Page images
PDF
EPUB

mize the expertise United States agencies can bring to bear to address a proliferation threat.

We believe there remains not only fissile material and possibly nuclear weapons, but also dangerous pathogens and perhaps chemical weapons or weaponized chemical agents in countries outside the former Soviet Union that pose imminent threats to the United States and its allies. The reality of the WMD threat is so changed since 9/11 that we need to rethink how we position the United States to respond quickly and decisively to emerging WMD proliferation threats. DoD has special expertise in this area and, sometimes, special access. Therefore, we believe it important that DoD be provided the flexibility to leverage these factors when appropriate and in full coordination with the interagency.

COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES IN COLOMBIA

Question. The President's supplemental request includes $34 million in the Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities program to fund increased operational tempo in Colombia's unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities. Three American DoD contract employees are currently being held hostage by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the FARC), a long time narco-terrorist organization. What portions of this request are intended to provide support to ongoing counter-drug activities and what portions are intended to help the Colombians in their counter-terrorist effort?

Answer. The entire $34 million provided in the supplemental is designed to assist the Colombian military in their fight against narco-terrorists. Terrorism and narcotics trafficking are clearly linked. The Colombian narco-terrorist organizations (FARC, ELN, and AUC) receive a large majority of their funds from the illegal drug trade. Congress provided DoD expanded authority during fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist organizations operating in Colombia. Attacking both terrorism and narcotics trafficking simultaneously leverages limited resources and provides the most effectiveness.

Question. What portion of these funds will support American DoD personnel and what portion will be provided to Colombia?

Answer. DoD funds will provide approximately $11 million to support DoD personnel assisting Colombia in their war against narco-terrorists. This includes Operations and Intelligence Teams, which will advise and train Colombia military units in operational and intelligence planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Funding also supports costs associated with the Air Bridge Denial resumption. Although this funding supports the deployment and sustainment of DoD personnel, the direct benefit is to Colombian military units. Approximately $23 million will be provided to purchase equipment, construct facilities and force protection upgrades, and provide contract logistics support for the Colombian military.

Question. Are there funds requested to provide force protection for U.S. personnel in Colombia?

Answer. Yes. Limited force protection funding for the Operations and Intelligence Teams was included in the Supplemental. In addition, funds will be used for force protection support for Colombian facilities in which we have invested DoD support. In addition, supplemental funds will provide force protection support for Colombian facilities supporting expanded authorities at multiple locations. DoD personnel normally operate from several of these locations.

Question. Are you confident that the request is consistent with current Congressional authorizations which address the use of Counter-drug funding for Counterterrorism activities?

Answer. Yes. We review all of our activities to ensure compliance with the law. Question. Why is this requested in the Supplemental request for funding the War in Iraq?

Answer. The supplemental request is directly related to the Global War on Terrorism. The FARC is one of the largest, most well-organized terrorist groups in the world. The FARC has killed Americans, including DoD contractors, and was seeking to assassinate multiple foreign dignitaries, including the U.S. Ambassador, in a failed mortar attack against President Uribe at his inauguration. The FARC is multinational in character, with cells and financiers in several countries. The FARC currently holds three U.S. government contract personnel hostage. The FARC's main source of income remains the drug trade. Narco-terrorist elements in Colombia actively seek to overthrow the freely elected Colombian government, the oldest democracy in Latin America. Supplemental funding was requested for Colombia based on commitments the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made to Colombian President Uribe. These commitments include an increased support to Colombia against narco-terrorists, part of the Global War on Terrorism.

We seek to provide a surge of training and equipment to Colombian military and police forces. The U.S. will remain in a supporting role.

Colombia is waging a valiant effort to reclaim territory from the narcoterrorists. President Uribe is working to destroy narco-terrorist organizations and illegal armed groups, and the ability of these groups to undermine Colombia's democracy and national security. The Government of Colombia urgently needs U.S. support to improve its countermarcoterrorism capabilities. With the momentum provided by the election of President Uribe, there is a window of opportunity to significantly affect narco-terrorist organizations operating in Colombia."

DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM

Question. There is $301.7 million in the supplemental for Defense Health Program. How is this divided among the Army, Navy/Marine Corps and Air Force?

Answer. The Defense Health Program (DHP) is currently undergoing a midyear execution review, along with all other DoD organizations, conducted by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Once that action has been completed, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) will review any adjustments to the DHP budget, all addiltional funding requirements surfaced during the review; and, after soliciting input from the Armed Services Surgeons General, make a decision on the $301.7 million proposed in the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act.

No distribution will be made to the Marine Corps as their health services are provided by the Navy.

Question. Does this amount include initial supply and resupply of medical units in theater?

Answer. No. Funding for those requirements were included in Service "line" portion of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, identified for distribution to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. No amounts were identified for the Marine Corps as their health services are provided by the Navy.

Question. Is this amount based on the number of servicemen and women currently deployed?

Answer. The Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act appropriated $501.7 million for the Defense Health Program. Of this amount, the $301.7 million in the Department's request was based on the number of activated Reserve and National Guard personnel, to pay the anticipated health care costs for those personnel and their family members. The additional amount of $200 million was added by the Congress for additional requirements.

DISPOSITION OF EQUIPMENT AFTER THE WAR

Question. Will any of the equipment that we have shipped over to the Gulf be kept in the area after the war is over?

Answer. This question goes to the heart of our "Pre-positioning" strategy. As part of the strategic mobility triad, consisting of airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned material, we use "Pre-positioned war materials"-frequently referred to as "Prepo"-to reduce the response time to a contingency around the world. Under this concept, DoD assets are placed in pre-selected global locations to provide quicker response times to potential contingencies. We have maintained prepo assets in the CENTCOM AOR for many years and this strategy will remain an essential part of our overall strategy into the future. In fact, with the new emphasis on relooking our overseas footprint, this program may well become more important, particularly in a region as critical as the CENTCOM AOR.

We are currently conducting a "Post-War Defense Assessment" which will involve taking a look at our near and long-term strategic goals, plans for setting the force, and reviewing our integrated global footprint in the near and long-term. This assessment will not be completed until the late summer or fall of '03 but it will have a major impact on our global presence and contingency plans. These decisions will impact the near and long-term. This assessment will not be completed until the late summer or fall of '03 but it will have a major impact on our global presence and contingency plans. These decisions will impact the near and long term decision on the final positioning of our prepo assets and ultimately determine if equipment will be kept in the area into the future.

Question. If so, are costs included in the estimate to properly repair and store the equipment?

Answer. The cost to repair and store the pre-positioned materials used in the war were included in the supplemental, however, there may still be additional cost associated with future decisions to change the posture of the pre-positioned equipment. As part of our pre-positioning strategy we must complete our "Postwar Defense As

sessment" prior to determining the final plans to stage equipment in CENTCOM or determine what equipment will be left in theater. Any plan to pre-position material based upon the outcome of the assessment will involve additional costs. These costs include transporting, overhauling, and maintaining the equipment in an operational status. Our assessment is not complete, as a majority of this equipment is still engaged in operations. Based on the condition of the equipment that has been returned, significant maintenance cost will be incurred. We fully expect the FY Supplemental to cover the cost of repairing the equipment that has been returned to date. This includes the Marine Corps equipment that will be repaired in theater and returned to the Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons to be available for future missions. It is important to note that in all cases only the best and most modern equipment will be repaired and returned to PREPO. Like all aspects of our basing and force positioning strategy, PREPO equipment will continue to evolve into a more agile and flexible capability.

Question. Will any plans for restationing of our forces that are now based in Europe impact the places to which you would ship the equipment?

Answer. The "Post-War Defense Assessment" will involve taking a look at our near and long-term strategic goals, plans for setting the force, and reviewing our integrated global footprint in the near and long-term. This assessment will have a major impact on our global presence and contingency plans. These decisions will also impact the near and long-term decisions on the final positioning of our military assets. Such a plan will incorporate the changing environment in Europe and our long-term plans and interest on the European continent as part of a comprehensive review of placement of prepositioning in the future.

Question. How long do you intend to keep the hospital ship USNS COMFORT in the region?

Answer. The USNS COMFORT departed the CENTCOM AOR on 10 May 03. Her deployment lasted from Jan 6, 2003 to June 13, 2003.

STORM DAMAGE

Question. The Air Force facilities on Guam suffered over $130 million in damage due to Typhoon Ponsonga earlier this year. Now the Department has deployed additional bombers to Guam in order to be ready for anything that might happen in Korea. What is the condition of the hangar facilities in which we are storing the bombers, or doing maintenance on the aircraft?

Answer. After Typhoon Pongsana in December 2002, the Air Force spent approximately $14M to provide essential repairs to restore limited operational capability to Andersen Air Force Base. The super typhoon substantially damaged 3 of the 4 large hangars. Hangar 1 (concrete structure built in 1981) was undamaged. Hangars 2, 3 and 4 were heavily damaged. These three smaller nose dock/hangar facilities were used for B-2 Low Observable maintenance, but were badly damaged with major portions of the siding torn-off, electrical/lighting and environmental controls destroyed. Basically, the facilities are unusable. Minimal work was needed immediately to secure unsafe structures until a new storm proof hangar can be constructed. As a result of the typhoon, aircraft servicing is severely limited, especially for B-2s. Only Hangar 1 provides shelter from elements for sensitive internal systems. Hangar 1 can house one B-52 or two B-2s but is not environmentally controlled and, therefore, not suitable for maintenance on sensitive B-2 systems. The other hangars could house one B-2 each and were environmentally controlled before the latest typhoon.

Question. Are the bombers adequately protected?

Answer. No. With only one hangar large enough to house a B-52, hard-broken aircraft that could not be flown away before the storm hit would be unprotected in the event of a super typhoon.

Question. Does the supplemental request include funds to repair the storm damage on Guam?

Answer. The supplemental request included O&M funds to repair damage caused by Typhoon Pongsona, but the request did not include MILCON or MFH funds. Note: The table below summarizes supplemental funding received/to be received for Andersen AFB, Guam storm damage.

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]

*After further review, the Air Force determined that supplemental funding should not be used to source $9.5 million in Typhoon Pongsona 0&M damage as these facilities do not directly support the global war on terrorism. The Air Force has included these 0&M requirements on its FY2003 0&M Unfunded List. Should additional resources become available, these requirements will be considered for funding along with other critical, must-pay shortfalls.

**MILCON and MFH funds were added to the supplemental by the House and Senate appropriators.

ACQUISITION OF REPLACEMENT UAVS

Question. The Committee understands that within the supplemental request is approximately $57 million for the acquisition of additional Predator UAVs to replace combat losses. How many Predator UAVs in support of the Iraq military action have

been lost?

Answer. Three Predator unmanned aerial vehicles were lost.

Question. Would it be your intention to purchase additional vehicles, ground stations, or other equipment such as laser designators and hellfire missile kits?

Answer. The Supplemental included $57 million for Reconstitution. This was justified as "Predator requires the reconstitution of aircraft, ground and communications equipment and spares to continue to support and sustain fielded and in-production aircraft needed by the combatant commanders to fight the ongoing Global War On Terrorism."

[In millions of dollars]

2 Fixed Ground Control Stations and 2 Launch Recovery Elements

Communications Equipment

Ground Support Equipment

2 Readiness Spares Packages 3 MQ-1 Predator Aircraft

$7.4

15.4

7.8

11.4

15.0

Question. How many Predator UAV vehicles are currently available for use-is there sufficient inventory at this time to replace the vehicles that have been lost? Answer. Currently, we have 38 aircraft in the inventory-of which 26 are available for operations and training to replace the vehicles lost until the inventory can be augmented.

Question. Understanding the need to replace lost vehicles, does it make sense to replace one for one what was lost? Would it make sense to purchase equipment that would provide better capability for the future?

Answer. Unlike older generation aircraft that may have been lost in the war and replaced with a more capable aircraft, the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle is a new aircraft that has provided the warfighter with valuable intelligence information. The plan is to replace the aircraft lost with an upgraded Predator air vehicle capable of carrying the Hellfire missile.

Question. Please provide a detailed description of the capabilities and items that would be purchased with the request.

Answer. The Supplemental request for $57 million will provide for the reconstitution of aircraft, ground and communications equipment and spares to continue to support and sustain fielded and in-production aircraft needed by the combatant commanders to fight the ongoing Global War On Terrorism.

[In millions of dollars]

2 Fixed Ground Control Stations and 2 Launch Recovery Elements

Communications Equipment
Ground Support Equipment

2 Readiness Spares Packages

3 MQ-1 Predator Aircraft

$7.4

15.4

7.8

11.4

15.0

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Question. The supplemental request includes a number of legislative provisions. Would you briefly discuss each one. Increase funding authority for the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund. (Formerly known as the CINC Initiative Fund.)

Answer. The primary focus of the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund is to support unforeseen contingency requirement critical to Combatant Commanders

joint warfighting readiness and national security interests. The fund allows the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff the capability to address unanticipated requirements that the Department's normal Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) cannot handle on a timely basis. Since September 11, 2001, the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund has been a key enabler with respect to supporting emergent, low-cost, high-benefit initiatives that enhance DoD's warfighting capabilities in the war on terrorism. With the ongoing operations in Iraq and the continued hunt for terrorists around the globe, the number and associated cost of unforeseen combatant commander requirements has grown significantly. All indications are that this growth trend will continue for the foreseeable future. As a result, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, requires additional authority to quickly respond to mission critical requirements identified by combatant commanders.

Question. Provide additional authority for extraordinary and emergency expenses, from $34.5 million to $69 million.

Answer. The war with Iraq has created uncertainties that were not factored in when we submitted the FY 2003 budget, shortly after 9-11. Moreover, our FY 2003 budget did not adequately take into account the increasing uncertainties associated with the global war on terrorism. In fact, our E3 request for FY 2003 was only slightly higher than the annual amounts requested for the preceding three fiscal years (pre 9-11), as shown below: FY 2003-$34.5 million; FỶ 2002-$33.5 million; FY 2001-$30.0 million; and FY 2000-$32.3 million.

The Secretary of Defense's E' authority is used to satisfy the requirements of all the Defense agencies, the Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In order to meet the requirements associated with the war with Iraq and the ongoing global war on terrorism, much of the FY 2003 requirements previously identified by the Defense agencies have been deferred. An increase of E authority to $69.0 million is required to backfill the Defense agencies requirements, and also meet emergent requirements associated with the war with Iraq and the global war on terrorism.

Approximately 75 percent of the Secretary of Defense's FY 2003 E authority ($34.5 million) has already been allocated. Critical Defense Intelligence Agency and U.S. Special Operations Command missions requiring E' authority still lie ahead. In addition, other Defense agencies' (including National Security Agency's) requirements currently uncovered due to more urgent needs must also be satisfied.

Question. Provide authority for the DoD to use funds appropriated in this act to undertake military construction projects with the requirement that the Congress be provided with a description and cost estimate 15 days before obligating the

amounts.

Answer. Section 1901 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental requires the Department to notify the Congress 7 days prior to transfer the money appropriated in this act and to notify the Congress 15 days after the funds are obligated. Section 1901 allows up to $150 million to be transferred to Military Construction, Defensewide for projects that are not authorized by law.

So far, we have notified the Congress for 3 Army Military Construction projects totaling approximately $10.4 million that are required to wash vehicles that were used in the Iraq war prior to bringing them back to the United States.

We are evaluating several Navy and Air Force projects but haven't approved them yet. Therefore, we haven't notified Congress prior to transferring the funds.

Question. Provide additional general transfer authoruity, up to an amount equal to 2.5% of the DoD Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2003. This would increase transfer authority from $2 billion to approximately. $9 billion.

Answer. This additional authority is critical to give the Department the flexibility needed to respond to emerging requirements, especially related to military operations in Iraq. It would remove the deadline for submitting notification of multiple reprogrammings to the Congress, giving DoD more time to assess mid-year changes in priorities.

Question. Reimburse the services for a drawndown of $165 million under the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002.

Answer. This authority would enable the military services to be reimbursed for expenditures related to Afghanistan operations—thus reducing the strain on readiness and quality of life for the rest of the fiscal year. The drawdown was necessary to support emergent requirements for training and equipping the Afghan National Army ($150 million), to build a bridge between Tajikistan and Afghanistan ($8 million), and to assist Jordan in its operations in Afghanistan ($7 million).

Question. Authorized reimbursement funding from DoD to the services for $63.5 million under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998; and make up to $150 million of funds appropriated to DoD available for support to indigenous forces.

« PreviousContinue »