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tude control switching issue, and improves producibility by reducing the number of welds by 80%, resulting in reducing SDACS lead time from 15 months to 9 months. This approach resolves initial manufacturing concerns that existed with the original "tube" design. In addition, this monolithic design improves structural and thermal margins over the "tube" design.

Development work is still ongoing to finalize the addition of a second high-energy pulse (pulse 2) ultimately planned to be used in terminal mode against some threat types. Previous ground tests have resulted in missed switching during pulse 2, and there is considerable ongoing engineering effort to understand and resolve this issue. When Pulse has been proven operationally in ground testing, it will be flight tested and subsequently introduced as a future change to the SM-3 missile when appropriate. While this design feature is not needed for capability against Block 04 threats, it does provide additional margin against a broader set of ballistic missile threats.

Flight Mission (FM)-5 data analysis is now complete and the cause of the failure is with the SDACS Attitude Control Assembly (ACA), which had a "stuck valve" most likely caused by a cracked diverter ball. Details are described in the following statement, recently released by MDA headquarters.

"Q: Has MDA completed the post-test analysis for FM-5? Have you been able to determine why there was no intercept of the target?

"A: The primary objective of Flight Mission (FM-5) was to characterize the Standard Missile -3 Kinetic Warhead's (KW) guidance, navigation and control operation in space using an upgraded solid divert and attitude control system (SDACS). FM5 was the first flight of the upgraded SDACS.

"The KW ejected normally, stabilized, acquired, and tracked the target, which was then centered in the KW's field of view. Seconds later, a slight increase in SDACS pressure was immediately followed by a large unexpected negative angular yaw acceleration. This negative acceleration was indicative of the Attitude Control Assembly (ACA) yaw valve operating improperly. Basically, the valve was "stuck," resulting in the KW going into a flat spin, causing the loss of the target from its seeker field of view, with resulting loss of target track.

"The SDACS attempted to counter the spin, by commanding the yaw thruster to fire in the opposite direction, but to no avail. The KW spin was confirmed by telemetry and by imagery. The FM-5 investigative team composed of government, industry and laboratory participants examined test data, and we believe that the most likely cause of the anomaly was a failure in the ACA Valve Ball Chamber, possibly due to a cracked diverter ball, which resulted in the KW's flat spin just prior to the planned intercept.

"At this point, we don't know precisely why the ball cracked. We are examining specification tolerances and conducting stress analyses. The Aegis ballistic missile defense program continues to progress, and we plan to conduct FM-6 near the end of this year."

The SDACS, as currently configured, is fully capable of responding to all Block 2004 threats and will not affect the ability of Aegis BMD to deploy its Block 2004 system. Preliminary analysis is showing that even with an SDACS in the "sustain❞ mode the system should be capable of responding to Block 04 threats. This is true, despite the constraints on the SDACS configuration, because the Aegis BMD weapon system has proven that it exceeds expected performance, demonstrating "handover errors" that are much smaller than required, resulting in a much more precise guidance of the missile than specified.

Question. Please describe the program schedule and testing objective for the SM3 missile.

Answer. SM-3 Flight Mission schedule and objectives are outlined in the following chart.

[CLERK'S NOTE.-The Department did not provide this chart.]

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM-LAUNCH FACILITIES

Question. The initial Ballistic Missile Defense System capability will rely on Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) which consists of interceptors located at Ft. Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.

What land-based sites will support the initial capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense System?

Answer. The following land-based sites will support the BMDS' initial defensive capability:

• Fort Greely, Alaska: six silos and interceptors; interceptor communications terminal; GMD Fire Control node

• Vandenberg Air Force Base, California: four silos and interceptors; interceptor communications terminal

• Shemya, Alaska: upgraded Cobra Dane radar; interceptor communications terminal

• Joint National Integration Center (JNIC): GMD Fire Control Node

• Beale Air Force Base, California: Upgraded Early Warning Radar

• Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado: downlink node for Defense Support Program satellites

• Reagan Test Site, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands: Ground-Based RadarPrototype and interceptor communications terminal may participate in defensive operations, depending on the scenario; however, they would be out of range for some

scenarios

Question. How many interceptors will be based at each of these sites in block 2004 and in subsequent blocks of development?

Answer. During BMDS Block 2004, there will be six interceptors located at Fort Greely and four at Vandenberg AFB. In calendar year 2005, by the end of Block 2004, an additional ten interceptors will be added at Fort Greely. Future block configurations are still under consideration.

Question. Is the number of interceptors restricted by the number of launch tubes available at each site?

Answer. The number of interceptors that can be placed in the ground is limited by the number of launch tubes available. Launch tubes can be reused once an interceptor is fired. However, due to funding and time constraints to meet the presidentially directed Initial Defensive Operations (IDO), there are no spares available to replace interceptors that have been used.

Question. Will each launch site contain only one type of booster? If not, why? Answer. In order to achieve the required interceptor fielding rate, it may be necessary to field both booster types at each site, particularly at Ft. Greely. The system is designed to operate this way if necessary.

Question. Is unique launch control hardware required for each different type of booster?

Answer. The present Command Launch Equipment (CLE) hardware can support the OSC booster or the BV+ booster, but not both simultaneously with the present software version.

Question. Do you require military construction funding to prepare the launch sites for the initial deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System? If so, is funding requested in the fiscal year 2004 budget?

Answer. No, military construction funding is not required to prepare Fort Greely and Vandenberg AFB. Funding for development and construction at these facilities is requested under RDT&E PË 0603882C, Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Element.

MDA has requested statutory authority to use RDT&E funding to field initial capabilities, and H.R. 1588 as passed by the Senate includes such authority in the following provision:

SEC. 221. FIELDING OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.

Funds authorized to be appropriated under section 201(4) for the Missile Defense Agency may be used for the development and fielding of an initial set of ballistic missile defense capabilities.

With section 221, military construction funding will not be required.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM-COMMAND AND CONTROL

Question. The Unified Command Plan indicates that all forces within the geographic area of responsibility (AOR) assigned to a combatant commander shall be assigned or attached to and under the command of that combatant commander-unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. The groundbased components of the Ballistic Missile System testbed are located in Alaska and California, within the U.S. Northern Command area of responsibility (AOR).

Do the elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System testbed, located in Alaska and California, presently fall under command and control of the Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Northern Command or another combatant commander(s)?

Answer. The Missile Defense Agency is not a military unit and does not exercise the command authorities of combatant_command, operational control, or tactical control. The Ballistic Missile Defense System testbed is being developed by the MDA; command and control functions will be performed by the supported combatant commander. The exact command relationships are still being worked by the Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders.

Question. Does the Unified Command Plan require a specific decision by the President or the Secretary of Defense to assign the assets of the testbed from the Missile Defense Agency to U.S. Northern Command or another combatant commander?

Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been directed to make available the ballistic missile defense capabilities of the testbed for combatant commanders beginning in 2004. Ballistic missile defense will be executed like all other military operations-under authority of the President and Secretary of Defense, through the combatant commands. Testbed elements will remain MDA assets and capabilities will be made available to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), the supported commander for missile defense, for further use by other combatant commanders as the situation dictates.

Question. Is such a decision being considered in the case of the initial operating capability provided by the Ballistic Missile Defense System testbed?

Answer. The initial operating capabilities of the testbed have been directed to be deployed for operational use beginning in 2004. Specifics are not currently available, but once they are, the Joint Staff would be the most appropriate organization to answer this question.

Question. What is the chain of command that the Missile Defense Agency and the combatant commander will rely on to determine whether to respond to an apparent attack?

Answer. Ballistic missile defense will be executed like all other military operations-under authority of the President and Secretary of Defense, through the combatant commands. Detailed questions on the military chain of command and how the orders to assign/attach the assets of the testbed to a combatant commander should be addressed to the Joint Staff.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM-ACQUISITION STRATEGY

Question. Unlike most other major acquisition programs, the initial capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense System does not have a fixed system architecture, and does not have an operational requirements document (ORD). Also, within the Department of Defense the philosophy for developing the system is that no single system integrator has the expertise to bring together all the technologies needed to develop and integrated a missile defense system. Therefore, the Missile Defense Agency has established a National Team approach for System Engineering, and Battle Management and Command and Control. The concept is similar to the Lead System Integrator (LSI) approach used by the Army to develop the Future Combat System. Please explain the National Team model employed by the Missile Defense Agency to develop missile defense technologies.

Answer. Prior to fiscal year 2003, Missile Defense consisted of a collection of individual programs (e.g., Ground-based missile defense (GMD), Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), PATRIOT, Airborne laser (ABL), etc.). With submittal of the fiscal year 2002 Amended Budget, the Secretary of Defense directed the Missile Defense Agency to create a single, fully integrated Major Defense Acquisition Program with the mission of defeating a wide range of missile threats, from boost to terminal phases of flight. This program was also to be capability-vice requirementsbased. In other words, the program would increase in capability over time as new concepts and ways of integrating and using elements and components were developed.

The Missile Defense National Team is the concept determined to be the most appropriate vehicle for obtaining the best and brightest people from industry, Government support contractors, and Government to provide the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)-level systems engineering and command, control, battle management, and communications expertise to create this single integrated, capabilitybased, program. The Missile Defense National Team has two parts: the MDNT (Systems) and the MDNT (Battle Management Command and Control). While Element Programs continue to have systems engineering functions for their specific mission, the MDNTS has systems engineering responsibility for the entire BMDS mission. The MDNTB has the responsibility for the C2BMC element of the BMDS which integrates all of the sensor and weapons elements into a single BMDS.

Question. The Missile Defense Agency has adopted an evolutionary development strategy that organizes its programs into a series of blocks with each subsequent block representing a new increment of "militarily useful technology". This process begins with block 2004. Please define for the Committee the capabilities in block 2004 and any other blocks funded in the fiscal year 2004 budget request.

Answer. The fiscal year 2004 budget requests funds for Blocks 2004, 2006 and 2008. Only Block 2004 has been defined in specific capabilities. Blocks 2006 and

2008 are defined in terms of estimated capabilities based on projected technical maturity and expected threat environments.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) evolutionary development in Block 2004 is focused on four major capability areas:

• Ground-based defense versus long-range threats

• Sea-based defense versus short/medium-range threats

• Air-based boost kill demonstration

• Forward-based tracking sensors

Technologies supporting each of these capability areas constitute the "militarily useful technology" from which incremental development of new capabilities will continue through Blocks 2006 and 2008.

Major capabilities areas for Block 2006 and 2008 are identified in both the classified and unclassified MDA Statement of Goals (SOG), which identifies and specifies key goals and objectives for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

Block 2006 will build on militarily useful technologies from Block 2004 that provide capabilities for:

• Ground-based defense versus short/medium-range threats

• Netted, forward-based tracking and discrimination sensors (ground, sea) • Space-based tracking sensors

• Advanced C2BM and discrimination software

Block 2008 continues evolutionary development of capabilities in the areas of: • Ground-, sea-, and air-based boost kill versus long-range threats

• Sea-based sensors/weapon advances against short-, medium-, long-range threats

• Advanced sensor fusion and discrimination software

Question. Each block is intended to present a "militarily useful" capability. How do you define that term? Does it indicate an increase in the quantity or quality of assets, or both? Please explain.

Answer. Military Utility is the term used to describe the possession of a “militarily useful" capability. Military Utility is the military worth of a system performing its mission in a competitive environment, including versatility (or potential) of the system. It is measured against the operational concept, operational effectiveness, safety, security, and cost/worth. Military utility estimates form a rational basis for making management decisions. Military utility can be applied to an increase in quantity of assets as measured against the operational concept and successful accomplishment of the mission, Military utility can also be applied to an increase in quality of assets as measured against operational effectiveness in the ability to accomplish the mission reliably and safely. When taken in the context of a particular block, an increase in military utility can be based on: an increase in the quantity of assets, improved performance of an asset(s), or a combination of quantity and quality.

Question. The Committee understands that the Missile Defense Agency has chosen not to develop an operational requirements document (ORD) for the initial BMDS capability. Why?

Answer. In January 2002, the Department made the decision to cancel the ORDS that were in effect for the different missile defense programs as part of the creation of the combined Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) program.

The traditional development process started with specific military requirements generated by the user and became formalized in the Operational Requirements Document, or ŎRD. This traditional ORD approach has generally served the Department well, especially in procurements involving well-known technologies, proven systems, sizeable production runs, and established operational experience. However, these conditions do not exist in missile defense.

For us, the strengths of the traditional requirements generation process can also be its weaknesses. It is rigorous, but that very rigor translates into a lack of the flexibility needed to deal with unprecedented technology development and uncertainty with the threats. Requirements defined in ORDs are typically set many years before actual system deployment, and can often lead to less than optimum capability against a threat that exceeds the description specified earlier. Furthermore, at the moment, we do not yet know all the technical approaches that will work best. A capability-based approach allows us to adjust to those changes in ways that the traditional requirement-based approach does not.

Although capability-based acquisition changes the approach for determining a project's baseline, once those baselines are set the development process continues normally down to the contract level. So there is accountability in terms of end product.

In summary, capability-based acquisition is a flexible approach to the acquisition of complex systems, incorporating advanced technologies, that permits the early de

ployment of a limited but effective capability that can be progressively enhanced over time as needed. It provides for continuous warfighter involvement and disciplined development aimed at reducing cycle time. It stays relevant to the threat and remains technologically current. That is our vision for the capability-based approach and also how we intend to execute it. This structure supports our capabilitybased approach by allowing necessary flexibility for the development of the program, while retaining the equally important structure to guide development efforts.

Question. How does the lack of an ORD effect the testing requirements to support developing the BMDS?

Answer. The lack of an ORD does not affect BMDS testing requirements.

The development and acquisition of the BMDS follows a different approach than traditional acquisition programs. MDA is developing the BMDS using an evolutionary acquisition approach, which leverages incremental development, to adapt to changing threats and maturing technologies. This allows MDA to build a capability to defend against threat capabilities instead of specific point solutions that might be easily defeated or become out of date with warfighter needs. The ORD-based requirements process became too slow and cumbersome to respond to changes in the threat and technological innovations available for solutions. Capability-based planning allows MDA to field an effective initial defense and then upgrade this rudimentary but effective capability over time.

It is important to remember that the lack of an ORD does not mean a lack of documented needs. BMDS components will continue to undergo rigorous testing, and will be subject to annual assessment by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). This assessment, which will be reported to Congress, will include the Department's operational assessments of system suitability and system effectiveness at each Block decision point beginning with Block 04. Over time, the missile defense system will undergo increasingly stressing testing and results will be used to improve the initial capabilities that President Bush directed MDA to field.

AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM

Question. The Airborne Laser (ABL) program integrates a laser onto a 747 aircraft to shoot down ballistic missiles during the boost phase. The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes $610 million for this effort. A lethal shootdown test is scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year 2005.

Please describe the laser system including the number and weight of the laser modules, and the total weight of the laser.

Answer. The High Energy Laser (HEL) system is located in the rear two-thirds of the YAL-1A aircraft. The system consists of six Chemical Oxygen-Iodine Laser (COIL) modules, which together produce a megawatt-class beam. The COIL works by combining, in different stages of its operation, basic hydrogen peroxide (BHP), chlorine, and iodine. Each COIL module is made up of around 3,600 parts and is approximately eighteen feet tall. Loaded with BHP, each module weighs about 6,500 pounds. However, with the supporting equipment, including tanks and plumbing, reactant chemicals, refrigeration and heating systems, optical system, and support structure, the entire HEL system weighs about 100,000 pounds.

Question. When is the first planned test of the laser modules? Does this test include the full complement of laser modules-equal to the amount planned for a fully functional weapon system? If not, when is the first planned test of the full complement of lasers?

Answer. The first COIL module intended for actual installation on YAL-IA was tested at TRW's Capistrano Test Site late in 2001 and early in 2002. In its final tests in January 2002, it produced 118% of required power. That laser module has been "cloned" five times and together these six modules will make up the HEL grouping on YAL-IA. The first test of all six laser modules operating at the same time called "first light"-is now anticipated to take place later this year. These six modules will comprise the weapon system that will be used in the missile shootdown now scheduled for FY05.

Question. The Committee understands that the aircraft requires extensive modifications to cope with the weight of the laser system. Please describe these modifications and their associated costs.

Answer. The primary purpose of the extensive aircraft modifications was not due to the weight of the laser as much as it was to physically attaching the laser, the turret, the optical benches and all the associated subsystems to the structure of the aircraft. The modification consisted of over 22,000 new parts with an estimate at completion on the order of $225 million.

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