drugs. Since some narco-traffickers are also involved in funding terrorist operations, the money from drug trafficking could support terrorist activities.

Question. Is this a continuation of existing activity or does the request support new activities?

Answer. The Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account currently funds minimal counternarcotics efforts in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility, primarily Special Operations Forces counternarcotics training deployments. This program supports the international community to address drug production in Afghanistan and is a new initiative within the Department.

Question. If the request is to fund training, equipment, and other items related to Afghanistan's narcotics trafficking problem, what assumptions were used to develop this estimate for example, what is the estimated extent of the training? What types of equipment will be provided?

Answer. DoD is currently working with the U.K. and other international partners to develop a countermarcotics training plan in Afghanistan. The cost estimate was developed based on the Department's experience supporting counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, Thailand and other nations.

Question. The request includes a provision that allows for the transfer of funds to the usual Department of Defense appropriations and for the transfer back from these appropriations if the funds are not necessary for drug interdiction and counter-drug activities. Would it be your intent to provide the Congress with an accounting of any funds transferred back to this appropriation?

Answer. The authority to move funds back to the Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account is not new. We were given this authority in Fiscal Year 2003 and all funds transferred back to the Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities appropriation is recorded on a DD1415-3, Internal Reprogramming Action. We have always shown the Congress our previous execution year experience when we submit our Congressional Justification Budget in February. Additionally, we submit prior year execution data to Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to fulfill the congressional reporting requirement of Section 705(d) of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 1998.

REQUESTS FOR FBI, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND COAST GUARD

Question. The supplemental budget request for Defense activities includes funding of $15.5 million for the FBI, $3 million for the Department of Energy, and $80 million for the Coast Guard.

Why aren't separate requests being made for these activities in the applicable appropriation accounts that fund these agencies?

Answer. The DoD supplemental request includes $80 million for Coast Guard operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Operations (AOR). The Coast Guard has historically had a military role during war, and this occasion is no exception. The Coast Guard possess and contributes to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) with capabilities, authorities, and expertise in the area of harbor control and interdiction of commercial shipping, which exceeds the mission of the U.S. Navy. The availability of Coast Guard ships and personnel in OIF allows the Navy to concentrate their assets on their primary mission.

Because the Coast Guard in operating in the AOR under CENTCOM control, performing a military mission under a Deployment Order issued by the Secretary of Defense, it was determined that their costs should be treated in the same manner at the other Armed Services, with their funding request included in the Navy's estimate.

The DoD supplemental request does not specifically include funds for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Energy (DOE). However, there is a potential that DoD Components may during the execution of the FY 2004 program, employ services and capabilities possessed by the FBI and the DoE.

TRANSFER AUTHORITY

Question. The Administration's request for supplemental Defense spending includes language that would permit the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $5 billion between the appropriations accounts contained in the supplemental bill. In addition, nearly $2 billion is requested for the Iraq Freedom Fund, which is essentially a transfer account. Finally, transfer authority of up to $500 million is proposed for military construction activities. That totals $7.5 billion in transfer authority.

Why is such a large level of transfer authority needed by the Department? Don't you have a fairly refined model of determining the cost of OPTEMPÓ that is already reflected in the budget request?

Answer. The DoD has prepared a realistic estimate of the cost of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Operation Tempo (OPTEMPO) estimate is based on the most current available force structure plans and assumptions from the Joint Staff and CENTCOM headquarters. However, even the best-prepared plans are subject to threat and requirement driven changes. Because of the complexity of modern warfighting, the Military Component's tactics and strategies during execution often difers from plans developed only weeks before. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) are no exception in this situation. Military operations are dynamic in nature, thus the funding that supports them must be adaptable as situations and requirements change. The DoD requires the flexibility to adapt to these changes in the environment, and consequently, needs to be able to shift funding between appropriations in order to address these changes.

The DoD has asked that $1.989 billion of the amounts requested to be appropriated in the Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF) appropriation, a transfer account that provides the DoD the flexibility to realign funds based on the most current situation in the theater. The Congress will be notified in writing prior to transferring the funds from the IFF to a DoD appropriation.

The authority to transfer $500 million for military construction is needed by the DoD in order to be able to react quickly to contingency construction requirements without having to seek additional funds from the Congress. The Congress will be notified prior to any transfer of funds.

[CLERK'S NOTE.-End of questions submitted by Mr. Lewis.]

THURSDAY, MAY 1, 2003.

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

WITNESS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD T. KADISH, DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

INTRODUCTION

Mr. LEWIS. The Committee will come to order. Today the Committee will have the pleasure of welcoming Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, who is the Director of the Missile Defense Agency. On behalf of the Subcommittee, I want you to know how much we appreciate your service and the critical importance of the work that you are about. Our friends are on their way from other very important meetings. Our Commander in Chief has said that we have to keep you guys on time, so we might as well move ahead. I will begin by brief opening remarks and call upon my friend Jack Murtha as well. As you know, per usual, your entire statement will be in the record and so then we will call upon you to give the remarks that you like and go to questions.

The budget that is before us is approximately $9.1 billion related to this subject area. It is very clear in this shrinking world that the sooner we are able to deploy an effective missile defense system in a practical way that the better off we will be, but also we think that the world will be. Let me say that the heart of this hearing today is to talk about the practical side of this. There are those who are asking questions as to why we didn't have one yesterday. There are other people who are suggesting that while we are making very significant progress, that there is technology in early stages that still needs to be very carefully measured before we expend too much money and maybe go too far too fast and have to play catchup. There are questions about how we should deploy these systems over time.

You have proposed national teams to help us with a lot of that analysis. The mix and makeup of all that raises a number of other questions for all of us. But probably most importantly to me, we are within this Subcommittee a group of men and women who have been able over time to develop a fabulous environment of almost nonpartisan work and our purpose is to secure the national defense as well as the peace.

This $380 billion is not just for casting beans out there but rather to get very positive results. The goal, long range, is to deal with a problem I hear about all the time. That is, many of my constituents as well as friends presume that someday out there, 15 or 20 years, we obviously are going to have a confrontation with one of the huge emerging countries in the Far East. It is my view that the reason for the expenditure of these dollars is to make certain (129)

that that absolutely does never have to be the case, because if America continues on the path that we are on, we are by far the strongest force in the world. I think leaders of this shrinking world will determine that maybe there are other avenues besides confrontation to get a share of the economic pie. So that these moneys are expended for purposes of not just our national defense but because we are the force for peace in the world.

That certainly is the heart of what your work is about, General Kadish. We want to welcome you to the Committee again and welcome also your statement. Mr. Murtha?

REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. General, if I remember, you worked with us on the C-17 program and you were the key person that really brought that C-17 program back. They couldn't pick a better person to be in charge of this very complex technologically, forward-looking system than you. You don't say a lot but you get the work done and we appreciate it. If you had been in charge of the C-17 earlier instead of Kelly, I don't remember who Kelly was, Kelly Burke I think it was, who killed the program for the B-1, we would have been better off. But at any rate we have got a good airplane out there and you were the major person responsible for it. We hope you will have the same success with this program.

General KADISH. Thank you, Mr. Murtha.

Mr. LEWIS. General Kadish, your entire statement will be placed in the record and you may proceed as you desire.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL KADISH

General KADISH. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. If I might, I would like to just take a few minutes to highlight some of the key elements of the Missile Defense Program as we see it today and the progress that we have made in my opinion.

RESTRUCTURING OF MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM

As you know, in early 2001 we started restructuring the Missile Defense Program to develop capabilities to defend the United States, our allies and friends, and deployed forces against all ranges of missiles in all phases of flight. With the support of Congress and in particular this Committee, we have made great progress in demonstrating those key technologies that are necessary for that mission. Our testing and our analysis today gives us confidence that the hit-to-kill technologies are actually working as we intended and the initial steps we are proposing to provide this modest initial capability are on track to provide us capability where none exists today. Altogether, we have made great progress. Our testing has been aggressive and productive. Over the past 2 years, we have achieved four for five successful ground-based intercepts against long range targets. We are three for three in our seabased intercepts against medium range targets and we are five for seven with the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor in the test program. During the question period, I might add the wartime performance as we understand Patriot-3 later on. And we are mak

ing steady progress with the Airborne Laser to develop the revolutionary speed of light technologies for missile defense.

There is no question we have had failures. We will in all probability continue to have some failures, but this scorecard has increased our confidence in the technical approaches that we are taking.

Mr. LEWIS. Excuse me, General, I hate to interrupt your comment. I was concerned that we might have to have a motion to close but apparently we are at one level of security, which is secure. Just let me say to the members that while this is not a closed hearing and our staff can remain, unlike a part yesterday-obviously my staff has informed me ahead of time on this. So I won't move the staff out but you are assured and the staff should know that this material discussed today ought to be kept in this room. Jack, I guess you don't have to read that statement I just made. Go ahead.

FIELDING INITIAL CAPABILITIES

General KADISH. Okay, Mr. Chairman. Last December, the President directed the Department of Defense to field an initial set of missile defense capabilities in view of our technical progress and our total lack of missile defenses against intermediate and long range ballistic missiles. Given our fielding approach using the test bed we have been working on and given our testing successes and analysis to date, I believe we are actually ready to take this step. With the President's decision, we now have a basic near-term architecture for a limited system to address a range of missile threats. I want to stress that we have no fixed long-term architecture yet. We will evolve and improve the capability of this block 4 system, as we call it, over time so that what we propose to field initially in the 2004 and 2005 time frame may evolve to look very different even a decade later.

EVOLUTIONARY IMPROVEMENT

The number and type of missile defense assets and their locations and the basing arrangements may be expected to change to make the system more integrated and more capable over time. This is consistent with the approach I have described in previous hearings. We are building and fielding a limited militarily useful capability as soon as they can be made available to us from a technological standpoint. We have said all along that when we do field, we will not field a system that will fully meet our missile defense needs. We will have constraints, limitations and gaps. Let there be no illusions about that. The system we will be fielding initially will have some restraints operationally even. But we went down this road knowing that there would be these types of limitations with a process that is specifically designed to make up for those limitations as soon as practical.

With an evolutionary capability based acquisition approach, we can put capability into the field, we can test it, we can use it, we can get comfortable with it, learn what works and does not work and improve it as soon as we can.

Before the President's decision, the fiscal year 2004 President's budget would have reflected the development of a set of test bed