technologies for improved tracking, weapon guidance, and imaging, and technologies for a space-based, high-power laser. While our S&T activities are not on a critical path for insertion into the BMD system, each one of them is being considered for their block enhancement value. Program Operations Our Program Operations expenses are primarily for government personnel performing management support activities, contractors that assist in performing these activities, and O&M-like costs associated with operations and maintenance at numerous facilities around the country, supplies and equipment, communications and printing, travel and training, and information technology management. Management and Oversight The missile defense program uses an acquisition approach tailored to the unprecedented nature of the technology involved in missile defense. We will continue to work very hard to ensure that the program has adequate management and congressional oversight. There is an improved process in place within the Department that preserves management, technical, and financial oversight by cognizant authorities on the Senior Executive Council and the Missile Defense Support Group. Senior warfighters, including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, have reviewed missile defense objectives and will continue to do so several times a year. Internally we have in place configuration management procedures, and we produce on a regular basis the necessary threat, system, and configuration control documentation to ensure that our activities continue to support our development and fielding objectives. As directed in the 2002 and 2003 Defense Authorization Acts, we have identified cost, schedule, testing, and performance goals and developmental baselines in the President's FY 2004 Budget justification materials and shown clear linkages between the Agency's budget and key performance measures. Closing Mr. Chairman, we are on track with our missile defense program. We know that the technology fundamental to the current generation of missile defenses works. We have demonstrated many times over the past two years that we can collide with a warhead and destroy it. We have the confidence to proceed with plans for an initial defense capability. A few years ago, I could not have said this to the American people. Today I can. We will build confidence in the system over time as we invest in the program. We also recognize that we have much more work to do to improve the BMD system. The architecture we have in 2004 and 2005 will probably be very different a decade later, depending on how our RDT&E efforts proceed. Our objective continues to be one of improving missile defense capability over time. We have made considerable progress in missile defense over the past three years. With the President's direction, and with your approval of our budget request, we will take another important step on that long road before us. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MISSILE DEFENSE THREATS AND CAPABILITIES Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, General Kadish. I might mention that our staff has done some very fine work at developing a variety of mix of questions. We will not be able to get to all of them in this session, I am sure, but we would appreciate your reviewing and submitting for the record responses that we don't deal with otherwise. In the meantime, taking a pathway that is not a part of our script, let me start by asking you to describe the "why." That is, we are talking about multiple billions of dollars over time to build a missile defense system. As you describe the why, would you give the Committee your guesstimate of where the threat, the threats, may lie and describe those threats and capability a bit? In terms of our defense system's eventual deployment, we are talking about deployment on our part from Alaska, Vandenberg, Aegis cruise missile. If you would kind of mix that in in terms of as you respond to why and then why those locations. Other than that General KADISH. That is a tall order, Mr. Chairman, but let me try to lay this out. When we looked at the program in the absence of the ABM Treaty, the why of the way we wanted to build a system became very clear. Without the treaty, we have much more flexibility to address the threat that would come at us and not just attack it in one specific regime of flight. When we looked at this as a mission to attack all ranges of missiles in all phases of flight, our response to that was to build a layered missile defense system that would attack a missile shot at us in the boost phase, possibly many times in the boost phase, in the midcourse phase, possibly many times in the midcourse phase, and eventually in the terminal phase. So that you get very high probabilities of successfully defending against these very difficult targets in a layered defense sys tem. That is actually no different than what we have done in other air defense type systems. When you look at all ranges of threats, the short range threat that we saw in Iraq is proliferated tremendously. There are great numbers out there. But the short range threat, even though it is proliferated, can be handled by some of our systems like Patriot and the systems that we are building in our R&D program. The threat that we face against long range missiles, however, is more problematic. We don't see a lot of the long range missile threat demonstrated today but we certainly see intelligence that indicates that this threat is developing. One of the benefits of having a deployed capability as rudimentary as it might seem that we are proposing in this budget is to act as a deterrent to building and cheapen the investment that potential adversaries might have by building longer range missiles with weapons of mass destruction. So there is a significant, in my opinion, deterrent value in having an operational system of this nature, limited as it might be against longer range missiles. So when you look at the threat and what we were asked to do, the budget submission that we have proceeds against a broad range of technologies and activities to take our testing and test beds, provide initial capability against short, medium and long range missiles and build on that over time by adding the develop ment capability of airborne laser, for instance, THAAD program, and fill in the layers of that layered system over time. That is kind of it in a nutshell, if that helps with the question that you asked. The layered defense is the why. The technologies that we are working on and the budget submitted supports efforts in each one of those regimes of flight. And the early deployment is a capability of defense against a potential long range threat from countries like North Korea, Iran, I don't think we have to worry about Iraq anymore; Libya and those types of threats. Not the Russian threat as we know it today. And then these limited quantities could be adjusted based on what we see the perception of the threat over time as the technologies mature. Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Murtha. NORTH KOREAN THREAT Mr. MURTHA. When you say threat, you are talking about capability? General KADISH. That is correct. Mr. MURTHA. And you have a very narrow pathway to the United States from Korea. In other words, short-term Korea could have the capability if the CIA is accurate, and you will have a layered defense at what time frame against that? General KADISH. We are trying to have an initial capability in the late 2004 calendar year, 2005 time period against long range missiles in the midcourse, against medium range missiles in the midcourse with Aegis cruisers and against short range missiles by using Patriot 3. What we would like to do is fill in a boost phase capability as soon as we can in that mix by the end of the decade. Mr. MURTHA. You assume they are firing from Korea? General KADISH. Mr. MURTHA. What is your best estimate of the range of their capability now, the North Korea capability? General KADISH. THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE (THAAD) Mr. MURTHA. Ten years ago, Secretary Perry thought that the greatest crisis during his tenure was the North Korean buildup and the tension between South and North Korea after the one election. We started to push that. Of course we pushed it to failure, is what it amounted to. Where is THAAD now? General KADISH. The THAAD program in particular? Mr. MURTHA. Yes. General KADISH. The THAAD program we put back into redesign after we did the final two tests, which were successful. Right now we are going to resume flight testing of that system in the late 2004 time frame. The program that we put together to do that redesign is ahead of schedule and under cost. We are doing all the ground testing that our critics pointed out that we didn't do the first time around. We have been fixing the failures we have been having in the ground tests. Actually I am very confident that when we do fly that, the THAAD missile, our first flight test will be very high probability of success for what we are doing right now. Mr. MURTHA. That will be the first line of defense at that point? General KADISH. It will be added to the layering of the defense, because THAAD will work in concert with Patriot as higher up in the altitude in the terminal defense, and then if we have Aegis Standard Missile 3, it will carry the flight and the trajectory to the ascent phase in the midcourse and to even the descent phase in the midcourse and then as we add the airborne laser if we can do that toward the end of the decade, we will have a boost phase capability. So it is a key element in the layering of our defenses. Mr. MURTHA. Where do you deploy it? You have got the Patriots. If you deploy them in Korea, where do you deploy the THAAD? Also in Korea? General KADISH. It is land based so we would lay it down in Korea, South Korea potentially; Japan. Without the treaty now we can actually hook the radars into the system to aid the Aegis, the Standard Missile 3 activity, and that is what we have undergoing with our national team engineering activity is to make sure that we can go beyond interoperability and actually make this an integrated layered defense. So that the THAAD radar can actually be a fire control mechanism for Aegis standard missiles and that Aegis radars can help us with early warning Patriot 3. And in fact in the Gulf War, the most recent PAC-3 performance, Patriot performance actually had the USS Higgins providing early warning cues to the radars and helping in the defense. So we already have some experience with this. It is a key element of the program now without the treaty preventing us from doing this to have the integration of this system to make it layered like I discussed. DEFENSE AGAINST OFFSHORE THREATS Mr. MURTHA. What is the defense against shipping a nuclear device or, say, a device hooked to a Scud missile closer to the shore? Do we have any defense against that at all? General KADISH. Mr. MURTHA. I am impressed the way you are doing things, very reasonable, down the line. You are solving the problems with research before you get into the operational side of it. I appreciate your testimony. General KADISH. Thank you, Mr. Murtha. Mr. Bonilla. MISSILE DEFENSE THREATS Mr. BONILLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, at what point does it become advantageous for the public to know about threats like the one you are talking about in North Korea? Because a lot of times we have to go out, and I am completely supportive as I know members of this Committee are of what you are doing for missile defense in general, but as you know, there are a lot of crackpots out there that are always trying to take a shot at the military and they say, oh, there is no threat and this is a big boondoggle. I think something like this is important for the general public to see so they can-when you start telling them that this is a real solid threat and we have got intelligence that shows that, I am sure that especially in light of what we have been dealing with lately in the Mideast that they would see this as a real threat. |