contributions to the Joint war fight. Modernizing the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment is one of the Army's top priorities and every effort will be made to use all available assets to accomplish that goal.

Question. Would the Army be willing to work with the contractors for each of these combat vehicles to find an innovative solution to resourcing the needed M1A2SEP tank and Bradley A3s to include zero sum movements of funding within each program?

Answer. The Army shares your concerns about the long-term viability of United Defense LP and General Dynamics Land Systems. We have initiated a series of discussions with corporate representatives in an effort to ensure these facilities can successfully bridge the gap between the end of the production of legacy systems and the initial production of the Future Combat Systems. We will continue to support the Abrams fleet as the Army transitions to the Objective Force, maintaining minimal risk on all fronts.

STRYKER/MOBILE GUN SYSTEM

Question. Modernization of the Stryker family of vehicles is generally considered a success story. Stryker is going from "factory to foxhole" faster, perhaps, than any other major system.

The Mobile Gun System (MGS) represents the vehicle in the Stryker family that will bring the most combat power. The fiscal year 2004 request funds procurement of Strykers for the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, a unit that will have more MGS vehicles than any other Stryker unit. Is this procurement rate adequate? If not, what would it take to accelerate it?

Answer. Yes, the procurement rate is adequate. The initial low-rate production decision is scheduled for December 2003 with first unit deliveries scheduled for December 2004. First unit fieldings to 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, will occur in late 2004 to support the MGS initial operational test and evaluation. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment will begin receiving MGSs in the second quarter of fiscal year

2005.

Question. The cannons for the Motorized Gun System (MGS) are made at the Watervliet Arsenal. These cannons require 18 months of production lead-time. Does the procurement request address, adequately, this lead-time or is there the possibility of a delay.

Answer. Correct, Watervliet Arsenal is the manufacturer of the MGS cannon, and it requires 18 months lead before its production is complete and it can be installed into the platform. The additional funds provided in the FY04 congressional marks adequately address the procurement of this specific subcomponent of the MGS.

ARMORED VEHICLE LAUNCHED BRIDGE

Question. One of the 24 programs proposed for termination is the Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB) Upgrade Program, a tactical assault bridge. The AVLB was supposed to replace the recently terminated Wolverine Heavy Assault Bridge program. Is there any allegation that the AVLB cannot do the job?

Answer. The Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB) is capable of providing the maneuver commander assault bridging capability on the battlefield within limitations. The AVLB was not designed to replace the Wolverine. The Wolverine was developed to replace the 1960s technology AVLBs; however, the program was terminated in fiscal year 2000. The AVLB continues to provide the majority of the assault bridging capability in the Army today. The AVLB comes on two separate chassis, the M48A5 and the M60A1. Both versions can carry the military load classification (MLC) 60 or MLC 70 ton bridges that can support, with restrictions, gap crossing for the M1 Abrams tank. To support the M1 tank crossing on the MLC 60 bridge,

a high-risk gap crossing must be conducted and limits the maximum crossing distance to 15 meters. The MLC 70 bridge is capable of supporting the M1 tank crossing up to 18 meters.

The Army currently has 79 MLC 70 bridges in the inventory. In the area of capability, the AVLB cannot keep pace with the newer Abrams and Bradley vehicles it supports. To mitigate the termination of the Wolverine program, and to provide a more reliable AVLB, the AVLB recapitalization program was developed. The AVLB recapitalization program was to provide both readiness and performance enhancements to a select number of the AVLB fleet. The program was designed to provide 65 AVLBS upgrades for the electronics, hydraulics, track, transmission, and final drive and provide MLC 70 bridge capability. The remaining AVLBS would have received the electrical and hydraulic upgrades and any modification work orders not applied to the vehicles. This program was terminated in December 2002 with the Army assuming risk in assault bridging capability to fund higher priority programs. The remaining fiscal year 2003 funding will continue to allow electrical and hydraulic upgrades for 54 systems. The 54 systems will support the Counterattack Corps, augmented with the 44 Wolverine Heavy Assault Bridges procured.

Question. How will the Army perform its assault bridging mission in Iraq or in any other conflict?

Answer. The Wolverine and both AVLB variants are supporting the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions in Iraq. Currently, the Army has 44 Wolverines programmed, with 25 fielded to the 4th Infantry Division. Ultimately, the 4th Infantry Division and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment will only have the Wolverine heavy assault bridge. The remainder of the Army will continue to be supported by the AVLB (with MLC 70 or MLC 60 bridges). These are assigned to mechanized engineer units at the division and corps level and to the armored cavalry regiments.

PREPARATIONS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

Question. One weekend ago, I had the privilege of traveling with Congressman Jack Murtha and Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi to Qatar and Kuwait. The purpose of the trip was to review the preparations for possible military action in Iraq. Our soldiers are all ready, motivated, and a great credit to the United States.

Inevitably, the congressional delegation asked "what do you need from us?" The principal response was "more bandwidth for communications." Despite buying commercial, there is still not enough. How can we help?

Answer. Both military and commercial satellite communications would be used extensively in any potential operations in Iraq. Units deployed to the Persian Gulf have sufficient bandwidth to accomplish their missions, although additional satellite hardware and bandwidth would provide more flexibility to execute operations.

Question. The next response was "more SOF (Special Forces) troops and helicopters." How can we help there?

Answer. In response to the increasing demand for Army Special Operations (ARSOF) support to Joint force commander campaign plans, the Army has validated and resourced growth in its SOF structure. Army support to SOF aviation, combat service support, Special Forces, civil affairs, Rangers, and psychological operations has been critical to the SOF transformation strategy. The agreement between the Army and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to transfer 1,788 manpower spaces to Major Force Program (MPF)-11 beginning in fiscal year 2003 is the first step in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's transition toward their Objective Force. The Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD's) recent Program Decision Memorandum (PDM-1) directed the Army to transfer an additional 677 manpower spaces in fiscal year 2004 to support USSOCOM and enhance ARSOF aviation and psychological operations. This represents a transfer of 2,465 spaces from the Army to USSOCOM in support of SOF transformation.

Since the commencement of ARSOF operations in support of the global war on terrorism, the Army has provided over $1 billion in new equipment to enhance ARSOF firepower, communications, and ground and air mobility. PDM-1 also directs the Army to transfer 16 CH-47 aircraft to USSOCOM in support of SOF aviation. OSD has identified a total shortfall for USSOCOM of 24 MH-47 aircraft. Given the mission levels and existing shortfalls in the Army CH-47 fleet, the Army would request Congressional funding assistance directly to the USSOCOM MPF-11 funding line for the procurement of the eight additional MH-47G new builds to meet the USSOCOM MH-47 shortfall.

The future SOF Objective Force will meet Secretary of Defense and combatant commander requirements with enhanced lethality, precision, speed, stealth, survivability, and sustainability.

Question. Although you have done a Herculean job with this most difficult deployment, some of it was so fast that it lacked coordination. The example given is: delivery of trucks before arrival of drivers. What can be done to synchronize and sequence this?

Answer. Without a specific unit example, we cannot know whether the deployment plan intended for the trucks to show up before the drivers. In many instances, equipment is scheduled to arrive first to avoid soldiers sitting idle waiting for their equipment. As part of routine procedure, ports of debarkation have the capability to move vehicles and equipment to staging areas. In many cases, a unit advance party will arrive in conjunction with the equipment and prepare for the arrival of the unit's main body. Specific examples of drivers scheduled to arrive in advance of unit equipment, but did not arrive as scheduled would need to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Considering the size of the deployment, it is possible that personnel and equipment schedules were altered, thereby causing synchronization problems. The Army will gather lessons learned to identify improvements as a part of our efforts to improve the synchronization of personnel and equipment arrivals. Question. I understand that there is a plan to arm and uniform a band of ragtag Iraqi dissidents. Are you comfortable enough with this group to put the imprimatur of the United States of America on them? What legal implications does this have?

Answer. I believe an operational question such as this is best answered by the Combatant Commander, United States Central Command. As for the legal implications I would again defer to the Combatant Commander and his legal staff.

[CLERK'S NOTE.-End of questions submitted by Mr. Hobson. Questions submitted by Mr. Bonilla and the answers thereto follow:]

SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Question. Secretary White, as we have discussed before, I am very interested in the new capabilities that Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are showing on the modern battlefield. UAVs are now being recognized as a vital tool.

I was pleased to see that the budget substantially increases our investment in UAVs. However, this increase will go primarily to larger UAVs. I believe that there is still tremendous need for a small UAV. I know the Army has been examining this issue for some time now, but the time has come to get a small UAV on the battlefield.

Currently, the Congressionally funded Buster UAV, is mature enough to serve our ground forces. Buster weighs only ten pounds and has a night vision sensor. It is fully automated from take off to landing. It also has the ability to have way points programmed into the flight management system and accept inflight changes.

What role do you see for smaller UAVs (UAVs that are carried with the soldier)? Answer. Unmanned systems will be a critical component at all levels of the FCS initiative. Current Army small unmanned aerial vehicle (SUAV) use is in the initial testing and developmental stages. SUAVs will provide an "over-the-hill or building" tactical reconnaissance and surveillance capability-a capability that currently does not exist. With this capability, the squad could have "eye in the sky" ability, as well as the ability to observe in an urban setting.

SUAVS are envisioned as part of a family of UAVS identified as Class I (backpackable) and Class II (off the fender). All are hand-launched, reusable SUAVS using existing commercial off-the-shelf technology. SUAV ground control stations are envisioned as small, handheld rugged computers ranging in size from laptop to personal digital assistant size capable of flight planning, flight monitoring, and video storage. The Army intends to pursue a common control interface for the SUAV ground control stations. This will ensure the ground control station is compatible with all SUAVs in use.

Buster, a small, fully-automated UAV in its fourth year of development, is among several potential candidates that can respond to the request for proposal issued in response to the FCS requirements.

Question. What is the Army doing to bring small UAVs to the battlefield?

Answer. The Army currently has several advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTD) ongoing with DARPA that focus on a scalable, lift-augmented, ductedfan SUAVS-basically a "flying donut" with the propeller in the middle. Called the micro air vehicle and organic air vehicle, these ACTDS provide for a SUAV that can hover outside windows, perch on a building, or loiter over a target where traditional, fixed-wing SUAVs cannot.

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