Forces. And Mr. Moran touched on where do we stand relative to what we have available? I see several figures in the budget submission. One is for $7.2 billion, and then there is another figure of about half that amount. Where do we stand relative to existing stocks and to what extent are the funds you are requesting going to be addressing those needs?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think we are in basically very good shape, particularly because early last year we ramped up considerably our production of a number of the key precision munitions which we expended at very high rates. It is difficult to predict exactly how much we will use, and some of it is related to the intensity of conflict. Some of it is related to the number of targets, but we have very ample stocks, including further contingencies. No one should think that dealing with Iraq is the only thing that we are capable of.

Let me say one other thing, and then I might ask General Cartwright or Dr. Zakheim to comment on the precise detail if there is more, but I think it is really important to emphasize that this precision not only saves American lives; it is saving Iraqi lives. And the Secretary has said repeatedly, we didn't bomb Baghdad; we bombed the regime in Baghdad. And the fact that so many people are going about their normal business in Baghdad is real testimony of the fact that they know we are accurate and they know we are not aiming at them. And I don't think you will ever find an example in history where a country had this much power and used it this carefully.

OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAM

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And it is good to know. I think that is an adequate response. Obviously winning the war is our primary responsibility, but as we look ahead, could you comment further on the potential role of the United Nations? From what I gather, the Oil for Food account and program is controlled by the United Nations. What do we literally know of the management of those funds, their expenditures to date, the nature of the places they deposit those dollars, and if, in fact, as some people have told me, there is any way of verifying whether those funds have ever been audited? In other words, have these funds been used for the purposes for which they were meant to be used?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Congressman, those are very important and good questions, and I think if you will let me answer them in detail for the record, I will give you a somewhat more general answer, which is to remember that the Oil for Food program was set up to try to monitor the use of money by this criminal regime, which we are about to remove. And there clearly is a role for the United Nations in the transition from the existing arrangement to something where these funds are in the hands of and controlled by a government that represents the real interests of the Iraqi people. And at that point it should be the Iraqi people who decide how their money is spent, not the United Nations.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Some have suggested that the United Nations' hands, in some regards, are not particularly clean in terms of their oversight of these particular dollars. It is more than just obviously how the regime uses the money, which we know go to

build larger and bigger bunkers and not defeat the people. But any additional information you can provide to the Committee in that latter regard would be appreciated.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No. I understand. And of course in some respects, the U.N. was set a task of monitoring a volume of expenditures that probably they did not have the real resources to handle in any case. So there were gaps in that system that you point to, and I will try to get you an answer either classified or unclassified on what we do know about it.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[CLERK'S NOTE.-The Department did not provide a response for the record.]

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Tiahrt.

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Let me say that Mr. Visclosky has been kind enough to let me go through-these guys have been sitting through for a while, and he wants to ring the bell at the end of it anyway.

Go right ahead.

TURKEY

Mr. TIAHRT. General Franks had plans to move some of our forces through Turkey. Subsequently, we have had to move them around to the Persian Gulf. In this supplemental we have consideration for Turkey, and financial consideration and some other ideas to help them along. I have two questions: Number one is have we estimated the additional cost that we have incurred financially, not in terms of irritation or human lives or any other aspect, but in terms of cost to move our forces around to the Persian Gulf? And the reason I ask this is because if I were to go to Main Street in Kellogg or in Wichita, Kansas and stop the first 10 cars, each and every one of them will tell you that they are angry with Turkey, they are angry with France, they are angry with Canada and other countries that have stood in our way to try to make the world a safer place.

And I think there is value in our relationship with Turkey, but it has cost us something. So I wonder if we have made an estimate of what it has cost to move our troops around. And then I would like you to comment a little bit on how important Turkey is to our efforts in Iraq today and what-about our relationship in the future.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Those are very good questions. It is a very complicated and incredibly important subject. First, with respect to the specific question, by the way, the fact that the costs turn out to be different is one of the reasons why we need the kind of flexibility we are asking for, but this isn't why you asked the question. The cost of moving through the canal and around the other way are not trivial, but they are small compared to many other numbers that we are talking about.

The real cost of not having the Fourth Infantry Division going through Turkey is the lack of having a heavy combat division in northern Iraq right now. It would make a big difference, and until we know how this conflict actually comes out, we won't know how big a difference it would have made and even then we will be guessing, but there is no question, if we had a U.S. armored force

in northern Iraq right now, the end would be closer to we would be able to see the end even closer. And so would Saddam and his people.

And I am not about to conceal my own personal disappointment in the--I know the President and Secretary Rumsfeld are deeply disappointed that the Turks didn't step up to the proposal that we made to them, but to be fair and to be clear, Turkey did not undertake the activities that some of the other countries that have been mentioned by name or alluded to of actively opposing U.S. policy. We were asking something very substantial from Turkey, very difficult for them to do. In the end of the day, they came close. The parliament actually voted for it, but they needed a majority of all members rather than just those present. It was a new government that I think didn't quite know what it was doing. It was a big, big mistake. And it is a big mistake for Turkey, because I think Turkey stood to benefit from that extra capability, and Turkey stood to benefit from the package that we were proposing of $6 billion to help offset their potential losses here. And that is clearly gone.

But Turkey has stepped up to some very considerable responsibilities. A little bit late, but in time Turkey permitted overflight of Turkish airspace. Now, some people will say, well, so did every other NATO ally, but Turkey is the only NATO ally that borders Iraq; and, therefore, it is the only NATO ally that has armed Tomahawks flying through its airspace. It is the only NATO ally that has B-2 bombers flying through its airspace, I believe. It is certainly the only NATO ally that has our Naval aircraft flying through on combat missions in Iraq; and it is the only NATO ally through which we are putting ground forces, including the 1,000 paratroopers that jumped last night into airfields in northern Iraq. So overflight of Turkey is a very big thing, and they gave it to us unconditionally. They didn't say, okay, now, what is the price for that?

But the money that is in the supplemental requested for Turkey—and here I am in danger of stepping into State Department terrain, but I think we have a common understanding here it is to try to deal with what we expect are going to be some real shortterm economic losses for Turkey stemming from this conflict. It is on their doorstep. It does disrupt their tourist business. It does disrupt many things that go on there, and Turkey's economy is in difficult circumstance, and that is not good for us. But the final thing I would say—and this I say to any Turks who are listening to this some way or other-not only I think did Turkey make a very big mistake by not offering us the full cooperation that we asked for, but the fact is that what we are undertaking with enormous help from our British ally, and from quite a few other allies, is going to relieve a huge economic burden for Turkey in the medium and long run, opening up peaceful trade with an Iraq that is not under U.N. sanctions is going to be good for Turkey and good for the Turkish economy. It is a matter of trying to help them get through the short term, and I wish we were in a better situation with a country that is a long-standing ally.

Mr. LEWIS. A very good brief response. That was great.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Sorry.

Mr. TIAHRT. I want to say that my brother-in-law who flies on AWACS has been stationed in Turkey. He is not currently there now, but he has been there a couple of times, and we have had good relationships with Turkey, and I think we need to be long term in the way we look at our relationships.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I appreciate that very much.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Tiahrt. We have got limits in terms of the use of the room and so on, and so I am concerned a bit.

Mr. Wicker.

RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ

Mr. WICKER. Well, I will echo that sentiment that Mr. Tiahrt just expressed. Let me also say that members of the Committee have been most complimentary of Secretary Rumsfeld. Those words also are intended for the entire team. I have met with some of you several times during the buildup to this conflict, and we very much. appreciate what you are doing.

It is important that we win this war. There is no question in the minds of Americans that we will do so. Maybe not equally as important, but very, very important is what we do after we have won this war, and history is replete with examples of the United States being successful in armed conflict and then making monumental mistakes with years and years of negative consequences.

I notice that your request contains very little for the rebuilding of Iraq, there is the accomplishment of a temporary civilian office of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, and the request anticipates some $489.3 million in natural resource risk remediation. Is that about all we have, gentlemen, in rebuilding Iraq? And if that is the case, have you made a current cost estimate of how much it is going to cost to rebuild Iraq, and who do you expect is going to pay for that?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Actually, I think the supplemental includes a category of $12 billion that is categorized as transition in Iraq stability, and that includes considerable amount of what would normally be classified as peacekeeping operations.

If I could just-really quickly three points. Number one, we haven't always done well, but-one case we did really well and it is worth mentioning because it is relevant, was in northern Iraq a month after the Gulf War, we went in. We left after 6 months. Jay Garner, by the way, was the deputy commander of that force. And we left behind a situation that except for Saddam's occasional invasions, has been pretty stable in the 12 years since.

Number two, that is the principle we like to see applied here, which is get the Iraqi people on their feet and functioning as quickly as possible. Don't create one of those dependent relationships that we have in a number of places where a doctor in Kosovo can make more money as a driver for the United Nations than practicing medicine.

And number 3, there is a lot of money to pay for in that doesn't have to be U.S. taxpayer money, and it starts with the assets of the Iraqi people. They will now own those assets instead of a dictator that owns them, and they should spend them for their own welfare.

So this is not the total of what is needed, but it is an estimate of what our contribution needs to be through the rest of the fiscal year, most of it for our military contribution.

Mr. WICKER. Can you give us that estimate?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I said it covers $12 billion for what we are calling transition in

Mr. WICKER. That is for our contribution. But what do you think the entire package is going to be?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Oh, it is-I mean

Mr. LEWIS. You don't have that.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We really don't, and the real number would be not what is going to get through the rest of the fiscal year, but what is it going to be over 2 to 3 years. And a rough recollectionwell, the oil revenues of that country could bring between $50 and $100 billion dollars over the course of the next two or three years. Now, there are a lot of claims on that money, but we are not dealing with Afghanistan. It is a personal innocent ward of the international community. We are dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction and relatively soon.

Mr. WICKER. Thank you.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much. In the meantime we will all be depending upon-they are calling him "Tin Cup" Zakheim. Mr. Visclosky.

INVOLVEMENT OF ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS IN IRAQ

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you very much, and I would want to follow up on Mr. Wicker's line of questioning on reconstruction. Could you, for the record, break out how much of that $12 billion for transition would be set aside for construction? Obviously, you have a military construction component, but I, too, would be interested in the issue of any original estimates and costs for reconstruction that is nonmilitary-related. Also I would like to have an explanation as to what the role and financing would be as far as the involvement of the Army Corps of Engineers with that. I serve on Energy and Water, and obviously we have a lot of Army Corp personnel over there now, and want to see the implications on their budget and how it is handled on the defense side.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I will try to get you something for the record, recognizing that whatever we give you now is going to be a best guess and not

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I understand. I would like to see what the best guess is, and again, I have a particular interest, serving on Energy and Water, how the Army Corps with specificity fits into that estimate. I would want some specificity as far as the Corps' role and the financing of that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information follows:]

As detailed in our fiscal year 03 Supplemental Request, this $12 billion is essentially all military funding. There is no nonmilitary-related funding, nor any funding set aside specifically for construction. The $12 billion is to finance military operations to stabilize the security environment in Iraq, supply immediate humanitarian assistance, and reestablish civil order.