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Question. What is meant by providing lift and sustainment to these multinational forces?
Answer. A significant number of countries with limited financial resources are willing to provide military forces for stability operations in Iraq. For these countries, the United States is providing strategic lift to the theater of operations, a 6 month personnel rotation, and re-deployment of forces and equipment to the home nation after forces have been deployed for 12 months.
The United States is also providing life sustainment and other logistical support to some coalition forces in Iraq at no cost. This includes the provision of water, food, laundry services, showers/latrines, vector control, medical care, fuel (including petroleum, oils, lubricants, and gasoline), and some equipment to include vehicles, battle dress uniform, and communications equipment. Equipment costs are largely covered by State Department Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) funds provided in the FY 2003 Emergency Supplemental.
Question. Are some countries that are not willing to contribute military units willing to contribute in this sustainment area by providing funding, equipment, or contractor provided services?
Answer. Nations that are not providing military forces for the most part have not demonstrated a willingness to provide funding, equipment, a contract provided services. One Gulf nation provided airlift to the Bulgarian battalion serving in the Polish-led division to the theater of operations at no cost.
Based on fundraising efforts over the last six months, we believe it is more effective to ask for contributions for reconstruction activities in Iraq rather than contributions for funding, equipment, or contractor services for U.S. and/or coalition forces currently operating in Iraq.
Military Personnel End Strength Levels
Question. Each of the Services will start fiscal year 2004 above their normal end strength levels. What is the number of personnel each Service is currently over strength?
Answer. The table below provides the active duty end strength overages as of 30 September 2003 as compared to FY 2003 authorized end strength levels.
30 Sept. 2003 end strength overage
Marine Corps 2,779
Air Force 16,062
Total DoD 44,677
Question. What is the amount requested in the Supplemental for the cost of the military personnel over execution?
Answer. The Supplemental request includes $2.5 billion for active duty over strength.
Question. What are the current active duty end strength levels for Iraq, Afghanistan and CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. The table below provides the number of active duty personnel mobilized by military operation as of the week of 22 September 2003. These force levels include active duty personnel supporting each operation, whether in theater of CONUS.
Active dut-v personnel
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 132.600
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 7,900
Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) —
Question. What is the current Guard and Reserve mobilization level for Reserve forces by operation?
Answer. The table below provides the approximate number of Guard and Reserve personnel mobilized by military operation as of the week of 22 September 2003. These force levels include all Guard and Reserve members supporting each operation, whether in theater or CONUS.
Mobilized Guard I
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 65,600
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 32,900
Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) 71,000
Question. What does the Supplemental request assume the Reserve mobilized levels will be during fiscal year 2004?
Answer. The Supplemental request includes an average Reserve and National Guard end strength of 191,950 to be mobilized during fiscal year 2004. This force level includes all Reserve and National Guard end strength members supporting contingency operations, whether in theater or CONUS (e.g. those on CONOPS orders, but in CONUS training up).
Unit Level Rebuilding Projects
Question. Recent news articles have noted numerous projects that are being performed by military units, that is, by companies or platoons. These types of efforts are said to be under-reported and that these projects represent the good news and successful side of the occupation operation. An example is the rebuilding of a school.
Would you elaborate on these types of efforts by military units to help to rebuild Iraq?
Answer. United States military units do indeed assist the Iraqi people to rebuild their country. Examples include helping to rebuild schools and restore official buildings to a usable condition. Units involved are both specialized, such as engineer companies, and non-specialized, such as infantry or artillery units, which may have access to heavy equipment such as bulldozers and hoists. Normally, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will identify appropriate projects through its contacts with local Iraqi officials. CPA will then coordinate with CJTF-7 ana U.S. military commanders to apply the resources. The U.S. division commander is the final authority to approve a unit's participation. It must be emphasized that these civic assistance projects are conducted only when manpower and time are available. They do not interfere with the unit's primary missions and tasks or degrade security.
Question. How are such military rebuilding projects funded . . . does the unit use operating funds that would normally go for parts and fuel?
Answer. The Coalition Provisional Authority has been funding a Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) using seized Iraqi assets to fund the military rebuilding projects. None of the seized Iraqi assets can be used to pay for parts and fuel for the U.S. military.
Question. How much has been spent so far for such projects?
Answer. As of 22 November 2003, the military has spent $97 million from the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding on urgent humanitarian and reconstruction projects in Iraq.
Question. Does the supplemental funding request include estimated amounts needed to continue such activities? If yes, how much?
Answer. As of 30 September the supplemental request did not include funding for the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). However, since the seized Iraqi assets were becoming exhausted, the Department of Defense added to its supplemental request. In the fiscal year 2004 Supplemental for Iraq and Afghanistan, Congress provided to the Department of Defense the authority to use up to $180M of DoD appropriations to continue the flexible and responsive CERP for urgent humanitarian and reconstruction projects in both Iraq and Afghanistan for fiscal year 2004.
Question. It has been reported that modern body armor has saved the lives of numerous soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, we continue to hear that units deployed to the combat zones do not have enough of the modern body armor, with the ceramic plate inserts, to equip all their soldiers. The shortages seem to be most acute in deploying guard and reserve units. What are the key differences between the so-called Vietnam era flak jacket, and the modern body armor with armor plate inserts?
Answer. Each new generation of body armor is designed to increase protective capability to stop or slow fragments and reduce the number of wounds over older versions. The latest version, which is being fielded to troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, is called Interceptor Body Armor (IBA). Below is a comparison, in size medium, between the Vietnam-era Flak Vest, the Desert Storm era Personal Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT) with the Interim Small Arms Protective Vest (ISAPO), and the current Interceptor Body Armor (IBA), which consists of the Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) and the Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI).
Vietnam-era FLAK VEST Desert Storm era PASGT with ISAPO Today's IBA
Weight 28 lbs (dry) Vest—9.1 lbs OTV—8.4 lbs
ISAPO—16 lbs SAPI—8 lbs
Total—25.1 lbs Total—16 4 lbs
Ballistics Fragmentation only Vest—fragmentation only OTV—fragmentation plus
With ISAPO—small arms up 9mm handgun
to 7.62mm. With SAPI—multiple hits from 7.62mm ball ammo
Other design elements incorporated into IBA that were not part of the previous version of body armor, the PAGST, address load carrying and modularity. Webbing on the exterior of the IBA's OTV allows the mounting of various items of field gear in place of having to wear additional load bearing suspenders to accommodate ammunition pouches, etc, thus helping to reduce overall weight. Also various components, including the ballistic panels, can be replaced within the IBA, which allows for ballistic material upgrades and easier repairs to the nylon camouflage shell.
Question. What is the supply status of modern body armor sets, including the availability of armor plate inserts, the SAPI (Special Armor Plate Insert) plates?
Answer. To date, the Army has fielded 265,200 Outer Tactical Vests (OTV) and 135,860 sets of Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI) Army-wide. One set of SAPI, consisting of two individual SAPI plates, combined with an OTV equals one "modern body armor set" called Interceptor Body Armor (IBA). The Coalition Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) still requires 30,426 OTVs and 56,382 sets of SAPI. In anticipation of receiving funding from the FY03 Iraqi Freedom Fund in the very near future, the Army has already begun to take steps to further increase IBA production rates in order to fulfill CFLCC's remaining IBA requirements as soon as possible.
Question. Does the current supplemental budget request fully fund the estimated need for modern body armor and armor plate inserts? When will all the needed modern body armor be available to the troops?
Answer. The Department plans to use $310 million from the FY03 Iraqi Freedom Fund to procure Interceptor Body Armor (IBA), which includes the Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) and the Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI). This $310 million will fully fund the Department's remaining IBA requirement for all Soldiers deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Our current plan calls for the remaining IBA requirement to be filled with November 2003 production quantities.
Question. The supplemental request includes almost three billion dollars for incremental depot maintenance of weapons, and weapon system platforms requiring major service after the wear and tear of combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. All this equipment must be restored to mission-capable status to prevent degradation in readiness and to be available for any future combat operation.
Please discuss how the services are rotating equipment back to the depots for repair and overhaul.
Answer. The Navy restores its ships, aircraft, and weapons during scheduled maintenance periods. These schedules have been modified to support both OIF/OEF and restoration to full operating conditions. This process is part of DOD's plan for resetting the force. Repair and overhaul work is performed in both the public and private sectors.
Question. Do you have a good assessment of the amount of depot work that needs to be done? Do you have assessment teams operating in theater to determine how much work and what kind of work will be required?
Answer. Yes, the Navy does have a good assessment of depot maintenance and repair work that must be accomplished. Naval aircraft and ships are inducted into naval air depots, naval shipyards, and private facilities in one of two ways: scheduled and unscheduled. Scheduled events are calendar based; so in any given year, month by month, the number of aircraft and ships ready to be inducted into maintenance and repair facilities is known. Naval aircraft engine repair requirements are based on the number of predicted engine failures per flight hour and meeting the Chief of Naval Operations' Readiness Based Spared (RBS) requirements. RBS requirements count the number of engines required to go into each of the Navy's aircraft plus an additional number for spares.
To sustain the Navy's forward-depoyed mission, a network of public and private depot support facilities is in place to meet unscheduled/emergent repair requirements. The Fleets determine how much and what kind of work is needed based on in-theater inspections, system condition assessments, and maintenance plans.
Question. I believe the 3rd Infantry Division drew its equipment from pre-positioned sets. Will that equipment be used by follow-on-forces, or will it go to the depot for overhaul and then back into storage?
Answer. The majority of equipment used by 3ID was from Army Prepostioned Stocks (APS), totaling over 7,000 major pieces of equipment. The Army expects to use the majority of this equipment for rotational forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom's continuing operations. To date, only that equipment requiring depot level work is being processed for shipment to CONUS depots.
Question. Can the depot system absorb all of this extra work?
Answer. The Army's focus remains on RESETing the force as rapidly as possible to meet future combatant commanders' requirements. To achieve this goal, the Army RESET requirements will be satisfied through a combination of organic and contract support. The Army has developed a plan to ramp up production at their five organic depots that will permit 41% of the RESET workload to be performed by the depots. To accommodate this additional workload, the depots will expand production through use of increased overtime, new hires, optimization of their Public/ Private Partnerships, augmentation of their workforces through contract field teams, and improved productivity from process improvements.
Question. Will the depots go to additional shifts? Are the skilled workers available for additional shifts?
Anwer. The depots are currently working a 2nd and 3rd shifts in select shops as result of our effort to support the Army in fiscal year 2003. These shifts have been retained and additional shifts for the remaining depot production shops are being hired to ramp up production across the spectrum. The Army's five maintenance depots have assessed available pools of potential employees (civilian and military retires, BRAC95 displacements, and other quealified individuals) within their geographic areas, and are confident of their ability to hire the personnel needed to execute the plan described above. The depots have already started the recruitment process and coordinated with all necessary civilian personnel office centers (CPOCs) to expedite the referral list. Various depots are generating additional skilled labor by utilizing contractor field teams (CFTs).
Question. We understand that the supplemental budget request is based on a combination of modeling and some specific cost factors based on actual experience in Iraq and Afghanistan thus far.
Is the funding requested in this supplemental adequate to restore Army and Marine Corps equipment to the standards specified in the operators' manual and unit maintenance manuals? Is necessary depot maintenance fully funded? If not, how much more is needed?
Answer. The amount requested corresponds with the funding that can be executed in FY 2004, after depots surge to accommodate additional work (with overtime and extra work shifts). However, these funds will not restore all equipment to required levels. A significant amount of equipment and weapons systems will not return from theater in time to be repaired this year. The funding requested was calculated based on return schedules of ships, aircraft, and tanks and workload capacities in both the organic and private sector depots. This funding will restore equipment to meet readiness levels required. Returning all equipment to pre-war standards will take place over the next several years.
Question. Is the funding requested in this supplemental adequate to restock prepositioned sets for supply stocks, repair parts, water decontaminating equipment, etc. It not, how much more is needed?
Answer. In FY 2003, the Department transferred funds from the Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF) to ensure that U.S. forces are reconstituted in a timely manner and military readiness is not compromised. Over $100 million was allocated to the Army to restock the Army prepositioned sets, both land based and aboard ships, in order to return them to combat ready condition. Any additional requirement to reset the prepositioned stocks will be reviewed during the President's budget and execution review in FY 2004.
Personnel Support Costs
Question. About three billion of the supplemental request is for the cost of incremental personnel support for active component and mobilized reserve component forces.
Are these costs related to calling up forces or are they related more specifically to deploying forces to a particular place, with associated special clothing and equipment needs?
Answer. Yes, Personnel support costs includes funding for both Active forces and mobilized Reserves Component (RC) and National Guard (NG) personnel directly related to the incremental costs for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The supplemental request asks for $3.6 billion under the personnel support costs category. Below is a summary of this section of the supplemental:
(Dollars in million* >
Active Forces Operation and Maintenance funding 1,641
Reserve Forces Operation and Maintenance funding 431
National Guard Operation and Maintenance funding 835
Health Support for Reserve and Guard 658
The Operation and Maintenance funds finance temporary duty allowances, the purchase of clothing and peculiar equipment that is needed by individual service personnel in the Iraqi and Afghanistan theaters. The category also includes the health care funding for medical support of the mobilized Reserve and National Guard personnel and their dependents.
Question. What are some specific examples of incremental personnel support costs?
Answer. The supplemental request provides for the incremental personnel costs for both Active and Reserve Component forces.
For Reserves Components (RC) and National Guard (NG) personnel mobilized in support of Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the supplemental provides for their mobilization pay and certain special compensation directly related to service in a combat zone. With regards to Active personnel, the supplemental only addresses the incremental costs of the special pay.
Personal, Active or Reserves deployed in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOMl area of operations are eligible for enhanced special pays, including Imminent Danger Pay (IDP), Family Separation Allowance (FSA), and Hardship Duty Pay (HDP).
In addition to special pay, the supplemental also provides funding for certain peculiar equipment like clothing that the personnel being deployed in the CENTCOM area of operations will need to accomplish their duties.
Question. Will these types of expenses be encountered every time we rotate forces in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan, or will some of the equipment be reused?
Answer. Force rotations fluctuate between various military Components and are influenced by the location of the force (Iraq or Afghanistan) being rotated. For this reason, every military unit's rotation schedule and the composition of the rotation differs depending on the mission requirement and the structure of the successor unit. Often equipment of the rotating unit (departing force) is left in the deployment location for use by the successor unit (arriving force). However, this not practical or beneficial in all circumstances. Some equipment may rotate out with the departing unit if the equipment is no longer needed, needs repair that can not be accomplished in the theater (mainly depot level maintenance activities), or if the unit being rotated into the theater is not specifically trained on that particular set of equipment. While every effort is being made to recycle equipment and reduce transportation costs, a portion of the equipment, particularly heavily used transport vehicles, will have to be replaced at some time because of the high operational tempo. For this reason, many of the vehicles currently in the Iraq will be rotated during FY 2004 despite the fact that similar equipment is still needed in the field. This equipment will be replaced with new equipment as time permits and as units rotate in order to perform needed maintenance.
Support For Multinational Divisions
Question. The budget justification indicates that part of the request for the Iraq Freedom Fund would be made available for supplies, services, transportation, and other logistical support to one multinational division of ground troops in Iraq.